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 This dissertation is about men’s guestrooms (sing. diwaniyya; pl. diwaniyyat or 
dawawin) in Kuwait and their place in the nation’s unique welfare compact with its 
citizens.  The central question guiding this research is unambiguous:  Why do Kuwaiti 
men visit the dawawin?  The answer, it is argued, lies in the nature of the distributive 
rentier arrangement in contemporary Kuwait that has allowed for the unprecedented 
expansion and utilization of these guestrooms.  It is the position of this study that the 
creation of an inflated, underperforming bureaucracy tied to an intricate system of 
patronage and brokerage extending downward throughout the state from the ruling Al 
Sabah dynasty has created the conditions wherein actors must provide their own inroads 
if they are to tap into the government’s vast resources.  However, given the opaqueness 
of the Kuwait state system, the personalization of offices and institutions, and the 
imbalanced distribution of oil rents throughout the community, knowledge of precisely 
who to contact for what ends has become a regular nightly activity.  Coupled with the 
benefits of luxury employment and subsidies that have bolstered discretionary incomes, 
hosting and visiting to foster and reinforce ties to governmental largess has become 
institutionalized in ways that have transformed these customary male guestrooms into 
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 This dissertation is about men’s guestrooms (sing. diwaniyya; pl. diwaniyyat or 
dawawin) in Kuwait and their place in the nation’s unique welfare compact with its 
citizens.  The central question guiding this research is unambiguous:  Why do Kuwaiti 
men visit the dawawin?  My motivations for this study were driven by two principal 
matters.  First, I wanted to delve deeper into the themes of male guesthouses, guestrooms 
and reception rooms; all institutions that sporadically appear in Middle East 
ethnographies1 but rarely have they ever been the focal point of ethnographic research 
about the region.2  So, I wanted to depart from the practice of adding such an 
establishment as a side note to a wider project and instead explore how the rites of 
guestroom socialization could stand at the forefront of a study about social, political and 
economic life in the Middle East.  Second, there was my decision to concentrate my 
efforts on Kuwait and the visitation routines of Kuwaiti men.  Part of the reasoning for 
this was purely serendipitous; I traveled to Kuwait in 2003 with the National Council on 
U.S. – Arab Relations (NCUSAR) and was afforded the chance to visit a diwaniyya.  
When I returned home and started looking for more information about Kuwait’s dawawin 
I realized that not only were these parlors virtually absent from the anthropological 
literature but that Kuwait itself was grossly underrepresented; dual deficiencies that I 
                                                
1 A few examples include Antoun (1972, 1979, 1997), Bujra (1971), Fernea (1970), and Slyomovics 
(1998). 
2 Richard Antoun’s enlightening account of conflict resolution in a Jordanian guestroom (2000) is a 
noteworthy exception. 
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wanted to address that would still allow for a guestroom, in this case the Kuwaiti 
diwaniyya, to be the centerpiece of my research agenda. 
 I spent 18 months collecting data in Kuwait between 2006 and 2010.  With the 
exception of a six week pilot study in June and July of 2006 to gauge the feasibility of 
this project, my research calendar revolved around the fall, winter and spring months.  
This schedule was necessary because, as I noticed in the summer when I was trying to 
ascertain the best way to pursue a guestroom-focused venture, many Kuwaitis avoid the 
oppressive hot months by vacationing abroad.  Expectedly, such a period when large 
numbers of Kuwaitis are traveling in and out of the country means that guestroom habits 
are going to suffer; attendance by hosts and guests is irregular, some diwaniyyat are open 
but devoid of any visitors, and other parlors only seem to act as temporary stopovers for 
callers busily searching for their usual cohorts.  Also, the National Assembly is normally 
in recess for part of the summer and its absence tends to invite a lull to creep into some of 
the politically-oriented dawawin.3  Therefore, to ensure the availability of participants 
and maximize the accessibility of fully-operational guestrooms, my research was 
conducted at intervals from October to May. 
 While in Kuwait, I sought lodging accommodations with non-Kuwaitis; that is, 
with expatriate workers.  Financially, this was the most sensible solution to Kuwait’s 
high-priced housing market for a lone male4 with a limited budget and without any real 
need for more than a single room.  Additionally, this circumvented any of the contracts, 
deposits, or associated set-up fees that are standard rental requirements.  There was, 
though, a more significant factor in my choice to live with foreigners and that is the fact 
                                                
3 Of course, this tendency is reversed if special elections are being held in the summer. 
4 Many apartment managers will not lease to an unmarried adult without a family. 
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that the people who are actually soliciting roommates online or in local circulars are not 
Kuwaitis.  The likely explanation for this is that Kuwaitis do not have the same fiscal 
pressures that compel expatriates to subsidize their housing by boarding strangers.5  
Regardless of the grounds for this disparity, I was relieved to share apartments during my 
different stays in Kuwait with an assortment of Indian families, Indian and Pakistani 
bachelors, and an Irishman.  Although this was a convenient answer to my housing woes, 
it also brought me face-to-face with how expatriates deal with their lives in the country – 
something that would otherwise have been sorely missed in the Kuwaiti-centric social 
world I was building for myself.6  However, living with expatriates in districts dominated 
by apartment blocks intended for foreigners had an extra advantage that I did not 
appreciate until a short stay of a few nights in a Kuwaiti household located in a Kuwaiti 
suburb:7  the abundance of taxis.  Because personal vehicles are the preferred mode of 
transportation in Kuwaiti neighborhoods, it makes it difficult to find a cab without 
resorting to an expensive pick-up service.  Needless to say, this logistical hang-up alone 
made it worth my while to reside in a taxi-infested expatriate quarter of Kuwait City. 
Initially, my fieldwork began when I arranged to meet with five contacts in 
Kuwait; one was a host during my first brief visit to the country in 2003 with NCUSAR, 
another was Yagoub Al-Kandari at Kuwait University who I reached out to after reading 
his book, Al diwaniyya al kuwaitiyah, and three others were recommended to me by an 
acquaintance who also happened to be their professor.  After preliminary discussions 
                                                
5 Nevertheless, in 2008 the Committee to Remove Irregularities on Public Property circulated flyers 
showing Kuwaiti homes with illegal shacks, used to house foreign workers, which encroached onto state 
lands, but this hardly qualifies as a roommate arrangement. 
6 It is odd that as a foreigner I neglected the “expatriate experience” in Kuwait. 
7 While Crystal notes that the government segregated citizen – noncitizen residential areas beginning in the 
1950s (1995b:79), Longva argues that today’s divisions are increasingly due to socio-economic factors 
(1997:37-38). 
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with each of these individuals about my interests in discovering as much as possible 
about Kuwait’s guestrooms, a purposefully broad objective given the scarcity of 
published research on these institutions, I asked for any referrals that they thought might 
be able to help me put together a candid portrait of the nation’s diwaniyyat.8  Fortunately, 
these early relationships yielded far more links than I could have anticipated and I was 
quickly inundated with enough primary, secondary, and extended networks (Boissevain 
1974:47-48) to allow me to begin gathering information.  All of my data were collected 
by way of interviews and, within the short time of a few days following my arrival in 
Kuwait, direct participant-observation in the men’s guestrooms.  I used a combination of 
Arabic and English for all parts of this project.  With interviewees, I left the choice of 
language to the discretion of participants, but most of those who took part had advanced 
English skills and oftentimes our talks merged elements of both Arabic and English.  
However, business in the guestrooms was carried out in Arabic, which I translated as 
much as I could hear into English in my notebooks, even though many of my own 
personal conversations in the dawawin were in English. 
 The formal, scheduled interviews9 for this project were conducted in a semi-
structured, open-ended fashion with 58 participants (49 of these sessions were with 
Kuwaiti men, six Kuwaiti women, and three expatriate males).  I chose this approach 
because my research goal was exploratory and, ultimately, inductive; I wanted 
interviewees to have the opportunity to express and freely expand upon their experiences 
and opinions about the diwaniyyat with minimal direction or bias on my part.  This was 
                                                
8 As this indicates, all participants for this study were selected by word-of-mouth, or snowball, sampling. 
9 I preferred to have participants choose meeting places where they would be comfortable.  These locations 
varied but included homes, offices, Western coffee shops like Starbucks or the Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, 
restaurants, diwaniyyat, or gahwa (literally “coffee” but used to refer to a men’s shisha café). 
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critical at the outset because my own thoughts on the subject were too speculative and 
based almost entirely on decades-old studies executed in poor, rural environs that could 
not be more different than 21st century Kuwait City.  Sample questions from this stage of 
interviews were mixtures and / or variations along the lines of: 
• “Can you talk to me about the diwaniyyat?” 
• “Do you visit a diwaniyya?” 
• “Will you tell me about your diwaniyya?” 
• “Why would a man host / visit a diwaniyya?” 
Then, from these general queries a rolling dialogue usually developed that gave me a 
chance to explore respondents’ specific answers by prompting them to tell me more about 
what was just said.  However, some of the Kuwaitis with whom I met did not need any 
encouragement from me and it was obvious that they had already formulated what they 
intended to share ahead of time.  Occasionally, though, my attempts to persuade someone 
to stray from his predetermined script or my incessant probing about a topic brought up 
in the course of an interview, like internal family squabbles, were instantly rebuffed with 
the caution that, “We should not be talking about this.”10  I always respected these 
warnings by switching to more amiable concerns.11 
 Later, once I had a better basis for understanding the guestrooms I refined my 
interview protocols to incorporate a pattern that kept emerging from the transcripts:  
social connections (wasta) and the necessity of generating contacts through hosting and 
                                                
10 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 6, 2006. 
11 Over time this became less of an issue due to a couple of reasons.  The most evident is that the long-term 
relationships that were created between me and many of my confidants led to a degree of familiarity as well 
as trust about my promises of strict confidentiality.  Also, when I was frequently cross-examined by anyone 
who knew by his own references who I had been talking to, my refusal to divulge anything was an 
important credential for follow-up interviews. 
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visiting.  Still, I did not deviate far from the aforementioned baseline questions about the 
diwaniyyat with new interviewees even after I narrowed my focus; instead, I made sure to 
ask for more details about wasta whenever it arose along with any personal, secondhand, 
or hypothetical scenarios that might serve to illustrate the points at which guestrooms and 
advantageous networks intersect.  For the veteran participants who agreed to meet with 
me again,12 I typically framed our subsequent conversations around revisiting some of 
their previous remarks that I had not pursued too deeply before, particularly any prior 
references made about diwaniyya networking.  The questions below, although by no 
means complete, do provide a sense of how I began giving wasta increased attention 
when it came up:  
• “What do you mean when you speak about wasta?” 
• “Why would someone need wasta?” 
• “Do you know people who visit the diwaniyyat for wasta?” 
• “Is there wasta in the diwaniyyat?” 
Yet, unlike my earlier, imprecise inquiries about guestrooms and the rituals of male 
hospitality in Kuwait, when my unawareness as an outsider seemed to have been 
anticipated by locals, the inclusion of wasta into the equation created quite a different 
reaction during interviews.  Gradually, it became apparent to me that there was such an 
assumed obviousness attached to wasta and its utility in Kuwait that my desires to have 
                                                
12 There were 16 participants who agreed to meet for repeat formal interviews.  Not included in this number 
are 10 one-time interviewees that I saw and visited with regularly once I was sitting in guestrooms, and 
even though I recorded our later talks, it was more relaxed.  From the 26 participants with whom I had 
recurring interactions, 14 became my closest confidants and they helped me with translations, rumors, 
gossip, and locating sources and materials.  With the other 32 interviewees, some were uninterested in 
working with me further and others simply ignored my phone calls.  I can only assume that in these cases I 
failed to establish a strong enough rapport and that meeting with me fulfilled the obligation to whoever it 
was that put us in touch originally.  However, I must admit that I was also responsible for discontinuing a 
few associations that were at odds with my personality. 
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people itemize their own encounters with it in the diwaniyyat were met with skepticism:  
How could I not comprehend something so basic and why should anyone even care about 
it in the first place?13  Yet, it was this very ordinary, habitual nature of Kuwait’s 
guestroom – wasta interactions that I found so extraordinary; that they were so integrated 
into the daily consciousness of life in the city-state that they had become routine. 
 Nonetheless, while the interview sessions proved to be an effective primer on 
many aspects of diwaniyya culture, I knew that my project, along with any semblances of 
ethnographic authenticity, rested on my ability to successfully get into a guestroom.14  I 
had prepared myself, not knowing what to expect or how people would react to my 
research, for the possibility that I might have to cold call guestrooms by actively 
searching for Kuwaiti men gathering in the vicinity of any house with a placard marked 
“diwaniyya” or “diwan.”15  Luckily, I never had to resort to this measure because on my 
third day in Kuwait, a female interviewee offered to have her brother take me along on 
one of his evening rounds of visiting.  That first night out, I followed my guide’s lead – 
everyone in the parlor rose from their seats for a handshake when we entered and, starting 
on our right and moving counterclockwise, we exchanged greetings with each person 
present16 – and mimicked his mannerisms.17  On this same outing, I received more 
                                                
13 I answered more versions of this question than any other about my fieldwork.  My truthful answer, that I 
found wasta and diwaniyyat to be fascinating, often elicited disbelief or the kind of sympathetic looks 
reserved for someone who should know better. 
14 This does not mean that the formal interviews ended with my participant-observation in guestrooms; 
rather, my days were devoted to interviews or tracking leads while my nights were reserved for diwaniyya 
activities. 
15 Theoretically, this is feasible according to the tenets of hospitality but socially it is disfavored.  As one 
Kuwaiti man summed up this idea, “The diwaniyya has an open door but in fact it is closed.  Nobody can 
get in unless he is a member.  A stranger can enter but he will feel uncomfortable.”  Ahmad.  Interview 
conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on April 8, 2007. 
16 As I learned, this is the fairly standard way that visitors, regular or special, are greeted when entering a 
diwaniyya.  In informal guestrooms, or when a guest is late or he is a longtime participant, a collective as-
salam alaikum (peace be unto you) may be given upon entry to the entire room, thereby bypassing the 
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invitations to guestrooms, and when combined with similar opportunities that stemmed 
from further interviews, the participant-observation phase of my study was rapidly taking 
shape. 
 It did not take long, however, before I was faced with the problem of defining 
exactly what constituted a diwaniyya.  Because nearly every Kuwaiti house has a parlor 
(Al-Naser 2001:11)18 and Kuwaiti men are often getting together inside of them to 
socialize, does every game of cards or late night chat within a diwaniyya room 
necessarily represent that a diwaniyya is meeting?  This quandary initially arose as a 
practical matter after one too many nighttime visitations to guestrooms that doubled as 
occasional lairs for card players, hashish smokers, and video gamers.  Even though my 
contacts promised me diwaniyyat, and they may have sincerely believed that such cases 
were sound exemplars of institutional variations, these trips proved taxing because they 
did not pass what became my own personal benchmark for a guestroom:  Do those 
present recognize their assembly to be a diwaniyya?  If not, then I could not classify such 
a group of men as partaking in diwaniyya socializing since they were not making that 
                                                                                                                                            
individual salutations; although once seated, a nod, wave or spoken masa’a al khair (good evening) might 
be given to friends or relatives.  
17 Some of these customary behaviors can be shaking the shared coffee cup three times when finished, or 
touching noses with someone close (this is viewed locally as a tribal tradition), or saying fi m’allah (in 
God’s protection) to those in the room when departing.  The real novelty for me was interacting with the 
ever-present Indian domestic servants who tend to all of the guests’ needs. 
18 Even though it is impossible to accurately calculate the number of dawawin in Kuwait City, there are two 
resources that hint at the sum.  The directory, Diwaniyya; The dawawin and diwaniyyat in the State of 
Kuwait (diwaniyya; al dawawin wa al diwaniyyat fi dawlat al kuwayt), has been issued annually during 
Ramadan since 2003 by Delta Group Publishing.  It lists diwaniyyat by districts in each of Kuwait’s six 
governorates.  In the 2005 edition, there were 3,522 dawawin cataloged.  For each entry, the formal name 
of the guestroom is provided, its moniker, an address, the day and time it meets, and a telephone number.  
Another source that can be turned to for guestroom figures is the office of Saud Al-Khatrash, the general 
coordinator charged with removing dawawin built illegally on public land.  Between 2008 and 2010, in the 
document, “Total Number of Removals of Unlicensed Structures,” Al-Khatrash’s office estimates that 
13,000 diwaniyyat were torn down (This record was faxed to the author by the office of Saud Al-Khatrash 
on November 28, 2010). 
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designation for themselves.19  Moreover, these impromptu mixers lacked my second set 
of criteria, which was founded on what all interviewees who were asked insisted was 
fundamental for a guestroom to be a diwaniyya: it must have a host who convenes it in a 
regular place on the same day and at the same time each week.20  Jointly, these guidelines 
served as the filters through which I prioritized my evenings’ agendas and they are the 
nominal qualifications that I used to select whether or not a congregation of Kuwaiti 
males signified a diwaniyya. 
 By the time that I had called on a dozen or so guestrooms, and I had begun to 
make repeat visits to a few that were especially receptive to my presence, I altered my 
approach and changed from being a one-off guest to a regular visitor.  There were several 
reasons for this adjustment.  Primarily, I wanted to take part in, and observe, the weekly 
life cycles of the diwaniyyat across the seasons; over holidays like Ramadan or ‘ashura, 
during major and minor elections, or when members were confronted with their own 
series of in-house bliss and turmoil.  Furthermore, although I recorded some wonderful 
biographical features about the guestrooms that I visited just once,21 I was also always 
alert to the reality that much of what was put before me was incredibly stage-managed, 
for the sake of decorum, and almost exclusively centered on me since I was the 
unfamiliar curiosity in the room.  To try to move past this, while not totally abandoning 
new diwaniyyat options, I reserved certain nights of the week for recurring visits to three 
guestrooms, each with its own public mission statement:  family, political, and public 
                                                
19 As stated, this was my decision for categorizing Kuwaiti guestrooms and there is certainly an argument 
to be made about the extent to which a group’s dynamics can be understood by those internal or external to 
it. 
20 I was given some other generalities about guestrooms, such as rules prohibiting immoral or illegal 
activities within their walls, but such notions tended to reflect individual ideals since there was little 
agreement about these proscriptions.  Besides, I witnessed quite a few conversations in guestrooms that 
challenged many moral and legal boundaries. 
21 There were a total of 19 diwaniyyat that I visited only one time. 
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activism;22 and each playing host every week to between 15 and 30 men. 23  While I could 
never erase my status as a stranger within these meetings, by slowly becoming a fixture 
to these groups my attendance was normalized to an extent that I could interact with 
everyone without any of the fanfare that characterized my original visitations.  For me, 
this meant that I could watch and listen-in to all that was occurring around me, or I could 
sit with someone for a spontaneous interview24 or request clarification about what was 
happening, or I could huddle with a cluster of men and engage in whatever subject 
concerned them at that moment. 
The product of these interviews, observations and “participant living” (Longva 
1997:15) in the nightlife culture of Kuwait’s men’s guestrooms is a narrative that 
expands the range of rentier thought by examining it through the prism of everyday 
practices.  In the earliest days of this project, I simply wanted to know why Kuwaiti men 
choose to spend their evening hours engaged in such spirited socializing in the dawawin.  
Frankly, I diverged very little from this straightforward research schematic, even after I 
had become quite familiar with Kuwait and its men’s parlors, because the data that I was 
getting was fairly consistent across participants:  men can visit guestrooms for a variety 
of reasons, but the need to foster social connections is almost always a factor.  
Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of men’s diwaniyya networks did not tell me 
about the utility of these interactions until I specifically asked about the uses of wasta, 
and only then did the state’s role come into full view.   From this point on, I concentrated 
                                                
22 By public mission statements, I am referring to the reasons that these guestrooms’ proprietors gave for 
hosting their diwaniyyat. 
23 This gave me an opportunity to work with 45 to 90 men each week.  When I had an evening without 
anything scheduled I usually dropped by a card-playing diwaniyya for entertainment and light chatter. 
24 To my surprise, many guests approached to talk to me about the guestrooms, or a specific diwaniyya, 
after watching me visit for many weeks.  Some of these led to outside confidential interviews about a 
diwaniyya where we were guests. 
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on how the dawawin can be used by supplicants to facilitate bureaucratic partiality and 
preferential treatments.  I stress that this is solely my own application of the data that so 
many Kuwaitis provided for my benefit but I cannot say if any of them would endorse my 
interpretation of their experiences.  Also, there is the distinct probability that I have used 
someone’s words or actions in a context that was either unforeseen or that might be found 
unfavorable.  Consequently, I have elected to use pseudonyms for both participants25 and 
guestrooms, and I have tried to omit any identifiers that could expose a source.  I do, 
however, hope that I have not mishandled any of the knowledge that was so graciously 
shared with me in Kuwait. 
 It is incredibly humbling to think about all of the people who have made this 
research possible and to realize how indebted I am to their contributions.  Without the 
insight, support, and encouragement that countless individuals provided at each and every 
juncture of this project, it is doubtful as to whether this undertaking could ever have 
reached its final form.  At the same time, there is a great sense of reward in knowing that 
so many people saw some merit in this study, at least enough to warrant the help on 
which I relied so heavily, and it is my sincere hope that this research will not fall too 
short of their expectations. 
 To my family, I have to first extend my deepest gratitude for always being the 
enduring and everlasting champions of all of my efforts.  Not only did they tolerate my 
repeated absences overseas, their good humor was a welcome respite to some of the 
frustrations that I faced as I tried to bring my protracted inquiry on Kuwait’s guestrooms 
to its conclusion.  Undeniably, I am perhaps most grateful for my family’s openness to 
                                                
25 I did not record the names of participants who requested anonymity nor did I provide them with an alias; 
they appear in the text simply as “anonymous.” 
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learning about another culture and for their willingness simply to listen to me; in this 
regard it is hardly an exaggeration to say that they know more about how I experienced 
Kuwait than I will ever be able to express through my research. 
 I also owe my committee an incredible amount of personal appreciation for all of 
their guidance throughout this process.  Here, I want to fully thank Laurence Loeb for 
serving as chair of my committee, commend Polly Wiessner for tirelessly laboring to help 
me elevate the standards of my work, and recognize all of the members for the invaluable 
insights that they imparted to me:  Peter Sluglett, Stephen Beckerman, Steve Ott, and 
Leslie Ann Knapp.  It is not easy to articulate exactly how much their generous supplies 
of wisdom, enthusiasm, and patience have meant to me but I cannot envision a more 
fruitful intellectual atmosphere.  It was honestly a privilege for me to have enjoyed the 
breadth of their knowledge. 
  Of course, no ethnographic study is even conceivable without the charitable 
involvement of its participants.  In my case, I can confidently state that at some moments 
I felt as if the whole country of Kuwait had opened its arms to me with what was nothing 
short of legendary hospitality.  At every turn I found that my constant questions were 
tolerated, my ignorance was never ridiculed, and all of my misunderstandings were 
remedied with the utmost grace.  Today, I am fortunate that I can count many of those I 
met during my fieldwork as friends and family.  Thus, it is with a good deal of regret that 
I have chosen not to reveal these close confidants in any way so that I might preserve our 
confidentiality. 
 Still, it would be careless of me not to mention at least some of those in Kuwait 
who selflessly gave their time and assistance to me through the years.  At Kuwait 
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University, Fahad Al Naser, Muhammad Al Hussien, and Yacoup Al Kandari of the 
Department of Sociology and Social Work always kept their doors ajar and their phones 
turned on whenever I called, giving me a local academic and institutional base to rely 
upon when I was abroad.  Also, there is Youssef Abdul-Moati, who was kind enough to 
allow me to access the remarkable library at the Center for Research and Studies on 
Kuwait.  Each trip to Kuwait required accommodations and I feel obliged to give credit to 
a few of the expatriates I lived with who showed me the non-Kuwaiti side of life in the 
country:  Cyril, Stephen, Tyron, and Declan.  
 Financial support for this project was provided by a number of sources.  While at 
the University of Utah, I received two Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) 
Fellowships for fieldwork through the Middle East Center; the Barbara & Norman 
Tanner Center Graduate Fellowship for the Prevention of Violence; the College of Social 
and Behavioral Science Giles W. and Elise G. Mead Foundation Endowed Scholarship in 
Honor of Professor Charles Hughes; and the Middle East Center Khosrow Mostofi 
Fellowship.  My last research excursion to Kuwait was funded by the Kuwait Program at 
the Chaire Moyen Orient Mediterrannee at the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) 
in Paris.  However, this does not imply the endorsement of these entities for the analyses, 
arguments, and findings presented within this text and any errors are solely my own. 
 There were two opportunities afforded to me by separate institutions that deserve 
particular recognition because both were responsible for introducing me to the wider 
community of scholars specializing in Persian Gulf studies.  The Gulf Research Unit at 
the University of Oslo hosted me for a symposium and pre-Middle East Studies 
Association (MESA) brainstorming session for our shared conference panel.  I distinctly 
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recall that it was during these several intensive days spent in Norway with Bjørn Olav 
Utvik, Jon Nordenson, and fellow guest Michael Herb that the disparate pieces of my 
research initially began to crystallize into a coherent narrative.  On the other side of the 
world, I have to thank the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore 
for bringing me in to present a condensed version of my study at their international 
meeting on the Gulf.  To have this many area specialists in one place at one time was 
truly a resource when it happened to be precisely at the very moment I was trying to 
collect feedback on my polished report. 
 Lastly, I must acknowledge the incalculable aid that Linda Morgan, Sandra 
McCarthy, and Ursula Hanly each made available to me just about anytime that I asked 
for it.  Together, these three women have almost magical talents when it comes to making 
sure that the necessary forms get signed by the right people and delivered to the 
appropriate desks.  Their collective expertise in all matters concerning university 
protocols and regulations is such that I never once lost sleep or agonized over any task 
with which they had been entrusted; I always knew that my questions would be 






















Rare are the nights in the small Persian Gulf nation of Kuwait when the roads are 
not packed with carloads of men on their way to a diwaniyya (pl. diwaniyyat or 
dawawin).  Located at the junctures between domesticity and outside sociability 
(Tetreault 2001:206), local historian Khalid Al Mukames defined the Kuwaiti diwaniyya 
as “a place separate from the main household specifically for men… [it] is a club 
comprised of groups of people who constitute a small community which deliberates on 
various affairs of life from the household or commerce or politics or literary and 
intellectual” (1986:19).26  The Kuwaiti academic Yagoub Al-Kandari also portrayed the 
diwaniyya in similar terms, identifying it as a “forum of cultural exchange within which 
is debated various matters and affairs associated with daily social life” (2002:51).27  
Western researchers, too, have given their reflections on Kuwait's diwaniyyat, describing 
them as “informal socio-political groups... [that] serve to coalesce, filter, and transmit 
Kuwaiti opinion on public issues” (Russell 1989:30); or, “regular private gatherings of 
relatives, friends, and colleagues that serve as forums for socializing, conducting 
business, and discussing politics” (Hawthorne 2004:8); to even labeling them as a 
                                                
26 Translation provided by the author. 
27 Translation provided by the author. 
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“gregarious place where many Kuwaitis... uniformly receive their knowledge and discuss, 
among other things, public matters” (Louër 2005:771).28 
Yet, missing from the preceding discussions on the diwaniyyat as a context for 
male sociability in Kuwait are any conceptions of how these institutions interact with the 
country's all-encompassing bureaucratic networks.  This is not an inconsiderable 
prospect.  In a state that employees roughly 90 percent of all its citizens (Ghabra 
1997:361), there is always a good probability that any assembly that includes adult male 
citizens will be synonymous with an unofficial gathering of civil servants.  Nevertheless, 
when the diwaniyyat are presented in the literature as political entities it is almost always 
according to their roles in formal, state-sanctioned activities (Antoun 2000:442), like 
parliamentary contests and political campaigning (Al-Naser 2001:13-14), as well as the 
less savory components of electoral participation:  vote buying29 and prearrangements of 
the pool of candidates via pre-election primaries (Gavrielides 1987:166-170).  What is 
frequently left unsaid is that these institutions also facilitate the “low politics” 
(Singerman 1995:15) of informality that allows actors to access the state, its offices, and 
its benefits without the procedural indignities or obstructions that typify official channels 
(Kilani and Sakijha 2002:18).   
 The goal of this research is to address this shortage by focusing explicitly on 
Kuwaiti reception rooms and demonstrating the utility of these institutions for providing 
points of contact between individuals and the overarching welfare state.  Although 
popular local accounts tend to explain the diwaniyyat as being inherited legacies of the 
                                                
28 Translation provided by the author. 
29 Miq.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 7, 2006. 
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past (Gel'man 2004:1022),30 this inquiry seeks to orient the guestrooms of Kuwait as vital 
endowments of the present that simultaneously penetrate the state while remaining 
mostly detached from its official apparatuses.  It is well documented that in Kuwait, 
along with its oil-rich Gulf neighbors, the development of an inflated, underperforming 
bureaucracy (Herb 2009:382) coupled with an intricate system of patronage and 
brokerage extending downward throughout the state (Hertog 2005:141-143) from the 
ruling Al Sabah dynasty has encouraged actors to provide their own inroads to 
governmental resources.  What is less clear is exactly how an establishment like the 
customary guestroom fits into this alignment as a marketplace for facilitatory support in 
such a high income urban environment.  The argument here is that the presence of this 
pervasive brokerage has become institutionalized to the point of normalcy through the 
Kuwaiti diwaniyya by virtue of its regular visitation networks that foster and reinforce 
ties to bureaucratic favors. 
 
Untangling Civil Society from the Social Bureaucracy of a Welfare State 
 To fully appreciate how the diwaniyyat act as a conduit for circulating public 
assets through social avenues demands an explanation of how the state-society 
framework is realized within Kuwait’s distinctive brand of rentierism.  At first glance, the 
diwaniyyat found throughout Kuwait City might fit well into what John and Jean 
Comaroff called “the present infatuation with civil society” (2000:293).  Although this 
                                                
30 The most repeated version of this narrative authoritatively situates the diwaniyyat in an imagined, distant 
past:  “The diwaniah is a historical phenomenon believed to have started thousands of years ago, long 
before the advent of Islam... [The] majlis, or board... very popular in the Khalifa era, later came to be 
known as the diwaniah” (Al-Naser 2001:6).  Origins dating specifically to the Abbasid Caliphate of the 13th 
to 16th centuries have also been mentioned in interviews.  What is always left out of these retrospectives are 
the intervening centuries between these historical roots and the appearance of the diwaniyyat on the 
Kuwaiti institutional landscape.   
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statement was written by the Comaroffs over a decade ago, its meaning continues to 
resonate to this day for legions of researchers, scholars, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and policy makers seeking to understand and evaluate, or even influence and 
shape, both grassroots and state-level sociopolitical realities (Hann 2003:55-57).31  In 
fact, it was the omission of any substantive discussion about the diwaniyyat that was 
explicitly cited by Richard Antoun in his appraisal of Richard Augustus Norton’s two 
volume collection, Civil Society in the Middle East.  Antoun criticized the contributors 
for their lack of any serious consideration of informal institutions, pronouncing that, 
“many authors [in these volumes] allude to patron-client relations, religious networks, 
sects, tribes, ethnic groups, groupings based on social type (village, town, neighborhood) 
and the diwāniyyah, without giving them any attention” (2000:442).32 
 So, what exactly does it mean to take notice of Antoun’s comments and give the 
Kuwaiti dawawin greater appreciation within the broader dialogues on civil society?  As 
already indicated, there is little argument that these guestrooms occupy what can 
appropriately be described as an intermediate space between the social world of 
household intimacy and the wider, unrestricted community (Tetreault 2001:206).  
Specifically, the country’s diwaniyyat are presumed to reside somewhere beyond the 
privacy of the home though still remaining sheltered from intrusions by the state (Delmas 
                                                
31 In academia, at least some of the focus on civil society can be said to revolve around the topics of local 
nonstate groups taking over a state’s distributive functions (Hemment 2004:217, 222) or as a 
counterbalance to a government’s authoritative presence (Kulmala 2011:51-53); hence, too much or too 
little government seems to pose questions as to where, and how, civil society fits into any particular state’s 
social, political, and economic equations.  For NGOs and official agencies, Partha Chatterjee’s conclusion 
that, “Civil society as an ideal continues to energize an interventionist political project” (2004:39) reflects 
Amy Hawthorne’s position that, “programs to ‘strengthen’ civil society have become a standard part of the 
U.S. and European democracy-promotion tool kit around the world” (2004:5). 
32 Even earlier, in 1993, Norton insisted that, “Arguably, the essential element in Kuwaiti civil society is 
the diwaniyya” (210).  Again, as with Antoun’s critique in 2000, Norton provided nothing to support this 
statement or reinforce its claim.  More recently, Paul Salem listed the diwaniyya under the heading of civil 
society without expanding much on his designation (2007:10-11). 
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2007:3).33  This latter guarantee is rooted in customary local convictions that point to the 
inviolability of the family domicile,34 which is considered to include any diwaniyya 
regardless of whether or not it is actually positioned within the property boundaries of a 
household,35 along with legal provisions that are in place to ensure that the values of 
domesticity are not violated (Tetreault 2000:61-62).  Under the Kuwaiti Constitution, this 
physical protection of the home from unwarranted disturbances by the state, and its 
consequent extension to the diwaniyya, is upheld by the language in Article 38.  The 
safeguards to assemble within the walls a residence, again applicable in practice to the 
diwaniyya, are designated in Article 44.36  Importantly, these constitutional provisos 
mean that the diwaniyyat and their congregations are excluded from the restrictive Public 
Gathering Law (Law Number 65 of 1979) that sets out the criteria that must be met by 
other types of civic organizations (Kelly and Breslin 2010:238).  It is for these reasons 
that, in the eyes of many Kuwaitis, the dawawin are repeatedly heralded as consummate 
“mini parliaments” where the “country’s affairs may be addressed and discussed”37 
devoid of state interference or arbitrary policing actions.  Thus, it is this disposition of the 
diwaniyyat as guarded institutions that allow the country’s citizens to harbor the 
expectation that they will continue to have these forums as outlets for their unhindered 
political expression.38 
 The traits listed here are the ideal kinds of qualities that likely make the 
                                                
33 This evaluation is also shared by other authors including Louër (2005:771), Hawthorne (2004:5), 
Alnajjar (2000:257), Tetreault (2000:62), and Stephenson (2011:187). 
34 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in A. M. Diwaniyya in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 7, 2007. 
35 Haitham.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 15, 2010.  
36 Recovered from the reprint of the constitution published by UNDP-POGAR (United Nations 
Development Programme – Programme on Governance in the Arab Region) at http://www.pogar.org, 
accessed on May, 05, 2012. 
37 Abd Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 26, 2007. 
38 Ahmad.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 7, 2007. 
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diwaniyyat of Kuwait such an appealing model to which some of the concepts that 
surround notions of civil society might be applied; particularly, the reception rooms’ 
occupation of that valuable social terrain located between the familial house and the 
government (Delmas 2007:3).  With these characteristics as a guideline, it is not too 
difficult to imagine the diwaniyyat being included in the laundry list of civil society 
associations that Robert Hefner provides in his brief summary of the term:  
Though writers differ on its details, most agree in describing civil society as an 
arena of friendships, clubs, churches, business associations, unions, and other 
voluntary associations that mediate the vast expanse of social life between the 
household and the state.  This associational sphere is seen as the place where 
citizens learn habits of free assembly, dialogue, and social initiative.  [1998:17] 
 
Phrased another way, albeit with less specificity about the variety of groups that can be 
encompassed by the classification, is Rosemary Coombe’s explanation that civil society 
can be thought of as, “An amorphous space that lies somewhere between the state and 
society and mediates between the two by way of representatives circulating in the public 
sphere” (1997:3).  Coombe continues with a more refined version of civil society that 
bars the most evident nonhousehold, nonstate entities from her definition:  businesses and 
marketplaces.  This further spatial clarity sets up a sectoral triptych where the state, the 
economy, and civil society can each be distinguished (Coombe 1997:3) along the same 
analytical lines that have been used by specialists in former Eastern Bloc and post-Soviet 
Russian studies since the fall of the European socialist regimes (Hann 2003:56).  In this 
rendering, as in Coombe’s evaluation, civil society is recognized idiomatically as a 
distinct “third sector” to emphasize its separation from the domains of governance and 
enterprise:  “The third sector is a realm of informal groups – associations, clubs, or NGOs 
(non-governmental organizations).  It derives its name from its role in a triad, where the 
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first is the state, the second is the private sector of businesses and enterprises, and the 
third is the realm of citizens’ initiatives” (Hemment 2004:217).  This three sector 
typology has also been amended to accommodate the addition of a fourth segment in 
appreciation of the possibility that contestants for political offices might not strictly 
adhere to the triad’s framework.  Therefore, civil society by this formula is proposed to 
be differentiated not only from the state and the economy, but from “political society” as 
well (Foley and Edwards 1998:11). 
Yet, this process of trying to cordon off civil society from any other forms of 
social interaction, whether economic, political, or state based, has had its relevance 
questioned as a universally valid theoretical paradigm (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999:17, 
24).  Principally, it is the obscurity engendered by delimiting where one zone ends and 
another begins, or assuming that certain sectors of associational life can enjoy absolute 
autonomy from all other facets of social intercourse without any intrusions, which makes 
isolating civil society an extremely subjective premise that ultimately undermines any 
semblance of clarity (Seligman 1998:28).  Blair Rutherford makes note of this very 
shortcoming with his work on the impact that local power disparities and the national 
government’s dispossessions can have on Zimbabwean commercial farm workers’ 
involvements with an assortment of manifestations that typically fall beneath the rubric of 
civil society: 
An important part of this analytic is its emphasis on what a hegemonic definition 
of the concept misses or marginalizes… Attention focuses on the role of 
boundaries… The crucial boundary-making processes are those between society 
and the state, public and private, and civil and un-civil forms of association and 
rationality.  Under the gaze of critical analysis, these boundaries have been shown 




Joseph Buttigieg, in a tone not too far removed from that of Rutherford, directs his efforts 
towards restoring what he believes to have been Antonio Gramsci’s views on civil 
society as put forth in his infamous Prison Notebooks.  Like much of the current general 
usage of the phrase, Gramsci’s outline of civil society came to minimally represent “the 
notion that the state and civil society are two separate and opposed entities” (Buttigieg 
1995:4).  However, Buttigieg contends that such a misappropriation strips the concept of 
all of Gramsci’s original intentions; namely, that civil society is a hegemonic extension of 
the political elites’ command of the state (1995:27).  On Gramscian side of this coin, cast 
sharply at odds against a civil society that is “somehow more authentic, and untainted by 
the vulgarities of the state and party politics” (Hearn 1997:34), power and sociability are 
tightly intertwined: 
Civil society is not some kind of benign or neutral zone where different elements 
of society operate and compete freely and on equal terms, regardless of who holds 
a predominance of power in government.  That would be the liberal view, which 
misleadingly portrays the formal restraints imposed upon the use of force held in 
reserve by the governmental apparatus of the state as a boundary line that 
demarcates the separation between the state and civil society.  [Buttigieg 1995:27] 
 
For each of these criticisms that challenge the assumptions of a civil society that can exist 
as a “neat division between state and society” (Worby and Rutherford 1997:67) it is hard 
not to recall Eric Wolf’s stance in Europe and the People without History on the pitfalls 
of disciplinary disarticulation in the social sciences.  Although Wolf was not writing 
about civil society, his assessment of the study of social relations without any attention to 
the political economy within which such interactions transpire echoes many of the same 
sentiments expressed here:  “What is the flaw in these postulates?  They predispose one 
to think of social relations not merely as autonomous but as causal in their own right, 
apart from their economic, political, or ideological context” (1997:9). 
  
9 
 Yet, if the conceptual case for a civil society comprised of “all the associational 
forms in society other than the state and the market” (Benthall 2000:1) is inherently 
deficient in its perspective, either through its ambiguity or its “cheerful illusion” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1999:24) of the existence of discrete limits for interpersonal 
exchanges, the diwaniyyat of Kuwait can only add to the growing bodies of literature that 
are uncomfortable with many of the underlying presumptions that accompany the idea.  
For instance, despite the fact that the Kuwaiti guestrooms do inhabit a midway point that 
is neither strictly household nor formally state controlled (Delmas 2007:3), it would be 
disingenuous to mark them as segregated, independent institutions that are able to persist 
apart from the government,39 the marketplace, or even the family.  Otherwise, a strict 
pursuit of civil society would have to dismiss the diwaniyyat of politicians and 
contenders,40 not to mention those of the country’s various political forums and 
associations,41 as straying too close to the state as well as “political society” itself (Foley 
and Edwards 1998:11).  A similar problem can be posed for professional diwaniyyat in 
which the participants all share a common occupation or are invested in an overlapping 
field, like architects and engineers or lawyers and underwriters.  Can a line be drawn with 
any degree of precision for these types of reception rooms that designates where they 
may sit in terms of a sectoral division of fraternity that excludes markets (Hemment 
                                                
39 Authorities have always been inconsistent with those dawawin that have run afoul of the law.  Illegal 
election primaries (Alnajjar 2000:245-246) and the illicit construction of diwaniyyat on state property are 
probably the most frequent violations (Redman 2012:28-33).  However, more well-known are the 
government’s raids on the diwaniyyat of the political opposition, the diwaniyyat al ithnein (Monday 
Diwaniyyat), in 1990 following the 1986 suspension of the National Assembly (Tetreault 2000:69-71). 
40 These offices are not limited to the National Assembly but include positions on the boards of sports 
clubs, the municipalities, and supermarket cooperatives. 
41 One active “friend” of the Kuwait Democratic Forum (KDF) recalled that five diwaniyyat, each gathering 
on a different night of the week in different neighborhoods, could be linked to the KDF.  Anonymous.  
Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 21, 2007. 
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2004:217)?42  These groupings are plainly off-the-clock and after-hours but their 
openness is curbed and trade knowledge is an expected topic.43  Then, there are the 
countless family dawawin that play host to some combination of kinsmen depending on 
the circumstances of the relationships at any given time.44  These, in conjunction with the 
guestrooms that are affiliated with individual tribes and tribal sections, complicate 
affixing the Kuwaiti diwaniyyat to any picture of civil society as “one in which a civic 
selfhood is (allegedly) distinguished from communal or collective roles and attributes” 
(Coombe 1997:3).  Still, it cannot be ignored that this catalog of the diwaniyyat is 
rudimentary at best; in actuality, nearly every diwaniyya and most attendees mix these 
rough categories on a consistent basis:  tribes and politics, families and businesses, 
politics and families, and so on. 
 It is also no easy task to try to manipulate the dawawin of Kuwait into the more 
optimistic proposals that seem to be tied in with the existence of, or need for, a strong and 
mature civil society.  Foremost, a diwaniyya is not a space for a participatory public 
despite many local protestations that would prefer to convey these reception rooms as 
available and accessible to all callers.45  As already stated, these are Kuwaiti men’s 
                                                
42 Take, for example, one long-established law firm in Kuwait City that took steps to create a “social role” 
for its solicitors requiring them to visit certain diwaniyyat.  Throughout the week, the firm’s lawyers are 
assigned specific diwaniyyat from which to recruit clients.  Senior lawyers call on high-profile diwaniyyat 
because sending a junior attorney would insult an important host and reflect poorly on the law firm.  Simple 
legal problems and issues are to be resolved free of charge by the visiting lawyer, but more complicated 
legal concerns will require a visit by the potential client to the firm for a no-cost consultation, with a fee 
charged only if the case goes to court or involves mediation.  Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait 
City, Kuwait on March 1, 2008. 
43 Mishal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 12, 2006. 
44 It is not unheard of for family disputes to cause a diwaniyya of relatives to split into completely separate 
dawawin or for antagonistic kinsmen to withdraw from their familial guestroom until their differences are 
settled to avoid an awkward setting.  Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 
16, 2008. 
45 Ahmad A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 21, 2007.  
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parlors (Al Mukames 1986:19)46 and this reality alone rules out any direct contributions 
from the vast majority of the population.47  This, too, calls into question the breadth of 
the civil society model (Seligman 1992:14) and if it is desirable to have its connotations 
attached to an institution that is so patently identifiable by its exclusionary nature.48  
Another issue is that civil society is oftentimes envisioned as a remedy for the distributive 
deficiencies of welfare states (Hefner 1998:17) that will persuade “non-governmental 
groups to take on the functions of the state” (Hemment 2004:217).  By providing 
services, it is hoped, civil society can reduce the reliance of citizens upon the government 
(Hefner 1998:17), thereby leading to the promotion of private markets founded on 
capitalist principles (Hemment 2004:221).  This theme relies on there being a dialectical 
tension defining civil society (Coombe 1997:3) and the state, whereby the growth of one 
results in a reduction of the other; two realms that continually oppose each other (Hearn 
1997:33).  Once more, though, such expectations are especially inadequate insofar as the 
diwaniyyat of Kuwait are concerned.  These are men’s rooms, parlors, and meeting places 
and it can be said quite confidently that the individual proprietors hold no grand delusions 
                                                
46 Translation provided by the author. 
47 The most current report in 2010 by the Central Statistical Office of the Ministry of Planning estimated 
the country’s total population to be 3,566,437 with Kuwaitis numbering only 1,133,214 (Recovered from 
http://www.cso.gov.kw, accessed on April 13, 2012).  Of this number, there are 195,000 male Kuwaitis of 
voting age (Olimat 2011:81); in other words, this is the 18.2 percent of the total population that for the most 
part constitutes the demographic of the diwaniyyat.  For the female portion of the citizenry there is one 
diwaniyya, that of Rasha Al Sabah, that stands as an often cited exception to male exclusiveness in these 
institutions (Tetreault 2003:38).  Since women were first granted the right to vote in the parliamentary 
elections of 2006 and now have legal political power, there are questions amongst women as to whether or 
not their sittings (yam'ah) constitute a diwaniyya, whether or not women should try to appropriate an 
institution with such overt male connotations, and the extent to which men's diwaniyyat will accept them if 
they wish to attend.  Social distance and unfamiliarity are also limitations to mixed gender diwaniyyat that 
cannot be overlooked and both of these themes are apparent in one woman's experience:  “I was going to 
meet my father to hear a lecturer.  But only upon arriving at the address did I realize that the lecture was 
going to be held in a diwaniyya.  I called my father and did not enter the diwaniyya until he arrived to give 
me some [sense of] security.  Even then, I strongly felt out of place and uncomfortable in the presence of so 
many strange men.”  E.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 3, 2006. 
48 This segregation extends to male citizens as well.  As one longtime diwaniyya guest explained the 
institutions’ open-door creed:  “The diwaniyyat are open for all, but not all are welcomed.”  Abd Aziz.  
Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 26, 2007. 
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of one day replacing the state’s massive welfare entitlements.  Moreover, the amazing 
proliferation of these establishments over the last decades (Al-Kandari 2002:68-69) has 
done little to promote economic privatization; if anything, the public sector portion of the 
national economy is as lopsided as it has ever been (Herb 2009:381-384).  Simply put, 
these additional examples show that civil society, as a concept, just presents too many 
limitations to properly serve as a starting point for understanding where the diwaniyyat fit 
into the social fabric of modern day Kuwait.  This conclusion is largely in part because, 
in concurrence with Robert Hefner, “Rarely has so heavy an analytic cargo been strapped 
on the back of so slender a conceptual beast” (1998:17). 
 Rather, what is proffered by this research is an abandonment of civil society as an 
ideational construct for situating the diwaniyyat, and instead it is proposed that it is much 
more profitable to examine the ways that these institutions are integrated into the state, 
albeit informally and without the obvious martial burdens that come with governance 
(Abrams 1988:77).  Moving “beyond the old state-society dichotomy” (Pieke 2004:518), 
a contentious split that can easily become reified in the rhetoric of civil society’s 
proponents (Rutherford 2004:128), the purpose here is to concentrate on how the 
diwaniyyat populate the interactional zones where state and society encroach upon one 
another to such an extent that it can make these areas practically indistinguishable.  
Whereas Hisham Sharabi derided such habits as symptomatic of Arab neopatriarchal 
customs, where the office is inseparable from the household salon (1988:131) and 
perhaps even the other way around as presently argued absent the essentializing 
overtones for the Kuwaiti diwaniyya, Timothy Mitchell suggests a more nuanced 
variation that is less of a cultural indictment:  “How are the porous edges where official 
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practice mixes with the semiofficial and the semiofficial with the unofficial to be turned 
into lines of separation, so that the state can stand apart as a discrete, self-directing 
object” (1991:82).  Likewise, as with Mitchell’s summation, there is Philip Abrams’ 
critique of the objectification of the state as a unit of study that can be thought of as 
distinctive from “the social agencies… of the society in which it operates” (1988:59); on 
this subject, Abrams was adamant that positioning the state as a detached, self-contained 
entity was a gross miscalculation that concealed the political truths about legitimacy and 
nonstate forms of power (1988:76-77, 82).  This may be why the state tends to be more 
legible in those places where it is most unexpected:  the everyday acts and deeds of the 
populous are precisely where the state’s opacity (Das 2007:163-164, 169) gives way to 
“the reality of the mundane, interested, and often uncoordinated contests of power that 
make up the individual and institutional ‘state system’” (Candea 2011:312).  Hence, it 
takes some creative effort to disregard or undervalue the complex interfaces that mediate 
the interchanges between the offices of the state, its bureaucracies, the informal arenas, 
and the citizenry (Pieke 2004:533). 
 Certainly, in a fashion kindred to that witnessed with the privileging of the social 
component of the civil society concept, without caution there is also the acute dilemma of 
overstating the role of the state in any discussion of social life.  If civil society is a 
nebulous body (Coombe 1997:3), it can be presumed that the state does not fare any 
better.  Impressions range from it being no more than an idea or a mask that screens 
political practices (Abrams 1988:82); a “fragmented and contested conglomeration of 
individuals and institutions” (Hoag 2010:7); to a “machinery of intentions – usually 
termed ‘rule making,’ ‘decision making,’ or ‘policy making’ – the state becomes 
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essentially a subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas” (Mitchell 1991:82).49  
Without a doubt, attempting to pry the state away from society is difficult to say the least 
(Rutherford 2004:128) and it is plausible only with a highly idiosyncratic set of standards 
in place (Mitchell 1991:81-83).  Of course, this should not be interpreted to mean that the 
state and the localized daily trials that shape it (Bailey 1972:35-36) are always 
inseparable from the routines of day-to-day socializing, nor does it imply that the politics 
of the state are inescapable (Candea 2011:311-313).  To think so, Marshall Sahlins insists 
in his whimsical refrain on Foucault that admonishes much of the current disciplinary 
fascination with power, is to universalize culture into a generic silhouette:  “Power, 
power everywhere, and how the signs do shrink. Power, power everywhere, and nothing 
else to think” (2002:20).  However, it is this definitional imprecision for locating the 
contours of the state’s intersections with society, the unidentifiable boundaries that 
obscure where norms end and regulatory mores commence (Lomnitz 1988:43-44), that 
can lead to the informal institutional arrangements found within formal political and 
bureaucratic systems to be overlooked (Helmke and Levitsky 2004:725-727). 
 The rentier logic50 of the Kuwaiti government’s cradle-to-grave welfare 
arrangements with its citizenry makes this chore of delineating the lines of pubic and 
private propriety even more muddled (Horn 1988:403).  This is because, under general 
                                                
49 Notwithstanding the contemporary insights that these definitions have provoked, it is worth recalling the 
classic Weberian image of the state as an instrument for the rightful dispensation of violence within 
territorial limits (1991:78).  
50 Chatelus and Schemeil give a fairly agreed upon synopsis of rent as, “any income not originating from 
the productive activity of the concerned unit, the flows and dimensions of which are not directly linked to 
the beneficiary’s activity” (1984:255).  For the rentier economy, as it is understood for the oil producing 
countries, it should be added that the rent monies come from sources external to the government and are 
accrued directly by the state (Robinson 1996:35).  However, this is a matter of degrees dependent on the 
extent to which the rents make up government revenues and are circulated throughout the population.  In 
fractional terms, oil rents are 93.2 percent of the Kuwaiti government’s operating revenue (Al Khouri 2008) 
while in per capita rates this equals slightly less than U.S. $30,000 for each citizen, ranking Kuwait the 
third highest amongst the oil exporters.  Compared to other petrol nations, these numbers qualify Kuwait to 
be considered an extreme, or rich, rentier (Herb 2009:376-377).  
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conditions where state-managed rents dominate the local socio-economic and socio-
political landscape, it is scarcely an exaggeration that,  
In such a context, the role of the state is paramount:  it is the unavoidable 
instrument of resource allocation whether in ‘liberal’ or ‘socialist’ regimes.  
Paradoxically, the state plays and even more determinant role in the economic 
activities of ‘liberal’ countries through budgetary expenditures… state-controlled 
or state-supported enterprises, food subsidies, administered prices, etc.  [Chatelus 
and Schemeil 1984:255-256]51 
 
It is commonplace knowledge that the regime and the bureaucracy in Kuwait are the 
unrivaled mechanisms for allocating the state’s resources.  Basically, the government’s 
welfare mandates have replaced the risks of the markets with the securities of 
entitlements (Pacek and Radcliff 2008:268-270) and it has inserted itself into many of the 
support roles that were once filled by “traditional societal institutions” (Quadagno 
1987:112).  Beginning with state employment, recognized today as a “right” by the 
citizenry (El-Katiri et al. 2011:27),52 close to 90 percent of all Kuwaitis are occupied in 
the public sector53 (Ghabra 1997:361),54 although many of these jobs are created merely 
to tackle unemployment and not to satisfy any pressing service shortages.  Yet, the 
government of Kuwait is not restricted to paying only for its own employees as private 
enterprises are subsidized for hiring Kuwaitis so that they might meet the same levels of 
compensation that public service workers receive; or, reworded with a purposeful hint of 
                                                
51 Montinola and Jackman contend that this is the “OPEC effect”:  a petrostate’s total domination of 
markets in conjunction with an absence of political checks (2002:169-170).  
52 The language of the Kuwait Constitution supports these assertions in both clauses of Article 41:  “Every 
Kuwaiti has the right to work and to choose the type of his work… The State shall endeavor to make it 
[employment] available to citizens and to make its terms equitable.”  Recovered from the reprint of the 
constitution published by UNDP-POGAR at http://www.pogar.org, accessed on May, 05, 2012. 
53 For the sake of comparison, Messaoud Hammouya, with the Bureau of Statistics at the International 
Labour Office in Geneva, calculated public sector employment to account for about 30 percent of the 
world’s total workforce.  Reducing this further, Hammouya found that, “Today the share of public 
employment in developed market-economy countries is close to 22 percent of total employment; the figure 
is around 40 percent in countries in transition and varies from 8 percent to 30 percent in developing 
countries” (1999:1). 
54 By contrast, expatriates make up 98 percent of the private sector’s labor force (El-Katiri et al. 2011:19). 
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irony, the state pays for Kuwaitis to work in the private sector to lessen their reliance on 
the government for jobs (El-Katiri et al. 2011:20, 27).  This economic presence by the 
state is, in Paul Salem’s opinion, not insignificant: 
The monolithic and statist aspect of the Kuwaiti economy is the main factor that 
gives the state a large measure of ultimate control and influence over society.  
While Kuwaitis agitate, oppose, and complain, their economic interests tie them 
firmly to the state and dissuade them from more openly shaking or challenging 
the system.  Students and youth agitate for change, but when they graduate they 
invariably turn to the public sector for jobs.  Even the so-called liberal reformers, 
who complain about the limited role the private sector plays in the economic 
development of Kuwait, suggest… increased government subsidies for private 
companies as a way to bring about such change.  [2007:9-10] 
 
On top of these impressive employment figures for the public and the private sectors are 
all of the ordinary subsidies that are an accepted part of Kuwaiti citizenship:  retirement 
pensions, free education, free medical care55 in domestic facilities or abroad if necessary, 
marriage gifts, electricity, water, food staples, housing assistance, and fuel.  Occasionally, 
loans and consumer debts are also forgiven along with the periodic Amiri grants that are 
distributed to all nationals from the state treasury (El-Katiri et al. 2011:8, 11-13, 17, 
18).56 
 It is undeniable that this sort of rentier contract put into place by the Kuwaiti 
government is much more consequential than just random allocations that are somehow 
                                                
55 As with employment, the Kuwait Constitution upholds retirement support (Article 11), education (Article 
40), and health care (Article 15) as responsibilities that are to be fulfilled by the government.  This is not to 
suggest that the constitution’s articles are infallible but to point out that there is a documented legal context, 
formulated by the state in 1962, which endorses the citizenry’s expectations for their entitlements.  Articles 
recovered from the reprint of the constitution published by UNDP-POGAR at http://www.pogar.org, 
accessed on May, 05, 2012. 
56 One example of such sovereign discretion occurred in January 2011, around the same time that the 
uprisings of the “Arab Spring” swept through the region, when the Amir gave each Kuwaiti a KD 1,000 
(U.S. $3,500) present and a 14 month grant of free food rations.  Ostensibly, these were awarded to the 
populace to concurrently commemorate several events:  the nation’s 50th year of independence, the 20th 
anniversary of liberation from Iraq, and Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah’s own fifth year in office.  
Recovered from Arab Times Online; January 17, 2011; “KD 1,000 ‘To Every Kuwaiti’” at 
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/164462/reftab/36/Default.aspx, 
accessed on May, 05, 2012. 
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allowed to flow unsupervised to the populace.  Instead, the rights that come with 
citizenship are buried deep within a byzantine bureaucracy (Hasenfeld et al. 1987:400) 
that is bereft of anything close to administrative transparency (Hertog 2010b:282-283).  
Surely, Kuwait’s indecipherable bureaucracy is not unique, a point that Colin Hoag does 
not miss in his review of the occurrences of bureaucratic morass when observed across 
societies: 
Bureaucracies are profoundly ironic when viewed in terms of their policies and 
everyday practices.  Despite their self-representations as rational and efficient… 
bureaucracies often represent precisely the opposite.  For many people, 
bureaucracy signifies slowness and delays, unnecessary paperwork, complicated 
protocols, and other measures or conditions that generally constrain the 
individual.  These organizations’ rules and hierarchies are often clearly spelled 
out, and yet bureaucracies are always at some level opaque, inscrutable, and 
illogical to both “insider” and “outsider” alike.  [2011:81-82] 
 
Still, what makes the Kuwaiti bureaucracy different from public employment in almost 
every other county (Hammouya 1999:1) is that the entire citizenry is essentially a part of 
it (Ghabra 1997:361).  Kuwait is, quite frankly, a “nation of bureaucrats” (Herb 
2009:375) where the state, for all intents and purposes, is operated by most members of 
the nation’s citizenry.  Every social right, entitlement, rent dispensation, and favorable 
allocation is secluded behind a wall of protocols (Silver 2010:284) that is overseen by a 
population of citizen bureaucrats (Verdery 1991:424-425) who possess a great amount of 
discretion for expediting or delaying requests (Lipsky 2010:14).  Knowing someone or 
having a proper introduction can transform what is normally an “inscrutable, 
unpredictable” (Hoag 2010:6) bureaucratic encounter and turn it into an ingratiating, 
personalized exchange (Boissevain 1966:29).  It is this malleability of roles (Boissevain 
1974:4-5) in such a widespread system of government laborers – the relative-
administrator, the friend-functionary, the acquaintance-clerk – that easily confuses efforts 
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“to distinguish between what is in the state and what is in society” (Kerkvliet 
2001:268).57  What can be problematic is tracking down that perfectly positioned 
gatekeeper who can negotiate access on feasible terms.   
 The presence of dysfunctional formal institutions like Kuwaiti’s overstaffed and 
inconsistent bureaucracy (Hertog 2010b:282-283) is frequently cited as a precursor for 
their substitution by adaptive informal institutions (Tsai 2006:140).  These latter bodies 
provide, according to Helmke and Levitsky, a “‘second best’ strategy for actors who 
prefer, but cannot achieve, a formal institutional solution” (2004:730).  As an offshoot of 
the official sector, or as a response to its defects, some alternative social practices can 
even compliment formal spheres without much apparent contradiction (Lomnitz 1988:47-
48).  In the milieu of Kuwaiti male sociability, the ubiquitous diwaniyyat fill the gaps 
where the state’s bureaucratic incoherence overlaps with opportunities for the personal 
utilization of governmental resources and privileges (Kerkvliet 2001:263).  For it is 
within any guestroom that a menagerie of brokers, patrons, gatekeepers, friends, relatives, 
and clients can all be brought together under one roof.58  However, just because the 
diwaniyyat are pervasive and well suited to rectify the failings of the state’s formal 
apparatuses it does not mean that they constitute any formative challenge to the ruling 
establishment (Scott 1985:33).  To the contrary, the diwaniyyat host a competitive 
“informal adjustment” to the bureaucratic status quo that allows participants to bend the 
regulations without fracturing the structure of their governmental rewards so that they 
might “systematically deviate from the rules of the system in order to stay in it” (Lees 
                                                
57 One is reminded here of Michel de Certeau’s articulation of institutional subversion via interpersonal 
exchange:  “Thereby the institution one is called to serve finds itself infiltrated by a style of social 
exchange… that is, by an economy of the ‘gift’ (generosities which are also ways of asking for something 
in return)” (De Certeau et al. 1980:4).  
58 Yousef A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on April 2, 2007.  
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1986:619).  It is not so much that the diwaniyyat permit the avoidance of bureaucratic 
controls altogether; more accurately, these men’s parlors actually reinforce incorporation 
into the state’s official channels by mending its perceived limitations for aggrieved 
supplicants.  Therefore, the transactions that occur in a diwaniyya cannot be thought of in 
the manner of classic patron-clientelism whereby the patron provides “material resources 
seen to be strategically more important to the client than anything the client could supply 
the patron in return” (Wilson 1990:163).  This neglects the “externality of benefits” 
(Corra and Willer 2002:180) being sought where the desired allowances are state 
resources, not private property, and what are brokered by intermediaries are bureaucratic 
admittances to these public assets (Hertog 2010b:289).59 
 It is true that the old saying, “It’s not just what you know but who you know,” 
(Lin 2001:41) captures the many of the constant reminders of all the frustrations that 
come with doing business in Kuwait’s convoluted state system.60  However, this 
proverb’s local derivative, wasta (connections), is all but inseparable from the men’s 
visitation networks that are expressed by their nightly calls to their associated diwaniyyat 
and there is a good chance that discussions of one will invoke some mention, intended or 
not, of the other.  Such was the case with a young surgeon who once offhandedly 
remarked, “I used to attend a diwaniyya with my father [because] I was told that I had to 
                                                
59 This is not to deny the existence of Weingrod’s political patronage in Kuwait by which “politicians 
distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support” (1968:379).  As widely reported 
there are plenty of “service” parliamentarians (Tetreault 2000:115) who, directly or through surrogate 
“election keys,” use the diwaniyyat as a forum to barter state privileges for electoral backing.  Nonetheless, 
far more common are those guestrooms where the participants are relatively equals.  Such horizontality 
lends itself more to relations of reciprocity, helping out, and open-ended mutual assistance (Lomnitz 
1988:43-46) than it does to outright hierarchical patronage (Wolf 1966b:47, 86).  Parity does not, however, 
insinuate the absence of “lop-sided” (Pitt-Rivers 1971:140) friendships, pragmatic interactions (Boissevain 
1974:6), and obligatory attendance (Antoun 1979:43-44). 
60 Faisal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 3, 2007.  
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go in order to develop connections [wasta].”61  There is nothing exceptional in this 
comment and there are many variations of it with more or less colorful details or 
intriguing circumstances.  Still, this single sentence is clear in identifying Kuwait’s 
guestrooms, the diwaniyyat, as the places where these wasta relationships can be 
crystallized.  Yet, the real significance of this doctor’s brief reflection is revealed when it 
is recalled that the wasta he is referencing is tantamount to a form of bureaucratic 
partiality; without the state this utility of the diwaniyyat as a liaison for wasta is 
incomplete since the core cause for these connections is unknown.  It is only by 
emphasizing the state’s day-to-day presence (Salem 2007:9) in the lives of Kuwait’s 
citizens that the value of the diwaniyyat is immediately recognizable for harnessing the 
social capital (Portes and Landolt 2000:532) needed to make the welfare bureaucracy 
simultaneously navigable and flexible (Lominitz 1982:53-54).  In this sense, the dawawin 
are emblematic of personalized hybrid institutions that act as surrogates for 
accommodating the government’s rigid bureaucratic command over the state. 
 
Outline of the Research Project 
 To understand where the diwaniyyat fit into interstices of state and society in 
Kuwait requires an examination of how the ruling contract that binds individuals, groups, 
and governing bodies together has been configured, amended, and rethought to adapt to 
changing circumstances.  This is summarized in Chapter 2, beginning with a look at how 
Kuwait's pre-oil oligarchy used their control of trade to dominate local governance and 
control the town's populace (Crystal 1995:21).  The mode of rule during this time 
distanced the sovereign from the public because the merchant elite were actually the ones 
                                                
61 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 3, 2007.  
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holding all of the power (Tetreault 2000:36).  The emergence of Kuwait as a major oil 
exporter in the mid-20th century ruptured this arrangement and established the dynastic 
Al Sabah family as the unrivaled political, economic, and social players in the country 
(Shah 1995:1018).  The consequences of this new paradigm, a rentier state that 
legitimates itself domestically through its policies of redistribution, are reviewed in 
Chapter 3.  This chapter is of particular importance because it highlights the nature of 
state-society interactions in Kuwait since it has been awash with petroleum profits:  the 
creation of governmental leisure employment (Herb 2009:382), the abundance of obscure 
and redundant administrative procedures (Hertog 2010b:292), and the personalization of 
offices and state privileges.  Chapter 4 introduces ways in which individuals can access 
or circumvent the state framework by relying on their own visitation contacts or by 
calling on the networks of others via the institution of the diwaniyya.  It is stressed here 
that it is within these informal guestrooms that the intersection of state and society is 
most visible.  Furthermore, an explanation is given for the proliferation of these 
establishments and what this expansion has meant for state brokerage.  Chapter 5 
elaborates on the value of diwaniyya networking with an in-depth review of seven case 
studies that serve to illustrate how supplicants can use these reception rooms to jockey for 
their positions along the continuum of state and society.  While there are the obvious 
instances of political candidacy and government permits that clearly show the state's 
presence in the diwaniyya, there are also the acts of family unity, friendly favors, and 
community activism that can sometimes make the state's proximity appear less apparent.  
Nevertheless, this appearance should not be too deceiving when, provided the 
government’s command over its own incalculable clientele, there is still the local truism 
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which holds that, “anyone who needs anything visits a diwaniyya.”62  Lastly, Chapter 6 
will review the arguments made in this study about state and society being actively 
transacted in Kuwait’s guestrooms, and it will also look at some of the possibilities 






































                                                














 Endowed with an astonishing array of cinemas, restaurants, shopping malls, and 
coffee shops, as well as its own brand of chic nightspots, Kuwait City today is the 
epitome of the globally homogenized (Hannerz 1992:234-237), transnational 
marketplace.  Undoubtedly, the contemporary portrait of Kuwait City is not one merely 
indicative of fiscal modernization; but, rather a picture of hyper-modernization buttressed 
by globalization (Tetreault 2000:24, 50-51) and reinforced by the rampant consumption 
of imported, particularly Western, commodities.  This reality is most colorfully expressed 
by the observations of Anh Nga Longva: 
The shelves of Kuwaiti supermarkets were filled with French yogurt, German 
sausages, Belgian salad dressing, Dutch lettuce, Swiss cheese, and American 
peanut butter.  Flowers in the flower shops were flown in from the Netherlands, 
Cyprus, and Columbia, clothes were imported from Paris as well as Beirut and 
Taiwan, while cars and all electric and electronic equipment came from Japan and 
Korea.  [1997:35] 
 
However, the pursuit of foreign-produced goods that characterizes personal spending 
habits in the country reverberates throughout the physical landscape of the city as well.  
In only a half-century, this coastal township (Ansari and Qutub 1983:52) emerged as a 
visual manifestation that adhered more to the blueprints and sensibilities of British, 
French, Italian, and Finnish architectural firms (Mahgoub 2008:164) than it did to local 
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traditions.  The resultant built environment introduced an alien aesthetic that is notable 
for its departure from anything indigenous and its unquestionable determination to 
“loudly reject any association with the past” (Al Bahar 1985:65).  Yet, Kuwait’s appetite 
for the novelty of imported products is equally matched by its desire to fill the ranks of its 
manual, unskilled and low-status job sectors with migrant laborers (Shah 1995:1017) 
whose numbers, at nearly three-quarters of the total population, dwarf those of the 
citizenry (Tetreault 2000:50). 
 Of course, it is unlikely that even a single one of these traits that outwardly 
exemplify Kuwait in the 21st century – the rampant consumerism that borders on 
fetishism (Taussig 1980:25), the sprawling superficiality of trendy residential villas (Al 
Bahar 1985:63) and modish public buildings, and what has recently been described as the 
“Asianization” (Longva 1997:34) of the state’s labor force – would have even been 
possible were it not for the country’s fortuitous location atop one of the world’s largest 
oil reserves (Ismael 1982:78).  Consequently, the nation prospered following the Second 
World War under what is deemed “one of the most dramatic rises in national income ever 
known” (Hill 1975:537); a status quo that is a direct outcome of the government’s 
redistribution of its petroleum income to all nationals.  Promises of guaranteed 
employment in an ever-expanding bureaucracy (Kaboudan 1988:50) and mandatory 
preferential hiring policies in private companies, free medical and educational services 
(Hill 1975:547), and generous early retirement pensions (Russell and Al Ramadhan 
1994:581-582) are just some of the programs enacted that have given rise to Kuwait’s 
present-day leisure class (Shah 1986:824-826).  Ultimately, though, the regime’s largess 
has fostered a welfare society that is almost completely reliant upon the reallocation of 
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capital surpluses generated solely by oil revenues (Ismael 1993:100, 154-155) and subject 
to external fluctuations (Kaboudan 1988:48).  
 Still, it is easy for this current depiction of Kuwait to be deceptively convincing in 
its portrayal of a statewide bourgeoisie culture prospering in perpetuity.  Indeed, this 
illusion is greatly bolstered by the fact that in the 1950s and 1960s the Kuwait 
Development Board organized the demolition of the town’s old mudbrick structures and 
defensive walls (Mahgoub 2008:154-156) to pave the way for its ultramodern concrete 
cityscape (Dickson 1971:191); a declaration that structurally and symbolically denoted 
the severance of Kuwait’s ties to its heritage in favor of a new order.  Similarly, oil 
profits eradicated all traces of traditional production, along with any associated fiscal 
motivations (Crystal 1995:11), and replaced it with widespread civil servitude (Ghabra 
1997:361).  However, this semblance of development is notable precisely for its recent 
occurrence in that it was “an unprecedented fast transformation of [the] Beduin tribal 
mode of life” (Ansari and Qutub 1983:52).  Hence, the image of affluent Gulf living is 
undercut by a not too distant history of hardship, scarcity and want; more simply, it is 
“the story of a humble, organic desert Arab village” (Shiber 1964:2). 
  
Pre-Oil:  Migration, Settlement and Growth 
 The textual existence of Kuwait before the 18th century remains shrouded in 
uncertainty (Slot 2003:8).  Primarily, all earlier references are limited to vague 
cartographic identifications of the area as Kadhema and Kazima on a mid-17th century 
French map, or the even more general Ottoman legal designation of the territory as 
falling outside of the Porte’s protection and thereby constituting part of the “Land of the 
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Tribes” (Slot 1991:10, 38).  Yet, it is known that until the 1750s the entire environs of 
eastern Arabia were part of the dira, or customary lands and pasturage (Sweet 
1967:1136), of the Bani Khalid (Abu Hakima 1983:1-5) and it is within this ambiguous 
setting that the Bani ‘Utub, the forebears of the country’s dynastic Al Sabah ruling family 
(Abdulmoati 2003:13), first warrant mention. 
 Local sources contend that during the second half of the 17th century a continuous 
drought in Najd (Abu Hakima 1983:4), compounded by sporadic livestock raids by 
opposing tribes (Fattah 1997:26) and intertribal conflict, drove the inhabitants of Haddar 
from their lands in al-Aflaj to search for better prospects on the eastern shores of the 
Arabian Peninsula (Al Juhany 2002:85).  These migrant Najdis were a collection of 
related families (Abu Hakima 1983:4) who later combined under the ‘Utub clan moniker; 
and, although this is a designation of uncertain origin (Crystal 1995:18), the ‘Utub were 
definitively adjoined to the ‘Anizah Confederation through the Dahamshah Section of the 
‘Amarat Tribe (Dickson 1956:26, 28).  After wandering for several decades (Al Shamlan 
2000:26) and unsuccessfully attempting to settle in a number of possible locations along 
both sides of the Persian Gulf, the ‘Utub finally found sanctuary with the Bani Khalid in 
one of their outposts, a fishing village and shaykhly summer residence (Abu Hakima 
1983:3) known as Qorain63 (Longva 1997:19).  Still, despite the contemptuous relations 
that accompanied the ‘Utub before their eventual piecemeal arrival in Qorain,64 the years 
                                                
63 This settlement has been alternatively identified as Grain, Green, Grijn, Graine, Grane, and Gran by 18th 
century European Cartographers.  However, Slot contends that this name does indeed correspond with the 
Persian designation of the village as Gran (Slot 1991:69, 107). 
64 One tradition presumes that the ‘Utub were chased from Qatar to Qorain following a dispute with the 
resident Al-Musallam.  Another version suggests that difficulties with Arabs along the Persian coast drove 
the ‘Utub to continue on to Qorain.  Alternatively, there is the report which states that the ‘Utub were either 
forced from the Ottoman territory of Basra due to their propensity for raiding caravans bound for the city 
(Abu Hakima 1983:4) or the threat that they posed for shipping along the Shatt al Arab after arriving there 
subsequent to a clash with the Huwala in Bahrain (Slot 1991:70-72).     
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of migration were filled with the lessons of an oceangoing lifestyle that would prove 
beneficial to the nomads as they made the transition from desert husbandry to mobile 
seafarers (Fattah 1997:26) encumbered with the task to create a maritime community that 
could rightly be called “Najd by the sea” (Dickson 1956:25).  Of course, while the 
establishment of the itinerant ‘Utub in Qorain marks what is popularly viewed as the 
founding origins of the territory that ultimately developed into Kuwait (Tetreault 
2000:33-35), this perspective obviously discounts the constant cycles of immigrations 
and departures that defined the nation’s past as Bedouin, Persians, Iraqis, Jews, and Gulf 
tribesmen found a place for themselves in the port settlement (Broeze 1997:163, 178-
179).   
 While the protracted movement of the ‘Utub from Najd to its ultimate, though 
unforeseen, destination on the northwest shores of the Persian Gulf was a monumental 
undertaking, the confluence of serendipitous circumstances that benefited the nascent 
encampment and helped usher it into a burgeoning coastal town cannot be overlooked.  
Ecologically, the location of Qorain offered very little.  It was devoid of surface water 
and its sandy, gravelly terrain (Dickson 1956:31) was unsuitable for agriculture 
(Haarmann 2003:38-39).  Nonetheless, sweet subsurface groundwater and the nearby 
oasis at Jahra (Dickson 1956:26, 44) provided some reprieve for the small population.  
More significantly, the site afforded its inhabitants a superb natural harbor sheltered by 
reefs (Broeze 1997:149), the potential of which had never been realized by the Bani 
Khalid in their preoccupation with control of the desert (Crystal 1995:19).  Further still, 
the administrative ambiguity of Qorain engendered a favorable political environment for 
the newly arrived ‘Utub.  The neighboring Ottoman Vilayet of Basra was far too ill-
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equipped, mismanaged (Anscombe 1997:91) and distracted by Persia (Abu Hakima 
1983:11) to extend its influence into the tribal hinterlands of the Arabian subcontinent.  
Frederick Anscombe, in his summation of the Porte’s affairs in the region in the late 19th 
century, presents a chronic condition that is applicable to the Sultanate’s tenure in the 
Gulf at even an earlier stage: 
This record of ineptitude was the result of conditions…that also afflicted Iraq.  
Too little money, too little manpower, too little equipment hamstrung policy 
makers.  More debilitating were corruption and the related increase in popular 
dissatisfaction with unfair, arbitrary rule.  More important, however, was the 
problem of communication.  Corruption flourished because officials had little 
supervision or fear of retribution.  Policy had to be shaped in Istanbul without the 
benefit of prompt, accurate information about events in distant areas.  [1997:91] 
 
As a result of this incompetence, despite the proximity of Basra, the ‘Utub were able to 
attend to their own concerns without fear of interference from Ottoman agents (Slot 
1991:126).  Similarly, Persia, the only other local power with considerable resources, was 
too preoccupied with its own survival to pose any realistic threat to Qorain.  Lastly, the 
position of the Bani Khalid was already fractured enough internally to give the ‘Utub 
relative autonomy in their own undertakings, although they were still strong enough to 
police any recalcitrant tribes and provide the ‘Utub with the cover of protection (Abu 
Hakima 1983:3-5, 11, 17). 
 Given the unobtrusive political situation that greeted the Najdi immigrants upon 
their debarkation at Qorain it is quite obvious that the settlers could pursue their own 
interests relatively uninhibited.  The harbor that had gone largely ignored by the Bani 
Khalid (Crystal 1995:19) was a vital asset that had not begun to reveal its full potential 
and the ‘Utub, with their maritime skills developed in Qatar (Mansfield 1990:6) and 
honed throughout the course of their migration (Crystal 1995:18), were well-poised to 
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exploit this resource.  Moreover, the surrounding barren landscape (Dickson 1956:31) 
dictated that any permanent, growing population would have to turn towards seafaring to 
support itself (Broeze 1997:153).  Thus, this is the framework within which Qorain 
emerged from a nondescript seasonal abode for the Bani Khalid into a bountiful “safe 
haven for trade” (Slot 2003:13) that not only thrived in the Gulf (Crystal 1995:19) but 
linked the markets of the Indian Ocean with those of the Mediterranean (Slot 2003:10-
11).   
Upon the death of Shaykh Sulayman bin Muhammad in 1752, the last powerful 
leader of the Bani Khalid had passed and successional infighting complicated by an 
unease over the rise of Wahhabi strength in the Arabian interior effectively granted 
Qorain and its resident ‘Utub their independence (Abu Hakima 1983:5, 19).  According 
to a prior agreement between three principal ‘Utubi families, the Sabah, the Khalifa and 
the Jabar, the Sabah assumed the reins of governance following the demise of the Bani 
Khalid.  Husayn Khazal depicts this negotiation as one wherein, 
[In 1716]... the chiefs of the most important three tribes that inhabited Kuwait 
entered into an alliance.  These were Sabah bin Jabar bin Salman bin Ahmad, 
Khalifah bin Muhammed and Jabar bin Rahmat al’ilbi (the chief of the 
Jalaahmeh).  The conditions… [stated that] Sabah will have leadership in the 
affairs of government… Khalifah will have leadership of the financial affairs in 
commerce; and Jabar will control the affairs of work on the sea.  All profits were 
to be equally divided among them.  [Quoted in Ismael 1982:23]  
 
The execution of this covenant translated into arrangement that divided the labor amongst 
the primary ‘Utubi lineages; the Khalifa and Jabar would not have to distract themselves 
from their commerce to deal with executive tasks like peacekeeping and dispute 
management, whereas the Sabah did not have to divert their attention away from 
administrative responsibilities in order to generate a regular income (Tetreault 2000:33-
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34).  Also, it is around this same period of ascendant ‘Utubi sovereignty that the name 
Koueit, a diminutive of kut or “fortress” and indicative of either the existent Bani Khalid 
barracks (Abu Hakima 1983:1-2) or a walled town, first appears in European records 
through the travelogues of Danish expeditionary member Carsten Niebuhr (Haarmann 
2003:39-40, 43-44).  During the next two centuries, the ‘Utub prospered as mercantile 
“maritime nomads” (Slot 1991:110) with a fleet that already amounted to roughly 800 
ships as early as the 1760s (Haarmann 2003:41).  This Golden Age of Kuwaiti nautical 
prosperity ushered-in an era of near unrestricted trade and commercial expansion for the 
tiny shaykhdom.  High customs levies imposed by Ottoman authorities in Basra deflected 
some traffic to Kuwait’s duty-free port which released traders from any polls aside from a 
small subsidy for the Shaykh.  The absence of customs officers also meant that 
merchandise was not scrutinized and goods prohibited by the Porte could be transferred 
without incident through Kuwait (Fattah 1997:9, 26-27).  Additionally, the overland 
caravan routes between the Gulf and Aleppo conveniently bypassed the Basra – Baghdad 
circuit and saved several weeks traveling time for only the cost of the Shaykh’s fee for 
safe passage (Abu Hakima 1983:6-7); a guarantee that the Al Sabah could afford to 
travelers partly due to the bonds of marriage that had enhanced their relationships with 
the inland tribes (Ismael 1982:27).  As this makes clear, Kuwait flourished not solely 
because of aquatic shipping lanes or terrestrial transport, but rather due to its interposing 
position as an entrepôt hub that provided a “gateway…between the sea and the desert 
area of northeastern Arabia” (Broeze 1997:149). 
 While the caravan commerce in and out of Kuwait was chiefly confined to the Al 
Sabah either awarding or denying transit to groups according to their payments of 
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appropriate tolls (Abu Hakima 1983:6-7) and the prevailing rapport between the Shaykh 
and the Bedouin tribes (Ismael 1982:27), the dynamics of the sea trade, on the other hand, 
were much more inclusive of the settled residents of Kuwait.  With the limited exception 
of stock wranglers inside the town, the caravan workforce was populated entirely by 
pastoralists who, in turn, were themselves insignificant to the settlement’s labor pool 
(Broeze 1997:162-163).  Therefore, historic Kuwait proper could rightfully be classified 
as maritime-intensive economic entity; a sentiment that, though true, was somewhat 
overstated by merchant descendant Saif Marzooq Al Shamlan:  “The sea was the basic 
element in the formation of Kuwait.  It is the source of its life.  Without the sea the name 
Kuwait would be lost to the world” (2000:59).  This seaward orientation was a year-
round endeavor for Kuwait’s inhabitants and it rested on a mutually reinforcing 
occupational structure that Frank Broeze labeled the as the community’s five pillars:  
“fishing, pearl diving, shipping, shipbuilding, and trade” (1997:152).   
There are several points here to note in terms of the settlement’s seafaring agenda 
and its relevance for the Kuwaitis.  Foremost is the reality that the port’s population was 
absolutely dependent on imported provisions simply for their survival.  Everything from 
the water shipped-in daily from the Shatt al-Arab in Iraq (Dickson 1971:83) to the 
products of Murtada bin ‘Ali bin ‘Alwan’s detailed 18th century analysis that included, 
“Fruit, melons, and other victuals are brought to Kuwait from Basra by boat every day, 
for it is a port city… All the cereals, i.e. wheat and others, arrive by sea because… [the] 
soil does not allow for agriculture; even date-palms do not grow there nor any other 
trees” (Haarmann 2003:37-38).  Ironically, the boatbuilding industry itself was even fully 
reliant upon timber and materials that originated in India (Al Mughni 1993:23).  As this 
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illustrates, marine commerce was the only mode of production that could generate 
adequate sustenance for the townspeople; fishing and inland pursuits such as animal 
husbandry or farming were too insufficient to support the most basic needs of the 
populace (Ismael 1993:24). 
 However, stocking the shelves of the souqs for local consumption in an 
environment that yielded no surplus in return required that Kuwaiti merchants focus their 
efforts elsewhere to garner capital:  long-distance commerce and pearling (Ismael 
1993:24-25).  In fact, just to keep necessities in the markets oftentimes entailed keen 
trading practices and supply networks.  One case in point was the importation of Iraqi 
wool that could be paid for with dates that had already been secured, either from the Al 
Ahsa oasis in eastern Arabia or from Iraq itself (Fattah 1997:68).  In time, the traders 
spread throughout the Gulf and extended their reach all the way down the East African 
coast and across the Indian Ocean to the Indian subcontinent (Anscombe 1997:24); a 
journey subject to the seasonal monsoons that carried vessels out (Agius 2002:26) with 
the summer southwest winds (Bernstein 2008:12) and returned them home in the winter 
via the northeast currents (Agius 2002:26).  Suhail Shuhaiber furnishes the following 
description as a sample of some of the cargoes that were transported each way during 
these voyages: 
Their imports consisted of piece goods, rice, sugar, timber, spices and cotton from 
India; coffee from the Red Sea; tobacco and dried fruits from Persia; grain and 
dates from Basra; cloth, dates, and fish from Bahrain.  Their exports were ghee 
and horses coming from the inland tribes and going on to India, and local dried 
and salt fish to Basra.  [2003:101] 
 
Naturally, as Alan Villiers discovered, this official ledger omits the black market 
enterprises of the crews which proceeded undetected and undeclared:   
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The sailors are inveterate smugglers; almost none of the goods they bring – apart 
from the main cargo – is declared… [And] since so much of their more highly 
dutiable goods are private ventures, such manifests as they produce to the 
authorities are useless.  The mariner buys his goods himself, and sells them 
himself (though he does not mind disposing of them to boats alongside).  He sees 
no point in accepting any official interference…  [1948:404] 
 
It is plausibly argued by Jacqueline Ismael that the conditions that drove the sailors to 
earn what they could on the side were already well entrenched in Kuwaiti power relations 
by the time Villiers recorded his experiences at sea.  In her estimation, the original pact 
between the leading ‘Utubi families was little more than the transference of their previous 
desert aristocracy into a sedentary model “that became the basis of differentiation 
between appropriators and expropriators… [The] Bani Utub became a class in themselves 
by their asserted right of control over the factors of production” (Ismael 1982:23). 
 The most substantial of these factors of production (Ismael 1982: 23) for Kuwaiti 
coffers was pearl harvesting.  Access to the rich, fertile oyster beds along the Arabian 
littoral (Agius 2002:24-25) gave Kuwaiti merchants more than just another commodity to 
transfer to foreign ports; to the contrary, pearls were the single surplus material available 
in these barren lands that were capable of delivering vast amounts of wealth.  As a matter 
of course, a symbiotic connection bound each element of Kuwait’s maritime economy 
(Broeze 1997:153):   
Pearling provided the capital for commerce, and commerce in turn provided the 
basis for the perpetuation of the pearling industry – the material subsistence of the 
community as well as the material needs of the pearling industry… [The] 
development of the pearling industry depended upon the commerce that provided 
the timber and other material resources for development of the fleet…  [Ismael 
1993:25] 
 
In this manner, the annual summer pearl harvest that took place between shipping seasons 
(Agius 2002:28) when the waters were calm and warm (Bowen 1951:169-170) 
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underwrote the generation of currency that could be reinvested in other shipping ventures 
(Broeze 1997:152-153).  Furthermore, the prevalence of coinage in pealing is acutely 
exhibited in the dominant role that debt represented to the entire system: 
The whole economic structure of the industry, even more than in ship-owning, 
was based on debt.  Everybody was in debt—the diver to the nakhoda [captain], 
the nakhoda to the merchant who financed him, the merchant to some other 
merchant bigger than himself, the bigger merchant to the sheikh.  Even the broker 
who came out to buy the pearls was probably heavily in debt to some money 
lender who financed him.  [Villiers 1969:353] 
 
Intertwined with this debt structure was a rigid division of labor without any occupational 
mobility; an overall symptom that epitomized the entire Kuwaiti seafaring economy and 
further distinguished the Bani ‘Utub as the community’s resident elite class (Crystal 
1995:19).  Captains, divers, sailors, and deckhands, constrained by their fiscal limitations, 
could rarely expect any opportunity for promotion; while, for their part, the merchants 
would never betray their station by serving on a ship (Villiers 1948:406-407).  The bleak 
nature of this lifelong debt servitude and the resulting reproduction of social boundaries 
is found in the account of the pearl divers’ plight given by Richard LeBaron Bowen, Jr.:  
[Any] diver who accepted cash advances from a nakhoda [captain] had doomed 
himself to diving until death, and unfortunately death might not be an exit, as his 
debt was simply passed on to his son or brother, who then went on to incur his 
own debt.  Once in debt a diver is prohibited from hiring to another nakhoda – he 
must repay his debt to the man who gave him cash advances.  A diver or anyone 
else who accepts an advance in the pearling industry has sold himself to economic 
slavery, for the nakhoda owns his ability to work… Thus, a diver is bound to 
return to the purgatory of pearling…  [1951:178] 
 
The consequential magnitude of the yearly pear harvest for the Bani ‘Utubi merchant 
monopolization of local labor and group relationships (Ismael 1993:33-35) is reflected in 




 It is also notable that the very same bonds that indebted the general populace to 
the merchant oligarchs correspondingly restricted the office of the shaykh held by the 
family of the Al Sabah.  The alliance that designated this one ‘Utubi lineage to act 
exclusively as political functionaries at the same time ensured they would remain 
financially dependent upon, and accountable to, the other two clans (Longva 1997:22).  
Thus, characterizations of pre-oil Kuwaiti politics are correct in their assessments of the 
polity as “a merchant republic headed by a coalition of Shaikhs” (Slot 2003:11) where 
“real power in the community resided in the financial-commercial class” (Ismael 
1993:35-36).  Although this appraisal conflicts with the details given by former British 
Political Agent H. R. P. Dickson of historic autocratic rule in Kuwait (1956:257), it 
cannot be disputed that the merchants were in complete command of the leadership by 
virtue of their total control over the economy.  It was principally by the generation of 
trade by the merchants (Crystal 1995:21) that the reigning Al Sabah could collect their 
one (Shuhaiber 2003:100) to two percent duties (Abu Hakima 1983:101) on imports that 
maintained their position within the community. 
This state of dependency for the Al Sabah altered only slightly during their first 
150 years of sovereignty.  For instance, Istanbul awarded Shaykh Jabir I date plantations 
on the Shatt al-Arab for his services in an assault against Persian forces in 1837; these 
were extremely productive landholdings that eventually exceeded 30 square miles in size 
(Finnie 1992:6, 90-91).  Later, an Ottoman stipend in 1872 (Anscombe 1997:65, 200) 
accompanied the bestowal of the honorary title qa’immaqam (provincial representative / 
subgovernor) upon Shaykh Abdallah II for deeds rendered in the Porte’s expedition to Al 
Hasa.  Concurrent with these episodic gains, the Al Sabah continued to amass dues from 
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the caravan trade in exchange for secure transit along the interior desert routes (Abu 
Hakima 1983:6-7, 87-90, 98).       
 Nevertheless, even with this degree of economic self-sufficiency the Al Sabah 
remained beholden to the dominance exercised by the merchant class (Longva 1997:22), 
because not only did the shaykh need their trade to garner the associated fees (Crystal 
1995:21), but the entire settlement was financed and sustained by their activities.  
Accordingly, the Al Sabah mode of governance was restricted domestically to dispute 
arbitration (Shuhaiber 2003:102, 103) and “the provision of [an] administrative 
infrastructure to support the community and its way of life – including enforcement of the 
labor contracts that allowed the merchants to accumulate significant wealth… [that] 
depended on the rulers keeping the system together” (Tetreault 2000:36).  This laissez-
faire policy at home was evidently noticed by Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the 
Gulf, when he visited Kuwait in 1863.  He declared that, “Indeed, there seems little 
government interference anywhere, and little need of an army” (Abu Hakima 1983:75).  
Given this lack of executive autonomy it is not surprising that even the order of 
succession itself had to be approved by the notables; for it was “from his contract with 
the notables and not merely from his nomination by the ruling family that the ruler 
derived his authority to rule” (Shuhaiber 2003:102).  If the sovereign ever overstepped 
the limitations of his office it was to his own detriment as the merchants held the decisive 
verdict:  secession and the resultant economic paralysis that would befall the town 
(Crystal 1995:21) as legions of laborers, more loyal to their employers than they were to 
their shaykh, would follow suit (Tetreault 2000:39).  This last happened when Mubarak 
ibn Sabah (r. 1896 – 1915) attempted to raise revenue to support his military aspirations 
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by taxing pearls, imports, the pilgrimage, and housing (Crystal 1995:24).  Mubarak’s 
actions led to a mass exodus of up to half the total population to Bahrain (Ismael 
1993:58) and humbled the Shaykh to the point that he withdrew his tariffs and convinced 
the merchants to return (Crystal 1995:24-25). 
 Contemporaneous with Shaykh Mubarak’s rift with the mercantile bourgeoisie 
was the increasing presence of European interests in the northern Gulf.  Until the closing 
years of the 1800s, Western diplomats had expressed little concern in the shaykhdom’s 
affairs (Busch 1967:187).  Yet, before the turn of the century Britain would sign a 
secretive treaty of protection with Mubarak for the “negative imperative” (Schofield 
2003:58) of keeping its rivals at bay.  In the words of the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
the India Office, “… we don’t want Koweit, but we don’t want anyone else to have it” 
(Busch 1967:196).  However, British awareness of its possibilities with Kuwait may not 
have been piqued had Shaykh Mubarak not sought its assistance following his fratricidal 
coup d’ etat and accession to power, a message to Britain that he was not an Ottoman 
subject as they had assumed (Anscombe 1997:93-94, 99-102).  Notwithstanding 
Mubarak’s pleas, the Crown was already warming to the prospect of limiting the Ottoman 
coastline in the Gulf while curtailing the proposed construction of a German railway 
terminus in the area (Schofield 2003:59, 71) and preventing a rumored Russian coal 
depot (Busch 1967:192); essentially, maneuvers by Britain to transform the Persian Gulf 
into a “British lake” (Anscombe 1997:110) affixed to its Indian holdings (Busch 
1967:188).  The outcome of the 1899 pact was, for Mubarak, security from Ottoman 
encroachments both locally and in his neighboring Fao date plantations without 
sacrificing his independence (Finnie 1992:16-17), whereas Britain barred its rivals from 
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gaining any foothold in the Gulf (Schofield 2003:61).  Although brief, this latter 
stipulation was the only one clearly specified in the agreement: 
… Shaikh Mubarak-bin-Shaikh-Subah, of his own free will and desire, does 
hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, not to cede, sell, lease, 
mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose, any portion of his 
territory to the Government or subjects of any other power without the previous 
consent of Her Majesty’s Government for these purposes.  [Abu Hakima 
1983:184] 
 
Therefore, formal protectorate status was avoided by Britain so that it would not provoke 
an incident with Istanbul, a loophole that allowed Shaykh Mubarak the flexibility to 
appease each authority as it suited him:  “Through astute role-playing – appearing for all 
the world as the loyal, subordinate Ottoman qa’im-makam in his dealings with the 
sympathetic wali of Basra…and reminding Britain of its ‘good offices’ clause… 
Mubarak effectively ensured the continuance of his rule in Kuwait” (Schofield 2003:62). 
 Political safeguards, though, did not yield dividends for economic prosperity and 
within a decade of the treaty with Shaykh Mubarak, Britain’s fleet dominated the 
commercial trade in the northern Gulf and reduced Kuwaiti shipping back to its 
subsistence-oriented origins (Ismael 1993:57).  After the First World War, the division of 
spoils by the victors firmly established boundaries where ambiguity once existed 
(Sluglett 2002:793-794, 800) and in 1922 the shaykhdom lost two-thirds of its customary 
territory to ‘Abd al-Aziz Al Sa’ud as Britain sought to establish borders (Dickson 
1956:274) that would minimize the extent of its writ of protection over Kuwait (Schofield 
2003:87).  Further contributing to this steady flow of hardships was the 14 year (1923-
1937) economic blockade initiated by Ibn Sa’ud (Abu Hakima 1983:135) to prevent the 
seasonal musabilah to Kuwait by tribes seeking market outlets (Dickson 1949:49) in 
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order to redirect them to his own merchants (Abu Hakima 1983:135-136).65  Even 
seaward, the 1930s offered little respite as the worldwide depression diminished what 
commerce remained and the introduction of Japanese cultured pearls onto the market 
ultimately eroded the demand for natural products from the Gulf (Agius 2002:27).  In less 
than 40 years, Kuwait had regressed from being a maritime presence whose influence 
was truly transcontinental to becoming an insolvent (Zahlan 1998:36), backwater British 
dependency that was gradually slipping into obscurity. 
 
Post-Oil:  Recovery, Realignment and the Welfare State 
 The discovery of oil in the Burgan fields in 1938 and the subsequent advent of the 
petroleum export industry following the Second World War (Ismael 1982:78) irreversibly 
altered the country’s prevailing status quo and released the grasp that the merchant class 
had held on the shaykhdom’s transactions for so long (Tetreault 2000:40).  
Interchangeably, oil has been labeled a “blessing” (Al Shamlan 2000:148), an “economic 
salvation” (Chisholm 1975:20) and a “windfall” (Zahlan 1998:39) for the simple reason 
that it is practically impossible to underestimate the impact that the resource has had on 
every aspect of the fledgling state’s affairs.  With the influx of petrodollars the country’s 
inseparable political, economic and social structures were realigned (Hurewitz 1972:113) 
to a point of unimaginable change.  In a matter of years, the longstanding but ailing 
maritime trade (Agius 2002:27) was completely displaced as oil earnings (Ansari and 
Qutub 1983:55, 59) fuelled new opportunities in formerly unknown sectors (Wolf 
2001:231) and gave rise to an all-encompassing central bureaucracy. 
                                                
65 Not only was this an economic strategy but it was also indicative of ‘Abd al-Aziz Al Sa’ud’s desire to 
absorb Kuwait into the Saudi realm (Toth 2005:149). 
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  To understand these transformations it is first necessary to acknowledge the 
configuration of Kuwait’s oil concessions; that is, that these licensing accords were not 
between the Shaykhdom of Kuwait and foreign entities.  Instead, these exploratory, 
drilling, and exportation contracts were solely between the ruling family and outside 
investors.  Diplomatically, this eased the shaykh’s reliance upon Britain for political 
backing (Tetreault 2000:41) and shifted the country’s importance from one of strategic 
geographical location to that of a resource exporter, thereby alleviating some of its 
external dependency (Hurewitz 1972:112-113).  More radically, these arrangements 
disrupted the domestic balance that had existed for 200 years between the ‘Utubi 
mercantile elite and the governing Al Sabah dynasty.  Initially in the form of royalties, 
then proceeded by a profit-sharing scheme, the oil revenue (Hay 1955:365) accrued by 
the shaykh and his lineage firmly established the royals as financial independents.  Since 
then, the rulers have no longer had to tread lightly to avoid offending the merchants or 
their economic preeminence.  
 The effect of oil upon the shaykhdom is easily revealed in sheer monetary terms.  
In 1951, petroleum exports accounted for 16 million dollars in state revenues; in just one 
year, that amount increased tenfold to 168 million dollars (Shuhaiber 2003:105) and by 
the 1970s the oil fields were the source of an overwhelming 90 percent of all state monies 
(Kaboudan 1988:47).  This endowment emboldened the Al Sabah to finally breach the 
union that had held them to their mercantile financiers, an association that the British 
Political Resident at the time dubbed, “the protection racket” (Crystal 1995:57).  
Nonetheless, the merchants’ earlier opposition to their political exclusion had culminated 
in the short-lived Consultative Council in 1921 and Legislative Assembly of 1938 
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(Russell 1989:30) during the economic upheaval wrought by the interwar collapse of the 
maritime industry (Ismael 1993:73-75); two events that served to caution the royal family 
against the unbridled autocratic rule that their petrol wealth could have funded (Crystal 
1995:56-58).  In light of this, the Al Sabah employed a more equitable tactic to preserve 
their ascendancy and simultaneously co-opt any dissident factions of the elite:  the 
creation of a redistributive welfare administration.  With their seemingly limitless returns 
from oil exports, the executors of the state could easily afford to cede all of the country’s 
business concerns to the merchants with the promise of minimal governmental 
interference in return for their political acquiescence.  Sharon Stanton Russell explains 
this strategy as one which rehabilitated what had been a deteriorating relationship 
between the parties: 
For some time, the major source of challenge to the power of the ruling family 
had been the wealthy merchant elites – descendants of Kuwait’s early merchant 
families.  They comprised the core of what we would now call the private sector, 
whose members are engaged in commerce, trade, and banking… During the 
1950s, the ruling family had made judicious use of newly available oil revenues to 
secure the merchants’ support for the regime, granting them a lucrative monopoly 
over local business affairs in exchange for their tacit agreement to remain outside 
of politics.  By the late 1950s and early 1960s, relations between the merchants 
and the ruling family were considerably improved… [1989:30] 
 
Thus, compliance by the merchants ensured their continued commercial viability and 
solidified the Al Sabah’s leadership role.  In other words, the pre-oil paradigm was 
replicated (Al Mughni 1993:30) although the benefactors and beneficiaries were now 
reversed.  Oil fiscally relieved the Al Sabah from their reliance upon the merchants while 
it made the traders into their financial clients, an interrelationship that is accentuated 
through the selective distribution of governmental contracts and controversial programs 
like the Land Purchase Program that simply transferred state monies as part of a “subsidy 
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system for landowners” (Al Qudsi 1981:403) to those with insider knowledge of the 
government’s agenda.66  In sum, to pacify the privileged required the allocation of 
“subsidies going almost entirely to wealthy Kuwaitis… Today, these schemes include 
agency commissions, monopoly privileges, and the permission to import labor… along 
with government bailouts of failed corporations, collapsed stock markets, and bad debts” 
(Tetreault 2000:156). 
 Even for Kuwaiti wage-earners, the former subsistence laborers who once toiled 
on the traders’ ships as mariners and pearl-divers (Ansari and Qutub 1983:53-55) as well 
as the inland tribesmen (Ghabra 1997:364-365), the regime repositioned itself to become 
the state’s exclusive economic sponsor and relieve the merchants of their clientele.  
Hence, the Al Sabah collectively became the “benevolent patriarch” (Shah 1995:1018) 
situated at the apex of wealth disbursement for the whole population and they used their 
petrodollars to drive a wedge between the mercantilists and the general populace.  
Whereas in the past pearling alone consumed at least a fifth of the labor force (Zahlan 
1998:29), by 1962 the government employed 46 percent of all Kuwaitis (Crystal 
1995:78-79) excluding the police force and military branches (IBRD 1965:40); in the 
1990s, this rate inflated to 90 percent (Ghabra 1997:361).  What these figures reflect is 
the state’s increasing function in place of the merchants as the country’s primary 
employer of its nationals (Shuhaiber 2003:108) on a scale irrespective of the economic 
costs or benefits: 
                                                
66 A contemporary critique by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development assessed this 
movement of capital from the government to the landed elite in the following manner:  “The private sector 
has probably relied on land purchases for investment capital… At the same time, we are convinced that the 
purchase of land at high prices in excess of development needs is not a good use of government funds from 
the standpoint of a desirable distribution of the oil revenues within Kuwait, or as a means of promoting the 
orderly development of the private sector of the economy” (1965:89).  While possibly correct in 
developmental or econometric terms this overview obviously neglects the sociopolitical investments that 
more accurately characterized the Land Purchase Program.   
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It seems clear that there are many unqualified employees in the Kuwait civil 
service… The 1963 [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] 
Mission was told that less than 1 per cent of the Kuwaitis in the classified civil 
service are college graduates, less than 5 per cent have graduated from secondary 
school and only 13 per cent from primary school… [And] nearly 30 per cent, 
were rated as illiterates.  These data perhaps are less a gauge of inefficiency than 
of the redundancy in the government work force. 
 
The subject of training in government service certainly requires attention, as does 
the problem of finding productive employment for the large number who draw 
pay without performing even a nominal service.  [International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 1965:40]  
 
The purpose of creating this public sector, contrary to any expectations of bureaucratic 
expediency or efficiency, was to further allow for the distribution of state funds (Crystal 
1995:78-79) in anticipation of political support (Ghabra 1997:364). 
 In addition to providing the jobs that eventually evolved into what has been 
categorized as “luxury employment” (Shah 1986:826) the regime also created a 
charitable welfare system through which it dispenses its surplus.  For example, 
government programs are in place to offset the costs of food (Tetreault 2000:156) and 
reduce the prices of basic utilities such as water and electricity (Al Qudsi 1981:401).  
Likewise, stipends were introduced to assist parents with the expenses associated with 
childrearing (Hill 1975:547) and pensions furnished for retirees (Ismael 1993:109).  Plus, 
included in this package of entitlements (Crystal 1995:79) are all-inclusive social services 
like comprehensive health care and education through postgraduate levels for those who 
qualify (Al Qudsi 1981:401).  Although far from exhaustive, this list could continue on to 
include marriage and family allowances, interest-free housing loans, and guaranteed 
property (Longva 1997:53); and, as public assistance it is important to note that these 
expenditures are provided unevenly based on need with the poorest families receiving 
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higher proportions of aid relative to their earnings (Al Qudsi 1981:398).67  In all, for the 
average Kuwaiti household these subsidies accounted for 46 percent its income in the 
1970s (Ismael 1993:132) and totaled ten percent of the country’s GDP for 1982 – 1983 
(Longva 1997:52).  Yet, there is a sociopolitical price for these benefits that is not as easy 
to approximate; that is, in the absence of taxation with the populous making no financial 
contribution towards the state for its services an unstated “no representation without 
taxation” (Zahlan 1998:45) policy by the leadership limits popular participation in state 
affairs.  Conclusively, “The political impact of this lavish welfare system, combined with 
the state’s policy of guaranteeing employment for all citizens, has been to blunt the 
potential appeal of [oppositional] revolutionary ideologies, at least among the native-
born” (Salih 1991:49) and encourage the citizenry’s continuing loyalty to the 
perpetuation of its dynastic monarchy (Tetreault and Al Mughni 1995:71).   
 Underwriting the country’s rapid development since the discovery of oil in the 
1930s has been the importation of migrant labor (Russell 1989:27) to serve as “immigrant 
human capital” (Al Qudsi and Shah 1991:144).  Cheap, expendable and without basic 
economic claims like property ownership or even rudimentary political rights (Shah and 
Al Qudsi 1989:32, 51), the most basic distinction between the state’s populations is that 
of citizen versus expatriate (Hill 1975:537); and, through the course of the past decades, 
the latter has steadily grown to far outnumber the former by a three-to-one margin 
(Tetreault 2000:50).  There is no single factor that can be attributed to this imbalance but 
there are several contributing causes.  The government’s reinvention of itself as the 
                                                
67 This system of differential distribution based on applicants’ needs was altered for the National Housing 
Authority in 1984; in that year, citizenship became the only requirement for state-provided houses or 
residential plots.  In a sense, this change has meant that subsidized housing is now as much about 
opportunism as it is about alleviating hardships (Alshalfan 2013:8, 26-27). 
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nation’s principal employer of its nationals through guaranteed, secure positions in the 
public sector (Shah 1995:1018) has increased to such an extent that it claims over 90 
percent of all working Kuwaitis (Al Hayyan 2003:327).68  Furthermore, the state’s 
emphasis on higher education has discouraged its citizens from participating in 
occupations requiring manual labor.  As a consequence, immigrants occupy the positions 
stigmatized by Kuwaitis as undesirable (Shah and Al Qudsi 1989:50-51).  Whether due to 
the physical nature of the job or the perceived instability of private enterprise, expatriates 
in this division constitute an incredible 96 percent of the workforce (Ali and Al Kazemi 
2005:64).  To this date, Kuwait’s planned economy in conjunction with its welfare 
package has “had perverse effects on the quality of the labour force.  Rather than 
reducing the proportion of foreign workers, these policies led to a ‘de-skilling’ of the 
Kuwaiti labour force.  The result was to concentrate Kuwaitis in service positions in the 
state sector while the bulk of productive works continued to be performed by expatriates” 
(Tetreault and Al Mughni 1995:70).  Equally apparent in Kuwait’s mounting 
demographic disparity is the demand for domestic workers which more than tripled 
between 1979 and 1987.  In part, these services were needed to offset the effects of 
Kuwaiti women entering the workplace, but alternatively maids were also socially 
commoditized “to be ‘consumed’ for social status” (Shah et al. 1991:471). 
 Clearly, this rendering of postpetroleum Kuwait mirrors even the most 
conservative definitions of a rentier state:  a country “that receive[s] on a regular basis 
substantial amounts of external economic rent” (Yates 1996:11); thereby freeing “the 
state from the need of raising income domestically” (Luciani 1987:69).  The presumed 
                                                
68 Illustrating this preference for state employment, a 2002 study found that 2,394 unemployed Kuwaitis 




product of this condition is straightforward: 
Because of their external income sources, these ‘rentier states’ need not extract 
significant revenues from their populations…The availability of exogenous rents 
enables the state to become the central, and in some cases, highly generous, 
distributor of goods and services.  In turn, the state elite uses patronage, or the 
provision of welfare, to buy the population’s loyalty or political quiescence.  
[Glasser 2001:7] 
 
Unquestionably, the Kuwaiti regime’s redistributive agenda following the exportation of 
oil, as it reconfigured the maritime private sector (Shehab 1964:463-464) into a 
government-funded welfare society, presents a prototypical case of rentier statecraft.  
Rampant public underemployment (Looney 1992:566), incalculable investiture in 
infrastructure developments and unrestrained social expenditures have all contributed to 
an ostentatious consumer society (Shehab 1964:471-472) directly dependent upon the 
government for the perpetuation of its comfortable lifestyle.  In return, the legitimacy of 
the ruling family and its state apparatus should be upheld and considered inviolable to 
popular pressure (Hammoud 1986:66).  Yet, this rentier model is undermined by its own 
overly-deterministic approach that proposes that predictable sociopolitical behavior 
(Niblock 2007:19-21) will stem from a fiscally autonomous state.  Accordingly, “Money 
does not spend itself.  Those acting in the name of the state make decisions, and the 
nature of the regime influences them” (Okruhlik 1999:297).  In Kuwait, it is the very 
mechanisms of redistribution that have provoked its citizenry’s discord:  the inequitable 
distribution of oil proceeds favoring those already well-situated and prosperous (Shehab 
1964:470) and the fabrication of an expansive bureaucracy that, although providing 
employment, also mediates access to state monies and services.  The outcome of this 
arrangement is increased structural distance between individuals and the regime, with the 
intervening gaps filled by the personal networks of politicians, petty bureaucrats and the 
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sundry officials who intercede and dispense state resources while accruing all of the 





































 Since 1946, the year that the Kuwait Oil Company began exporting its first barrels 
from the Burgan fields (Ismael 1993:78), it has become difficult to overstate the 
processes of change that have accompanied the influx of astonishing sums of cash 
generated by such minimal productive output (Herb 2009:382-383).  As early as 1955, 
just nine years after Kuwaiti petroleum entered world markets, visitor R. L. Banks 
remarked that, 
Usually lack of money keeps the rate of change down to a pace which enables the 
country to make the social changes and produce the technicians and 
administrators needed before Western technical methods and machines can be 
properly used. But there is one place – Kuwait – where finance presents no 
difficulty, where a small and rather isolated community has been able during the 
past few years to order almost what it liked from Western countries. A visit to 
Kuwait is, therefore, of special interest in that Kuwait displays in concentrated 
form the major and minor consequences of Westernisation at maximum speed.  
[1955:48] 
 
It is this physical dynamic that in the wider spectrum of Gulf cities can be characterized 
as intensive oil urbanization (Fuccaro 2001:175-187).  Specifically for Kuwait, this 
meant a move away from initial “petrol-can shanties around the fringe of the town” 
(Banks 1955:50) towards “speedy architectural and urban developments… [that] 
indiscriminately disintegrated the anatomy and identity of the traditional city” (Al Bahar 
1984:71).  These changes were most apparent in the occurrences of urban sprawl and 
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suburbanization as state oil surpluses were earmarked for the development of Western-
styled residential districts outside of the old protective city walls (Al Moosa 1984:47-48, 
53, 55).  By the 1960s, a sufficient number of modern public buildings had been 
constructed to serve the growing population and some of these structures even elicited 
international accolades for their innovative architectural merits (El Mallakh 1966:430-
431). 
 It would be misleading to dismiss Kuwait’s material development over the course 
of the last six decades as merely a visual spectacle built upon the proceeds of incalculable 
amounts of exported oil.  Instead, these monuments of unrestrained consumerism are 
indicative of the state’s postpetroleum social contract with its populace.  Departing from 
its mercantile past, a time during which the merchants supplied the funds that underwrote 
all shaykhly ambitions and territorial operations (Hay 1955:365), Kuwait emerged as an 
international supplier of natural resources with all of its earnings being directly deposited 
into the royal treasury (Tetreault 2000:41).  This new paradigm found the ruling Al Sabah 
situated atop the pinnacle of the nation’s petrodollars albeit without a solid legitimizing 
foundation.  In response to this shortcoming the regime, like its neighboring petro-states, 
fashioned itself into the country’s paramount benefactor, a benevolent “arch-distributor” 
(Hertog 2005:137) charged with providing job security within its labyrinthine 
bureaucracy (Russell 1989:32) in conjunction with social welfare and an overall 
“modernizing development ideology” (Baaklini 1982:359) that served to solidify the 
government’s role as its citizens’ guarantor (Gavrielides 1987:157-159).69  Comparable 
                                                
69 It is also relevant to note that the Al Sabah traditionally justified their reign by promoting their ability to 
safeguard the country from external threats through their diplomatic acumen (Tetreault 1991:566-567).  
Understandably, the Iraqi invasion in 1990 substantially diminished this reasoning and exposed the regime 
to criticisms of its foreign policy (Tetreault 2000:77). 
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to other Gulf dynasties, the Al Sabah have pursued “bread and circuses” (Bill and 
Springborg 2000:60) at the expense of any real form of political validation.  Therefore, 
…they have not developed an elaborate ideological justification of their 
rule…Certainly they have not been successful in selling such a justification to the 
populace.  Instead, they have chosen to discourage ideological approaches to 
politics.  They have done this by encouraging materialism, emphasizing their 
ability to supply goods.  They have tried to move people from the marketplace of 
ideas to the marketplace.  This celebration of consumerism, encouraged by the 
government, has largely been embraced by the population.  [Crystal 1995a:273-
274]     
 
In return for accepting their share of the oil wealth via entitlements, employment, 
services, and countless other allocations, the citizenry is expected to comply with the 
government’s directives (Krause 2008:8, 20-21) and consent to the ruling family’s 
implicit ownership of the state (Herb 1999:30).  This is contrasted against any ideals of 
transparent, rational bureaucratic norms of state institutions accountable to the public 
(Kassab 2010:356) by virtue of the Al Sabah having aligned themselves within the local 
sociopolitical framework according to the notion of mu’azib, or customary hosting in a 
patron-client relationship, that is now exemplified at the national level through the 
government’s redistributive apparatuses (Gavrielides 1987:157-161).  
 Similarly, Kuwait’s external relations have also been tempered by its access to the 
immense oil reserves lying beneath the sands.  Whereas domestically the profits from oil 
have gone towards reconfiguring the bonds of state and society, externally these monies 
have been instrumentally placed to preserve the regime’s existence.  Essentially, the 
government’s approach to its foreign policy has mirrored its tactics for internal stability; 
that is, the creation, through the mechanisms of distribution, of various clienteles 
(Tetreault 1991:566-567).  As early as the 1950s and 1960s, Kuwait supplied as much as 
60 percent of Britain’s petroleum and complimented this with annual investments totaling 
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between 50 and 80 million dollars.  Consequently, the British were more than willing to 
dissuade Iraq from expanding her borders in any manner that would have engulfed the 
tiny shaykhdom in the tumultuous years immediately following the overthrow of 
Baghdad’s Hashemite monarchy (Joyce 1995:281-283).  However, after its independence 
in 1961 and Britain’s gradual withdrawal from the Gulf, Kuwait had to reinvent itself as 
something more than a small, militarily insignificant state entity endowed with great 
capital.  It achieved this with a mixture of different investment programs aimed at 
cementing the ruling family’s position regionally as a financial patron.  Through the 
exchange of its wealth for security and stability the government created the Kuwait Fund 
for Arab Economic Development, a donor project that assists developing countries, with 
an emphasis towards Arab and Muslim countries, and as past events have shown, this 
strategy has paid for itself through foreign support and alliances (Moubarak 1987:538-
539, 542-543).70  In terms of popular perceptions in the area, the Fund has somewhat 
eased accusations that the oil-rich shaykhdoms are oblivious to the plights of their less 
fortunate fellows (El Mallakh 1964:420) and has thereby served to encourage favorable 
public relations, an observation that is further proven by the underperformance of 
Kuwaiti investments in Arab states.  Even after the Second Gulf War, the government 
sought to direct its capital towards both its supporters and rivals in an effort to 
recompense its allies as well as repair any damaged relations (Ahmed 1995:301, 305).  Of 
course, like the distribution of all previous investment and aid, this was a continuation of 
the state’s agenda “to mobilize an international constituency of supporters of Kuwait by 
creating foreign aid dependencies” (Tetreault 1991:579) that, even if not outright 
                                                
70 Iraq’s brief occupation of the Kuwaiti Al Samita outpost in 1973 was rebuffed by deferring Iraq’s 
scheduled Fund loan along with the intervention of multiple Arab states who shared an obvious interest in 
Kuwait’s continued financial health (Moubarak 1987:550).  
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supportive of the Al Sabah, would be pragmatically inclined not to want to see the source 
of so much revenue fall into anyone else’s hands (Moubarak 1987:538). 
 The product of this mode of governance, as demonstrably obvious in the domestic 
and international realms (Tetreault 1991:566-567), is the implicit understanding on the 
part of the populace that dissent and opposition can be assuaged not through coercion and 
martial punishment, but by entitlements and privileges (Krause 2010:8, 21).  The Al 
Sabah, either through historical accident or a tribal sense of duty (Tetreault 2000:33-34), 
today benefit from their place at the apex of the state’s income and utilize its control to 
ensure their continued preservation.  By monopolizing all of the principal instruments of 
the state, particularly its key ministries or wizarat al-siyada, the royals have established a 
bureaucracy that is entirely patrimonial in its orientation (Herb 1999:8) and overtly 
distributive in its function.  It is through their embeddedness in this generous state 
distribution system that the patriarchal dynasty is able to extend its reach into the depths 
of Kuwaiti society (Shah 1995:1018) thereby making accessibility to technocrats 
synonymous to a royal entrée in terms of rights and favors (Hertog 2010b:282).  In a 
nation where the majority of citizens serve in such posts (Ghabra 1997:361), everyone 
essentially becomes a gatekeeper of some sorts. 
 
Rentier Dynamics:  The Structure of Distribution 
 The rentier state concept has its origins in Hossein Mahdavy’s analysis of the 
Iranian political economy and what he termed the “fortuitous étatisme” (1978:432) that 
accompanied the nationalization of the country’s hydrocarbon industry.  Although he 
focused on Iran, Mahdavy proposed that his analytical approach was applicable to any 
  
53 
number of states both within and outside of the Middle East as long as their revenue 
sources are external, accrued directly by the government, and are substantial enough to 
dwarf any local productive capacities.  Hence, Mahdavy distinguished these 
qualifications wherein: 
Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a regular basis 
substantial amounts of external rent.  External rents are in turn defined as rentals 
paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or 
governments of a given country.  Payments for the passage of ships through the 
Suez Canal…are external rents.  The same holds for payments to the so-called 
transit countries in the Middle East that allow oil pipelines be passed through their 
territories…But apart from these so-called royalties, the governments of the oil 
exporting countries in the Middle East benefit from differential and monopolistic 
rents that arise from the higher productivity of the Middle Eastern oilfields and 
price fixing practices of the oil companies.  What is more important perhaps is to 
recognize that however one looks at them, the oil revenues received by the 
governments of the oil exporting countries have very little to do with the 
production processes of their domestic economies.  The inputs from the local 
economies – other than the raw materials – are insignificant.  [Mahdavy 
1978:428-429]       
 
Continuing, it was Mahdavy’s contention that intensive oil exportation engenders 
governmental spending and investment within its own sectors without the hindrances of 
public accountability since the citizenry is effectively excluded from the generation of 
state wealth: 
The oil industry’s major contribution is that it enables the governments of the oil 
producing countries to embark on large public expenditure programmes without 
resorting to taxation and without running into drastic balance of payments or 
inflation problems that usually plague other developing nations.  And since oil 
revenues typically increase at a faster rate than the GNP of the local economies, 
the public sector of the oil producing countries expands rapidly.  [Mahdavy 
1978:432] 
 
Following Mahdavy’s lead, many subsequent scholars were quick to adopt the rentier 
model and, unfortunately, pervert it through gross generalizations, assumptions and 
inappropriate applications.  These fallacious notions ranged from basic economic 
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determinism without any sociopolitical context (Okruhlik 1999:296) to broad 
classifications of universal rentier ethics (Beblawi 1990:98) that brazenly dismissed the 
realities of local, historically-specific circumstances. 
 These misappropriations notwithstanding, the rentier model remains an insightful 
construct for conceptualizing the dialogues that take place in oil exporting nations 
between citizens and their governments.  Most apparent are the enormous influxes of 
state capital from foreign sources that are entirely detached from national productive 
output (Mahdavy 1978:429).71  Furthermore, these external rents provide oil states with a 
source of revenue that is independent from the domestic population; in other words, it is 
unnecessary for such governments to extract the funds required to cover their operating 
costs by taxing their citizenries (Gause 1994:42).  Although this translates into varying 
measures of financial autonomy for the state (Chaudhry 1989:110) depending on the 
conditions of the world markets (Cooley 2001:165), its significance cannot be missed for 
governments that received these princely sums of wealth during the formative stages of 
bureaucratic development.  Instead of developing a state infrastructure founded upon 
appropriating its monies from the populace via tolls, taxation, and tariffs, the states that 
came into existence accompanied by the windfall cash surpluses afforded by the 
exportation of oil built bureaucracies dedicated to the allocation and distribution of state 
capital (Chaudhry 1989:110). 
 Obviously, not all rentier states were created equal and there are considerable 
                                                
71 Moreover, Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett described not just the generation of capital disconnected from the 
rest of the national economy but also the separation of the entire petroleum industry from all others within 
the state in their discussion of Iraqi oil as “a source of income deriving from an industry that is both capital 
intensive and self-contained, with few direct linkages to the rest of the economy, and employing only a 
very small proportion of the labour force.  Thus…the Iraqi state derives its principle income from a 
commodity for which demand is generated abroad, outside of its own processes of social reproduction” 
(2003:216).   
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disparities between them.  Aside from the innumerable contextual variations (historical, 
societal, political, cultural), demographic factors arise as the most noticeable variable.72  
States like Kuwait with small populations have been set aside as ideal types of rentierism 
(Shambayati 1994:310) due to the excessive impact of external rents on the national 
economy coupled with the negligible existence of any secondary wealth generating 
activities (Mahdavy 1978:431).  Politically, this small-state dynamic in the Gulf has 
served to amplify the effectiveness of governmental distributive efforts (Gause 1994:42).  
Also, ideological dispositions rooted in a range of sociopolitical and historical 
experiences prompted rent recipients to invest their revenues differently in accordance 
with their domestic agendas.  Kiren Chaudhry illustrated this tendency in her 
categorization of rentier regimes as displaying “socialist” or “capitalist” inclinations in 
regards to their petrodollar disbursements.  While her assessment is perhaps too 
diametrical and without any midpoints, it is still insightful if solely for demonstrating the 
range of possibilities available when it comes to the configurations of rentier states.  
Chaudhry maintained that, 
The key difference between countries like Iraq and Libya, on the one hand, and 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the other, was not the extent of state interference in 
the economy, but rather the size of the state’s client groups.  The ‘socialist’ oil 
states entered directly into production themselves, taking over industry, 
agriculture, trade, and services, and they used their control to uphold the living 
standards of a broad base of consumers.  The ‘capitalist’ oil states, in contrast, 
distributed oil wealth to create clients in society who had strong primordial links 
to bureaucrats and decision makers.  [1994:18-19]    
 
                                                
72 Michael Herb makes a convincing case that population size is one of the most underappreciated factors 
of rentierism.  Herb demonstrates that whereas most means of analysis focus heavily on the degree to 
which oil exports account for a nation’s GDP, this approach fails to account for the effect of such revenues 
by overlooking its impact per capita.  This oversight negates the economic realities that separate rentier 
states by haphazardly labeling them all the same.  However, by using Herb’s measurements based on per 
capita indicators, the discrepancies between the oil producing nations become more apparent.  Hence, there 
are rich rentiers and poor rentiers, with countries like Kuwait and the UAE falling into the first category 
while Angola and Nigeria occupy the latter (Herb 2009:376-377).  
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Again, in all likelihood the realities of rentier state-building lie somewhere between these 
two “socialist” and “capitalist” distributive schisms with administrations showing only 
predispositions towards one direction or the other.  For example, Iraq, one of Chaudhry’s 
“socialist” oil states, spent heavily in its private sectors during the boom years of the 
1970s and into the 1980s with the regime favoring those businesses that had close ties to 
official channels (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2003:235-239).73  In another case, Fuad 
Khuri defined the nature of Bahrain’s rentier system as structurally similar “to socialistic 
states in the sense that it [the state] controls the economic resources of the country” 
(1980:153) and it disperses these resources in the forms of extensive social services and 
public employment.  Yet, at the same time the government pursued capitalist strategies 
through its encouragement of private industries that rewarded its clients in a 
disproportionate fashion (Khuri 1980:6, 10, 137, 153).  Kuwait, too, cannot be said to 
exclusively exhibit “socialist” or “capitalist” rentier traits as the Al Sabah have diversely 
utilized both modes as conditions warranted.  There are broad-based collective measures 
that have improved the living standards of the citizenry as a whole, like free education, 
healthcare and infrastructural upgrades (Al Qudsi 1981:401).  Concurrent with these 
communal programs, however, have been the specific government distributions focused 
on sectarian and class distinctions:  funds reserved entirely for the members of specific 
tribes in return for their traditional loyalty to the ruling family (Gavrielides 1987:160) 
and an advantageous business climate for the mercantile elite in an attempt to secure 
                                                
73 Chaudhry’s argument that “capitalist” oil states “distributed oil wealth to create clients in society who 
had strong primordial links to bureaucrats and decision makers” (1994:18-19) is meant to exclude Iraq as 
“socialist.”  However, the government’s contract awards in the mid-1970s clearly reveal a favorable bias 
towards firms located in Tikrit, the familial and political stronghold of Saddam Husayn.  It goes without 
saying that many “of those who benefited most had some sort of privileged access to the regime” (Farouk-




political capital (Gause 1994:54-57).  Once more, further indication that a sharp division 
between “socialist” and “capitalist” rentier schemes is difficult at best if there is no 
recognition for internal variability. 
 Nevertheless, Chaudhry’s claims aside, it is widely accepted that for oil states the 
concentration of so much wealth derived from external sources places substantial powers 
and resources at their disposal (Gause 1994:42).  In comparison to extractive 
administrations in “productive economies” (Cooley 2001:166) that rely upon their 
populaces’ economic activities to generate state revenues (Vandewalle 1998:18), a rentier 
regime fosters a “ruling bargain” (Krause 2009:20) between itself and its citizenry 
whereby the state, in its role as the primary link connecting the local economy to external 
rents (Shambayati 1994:309), allocates its income to support the wellbeing of its 
nationals.  Yet, these allotments are far from indicative of a charitable ruling 
establishment.  The most evident deduction is that these distributive domestic policies by 
oil-receiving regimes discourage political discourse and invite compliance to spread 
amongst their populaces (Okruhlik 1999:308).  Through the mechanisms of allocation, 
the rentier government aspires to depoliticize the public and alleviate discord (Chaudhry 
1994:18-19) while legitimizing itself as the preeminent central actor in state affairs 
(Cooley 2001:166).  By using astute spending tactics like the allowance or withholding of 
official funds, “the intention is to provide benefits with the aim of gaining political 
loyalty or being able to deny such benefits…to those who oppose the government” 
(Gause 1994:43).  What this amounts to for all practical intents and purposes is an 
attempt by the state to purchase popular consent (Krause 2008:21) by virtue of the 
overwhelming resource imbalance between it and the rest of society (Hertog 2010b:285).   
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 The official instruments of this political co-optation commonly take multiple 
forms that range from the conspicuous privileges of citizenship (Cooley 2001:166) to 
more nuanced privileges of access (Hertog 2010b:286-288).  In regards to the former, 
subsidized goods and municipal services (Chaudhry 1994:18) along with socialized 
benefits like standardized medical care and universal education (Al Qudsi 1981:401) are 
the hallmarks of the leadership’s largesse.  Moreover, government employment and 
periodic gifts in the guise of loans (Chaudhry 1994:18) and debt-forgiveness (Gause 
1994:61) epitomize a sense of national entitlement.  In fact, these very welfare allocations 
were once lauded in the rentier literature as forming the underpinnings of popular 
obedience in the oil exporting states.  Yet, in addition to these comprehensive 
disbursements are the private, sometimes informal and largely uneven payments that go 
to benefit a narrow constituency at the expense of the overall population (Okruhlik 
1999:295-297, 300).74  In this manner, the “ruling elites can privilege certain sectors, and 
certain companies within sectors, through the letting of state contracts, control over 
access to capital, policies on the import of labor, and on the writing of government 
regulations” (Gause 1994:54).  Since these and all other allotments are viewed quite 
literally as public resources that are “gifts from God” with resultant revenues devoid of 
well developed policymaking (Shambayati 1994:308) or sizeable local monetary outlay 
(Mahdavy 1978:429), their inequitable distribution calls into question the image of the 
regime’s benevolence in the eyes of its citizenry (Okruhlik 1999:300). 
  In Kuwait, there have been a number of high-profile transactions that exposed the 
ruling family to accusations of malfeasance with the public treasury.  The first case was 
                                                
74 This occurrence is not unlike the aforementioned merger of Chaudhry’s “socialist” and “capitalist” 
distributive rentier models (1994:18-19). 
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possibly the Land Purchase Program of the late 1950s and early 1960s, a thinly-veiled 
reallocation of state funds to private accounts under the pretext of urban development (El 
Mallakh 1966:427).  John Daniels neatly described this ploy as one in which, 
…the government purchased the land on which construction or development was 
to take place at a very inflated price, and a minority of nationals exploited the 
advantage of buying and reselling land at a very handsome profit.  Even some 
officials, with inside knowledge of future developments, were reputed to have 
staked their claims on sites which they knew construction was to take place.  [Al 
Qudsi 1981:403] 
 
A reward to the wealthy meant to provoke their loyalty and gratitude towards the regime 
(Tetreault 2000:156), the Land Purchase Program reinforced the pre-oil dominance of the 
mercantile elites and their tribal counterparts in local dealings (Gause 1994:54).  To 
appreciate the sheer magnitude of these initial transfers of capital and the costs associated 
with privatizing public assets, the following report by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development is instructive:  
In 1959 the amount spent on land was roughly double the increment to public 
foreign investments…During the six and a quarter years ending March 31, 1963, 
over KD 295 million was spent by the Government to acquire land, or more than a 
third of total government income.  Over the same period, the increase in public 
foreign investments was about KD 140 million, or 16 per cent of government 
revenue. 
     From a financial standpoint, in addition to the fact that over 50 per cent more 
has been spent on land in the last six years than on capital projects, a striking fact 
is the relatively small amount which the Government has obtained from the resale 
of land or from rentals on government-owned property.  Despite the fact that the 
housing program would seem to provide for the turnover of a good deal of this 
land, only KD 15.4 million or about 5 per cent of the cost of land acquired by the 
Government has been recovered by sale in the last six years.  [1965:88-89] 
 
Clearly, though, the government had no intentions of recovering its investments in any 
way that would have been measurable by monetary standards.  Rather, its aim was to 
placate the old merchant families and those close enough to the Al Sabah to be privy to 
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its designs (Crystal 1995b:76-77).75 
 In less than two decades after the commencement of the Land Purchase Program 
the government was again afforded several opportunities to funnel its state monies into 
private pockets.  In 1977, the prices of shares on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) 
collapsed due to pervasive speculation and a preponderance of postdated checks.  The 
government swiftly stepped in and compensated traders for their losses with a bailout of 
over KD 150 million (U.S. $525 million) (Elimam, Girgis, and Kotob 1997:90).  
However, at this time the country’s market operated on single transactions of large 
quantities of stocks; minimally, 1000 shares per exchange that, in practice, barred the 
involvement of small investors.  As a result, once the bottom fell out and the treasury 
propped it back up, hundreds of merchants were saved from bankruptcy (Crystal 
1995b:97) while ordinary Kuwaitis watched.  Then again, only a few years later the 
average citizen would have a chance to venture into the market secure in the knowledge 
that the government had already shown that it would not allow for a financial catastrophe, 
self-induced or not, to cripple its populace (Al Yahya 1993:76).  Thus, with oil prices 
soaring, public spending multiplying, and few outlets available for domestic investment 
(Elimam et al. 1997:90) since the KSE remained limited to the old families (Crystal 
1995b:98),76 a parallel market arose in the Al-Manakh building that catered to 
newcomers (Darwiche 1986:95).  Absent of any regulatory oversight, Souq Al-Manakh, 
                                                
75 El Mallakh remarked that several years after the original land purchases were made from the wealthy 
landholders the state did begin to direct its acquisitions in such a way that included low- and middle-
income property owners.  Nevertheless, the budgetary allocations for these later purchases were 
comparatively reduced (1966:431) and it can be assumed that the financial impact for individual families 
was only slight given that the highly lucrative downtown properties were already in the hands of the 
connected classes (Crystal 1995b:76-77). 
76 As almost a matter of propriety these established families guarded the market and traded privately 
amongst themselves.  In this closed market, the “system of dealing is working well as a mechanism for 
moving large sums of money among a small number of investors” (Abdul-Hadi 1988:44).  
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as it came to be known, avoided the state’s safeguards that limited the participation of 
companies,77 brokers,78 and investors79 in the KSE (Abdul-Hadi 1988:21-26).  In this 
anarchic trading environment, where fictitious Gulf companies that existed only on paper 
(Elimam, Girgis, and Kotob 1996:666) were bought and sold with postdated checks80 
without a deferment period or traded for real assets, the euphoria was short-lived.  When 
an investor tried to cash a check for KD 55 million from one of Al-Manakh’s largest 
traders before it was due, the account was found to be insolvent and the market crashed 
(Darwiche 1986:60-61, 88) under the weight of a U.S. $94 billion debt that was over four 
times the amount of the country’s GDP (Elimam et al. 1997:92). 
In spite of this crisis, the government did not respond with the same sense of 
urgency as it had during the 1977 meltdown that paralyzed the merchants’ banking 
activities.  The leadership, though, was rightfully cautious given the enormity of the sums 
involved (Darwiche 1986:98, 101), the lack of any standard accounting methods (Elimam 
et al. 1996:666), and the illegality of the whole 1982 predicament (Al Yahya 1993:33).  
Besides, the government realized that it was ill-equipped to tackle a problem on this scale 
by itself so it called upon the services of the one concern that still remained unscathed:  
the elite-dominated Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) (Moore 
                                                
77 In 1977, the government banned the creation of new public companies to boost the market for existing 
firms.  Also, Gulf companies that were not incorporated in Kuwait were prohibited from being traded on 
the KSE (Darwiche 1986:13, 54-57). 
78 Most of the brokers in Souq Al-Manakh “were ignorant about the nature of the work of a stock exchange.  
Land and property brokers by origin, when share trading was introduced, they automatically changed to the 
new business.  Moreover, they were mostly interested parties, since they took stakes in the companies they 
traded.  Stripped of the impartiality of disinterested advisers, they promoted those companies in which they 
were personally interested” (Darwiche 1986:60). 
79 In addition to those citizens excluded from the legal market by the old merchant families (Abdul-Hadi 
1988:44), Al-Manakh was also available to non-Kuwaitis who were prevented from directly accessing the 
official market (Al Yahya 1993:32). 
80 A postdated check premium of 60 to 300 percent was added to spot prices to compensate sellers for their 
delayed payment (Elimam et al. 1997:91).  Some of these checks bore future dates that ranged from months 
to years (Darwiche 1986:60). 
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2001:137-138) whose representatives enjoyed access to the official market (Crystal 
1995b:100) and did not have to resort to Al-Manakh.  The inclusion of these traditional 
powerbrokers allowed the KCCI merchants to regain some of their hold over the 
country’s policies that they had lost in the post-oil years after the state replaced them as 
the nation’s employer and welfare provider (Crystal 1989:434).  For instance, to manage 
the fallout from Al-Manakh, the Supreme Planning Council was formed with seven of its 
ten independent members drawn from the KCCI.  Next, in 1986, “direct pleas by KCCI 
president al-Sagr resulted in the creation of the Economic Reactivation Committee, a 
high-level advisory board of KCCI board members and state technocrats.  The state also 
reversed its controversial personnel decisions of the 1970s by appointing KCCI loyalists 
and eventually the director-general of the KCCI to head key economic ministries” 
(Moore 2001:137).  Expectedly, the old guard seized this turn of events as a chance to 
reassert their control over the private economy while penalizing the upstarts who had 
facilitated the Al-Manakh debacle; a class of investors who were depicted as: 
[N]ew speculators with little to lose, people of modest origins or former civil 
servants, who seized an unrepeatable opportunity to improve their financial status.  
The majority of those involved in Al-Manakh belonged to the families of the 
nouveaux riches rather than to the traditionally wealthy families prominent in the 
economy and in major businesses.  [Darwiche 1986:95] 
 
Despite any evident conflict of interests, the principals of the KCCI also oversaw the 
Kuwait Clearing and Financial Settlements Company and acted as legal agents for 85 
percent of the debtors; a process that strengthened its position as an intermediary between 
the government and its citizens (Moore 2001:138-139).81  More profitably, though, the 
                                                
81 To illustrate the suspect motives of the KCCI in its role as mediator and whether it represented its clients’ 
best interests is a meeting that was held between its Finance Committee and the Cabinet Economic 
Committee.  In this session, the KCCI representatives sought to cease further bankruptcies and lower the 
debts of existent bankrupts.  Not only was this proposal unlawful but “creditors of bankrupts would have 
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merchants’ involvement yielded significant incentives.  In 1983, over the course of only 
two months the state injected a sum KD 250 million into the commercial establishment’s 
preferred official stock market (Al Yahya 1993:38).  Additionally, the succession of 
bankruptcies that followed in the wake of Al-Manakh (Elimam et al. 1996:666; Darwiche 
1986:127) transferred extensive newly moneyed properties back to the business 
aristocracy at liquidation prices, and the declining economy even convinced the 
government to reintroduce its Land Purchase Program (Crystal 1995b:100).  The cordial 
working relationship with the state throughout the entire Al-Manakh episode also led the 
merchants to marginalize their counterparts (Moore 2004:134-135) and pursue more 
restrictive policy measures to protect their own trade interests (Crystal 1995b:100).  As 
just one example of this, the 1983 Decree on the Regulation of the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange instituted the Market Management Committee and designated that four of its 
12 members were to be taken from the ranks of the KCCI (Darwiche 1986:128).  
Entrusted with overseeing the market and approving brokers’ applications, as well as 
setting the fees for new brokerage companies (Abdul-Hadi 1988:27-28), the Committee 
gave its KCCI majority recognizable leverage in the postparallel market.  This correlates 
well with Jill Crystal’s conclusion that once Al-Manakh was contained, ultimately it was 
the “older merchants [who] had thus benefited from the crisis” (1995b:100).    
 The last serious disruption to this implicit “business as usual” domestic rule 
                                                                                                                                            
suffered an injustice, in that they would have incurred a part of their debtors’ insolvency.  The injustice 
would have been flagrant, because dozens of other creditors had received what they were owed in full 
through the [Security] Fund.  A double standard would have been created between those who had recovered 
their monies in full and those asked to make sacrifices” (Darwiche 1986:120).  Nevertheless, the passage of 
Law 100/1983 was indicative of the KCCI agenda (Moore 2001:139):  a ceiling of 25 percent on postdated 
check premiums.  Debtors who settled before this law lost money by paying a higher premium as well as 
losing the premiums they had expected to collect as creditors (Al Yahya 1983:41, 76).  Thus, for the dealers 
caught in the middle, having paid their debts in full but now legally bound to collect only a quarter of their 
outstanding dues, bankruptcies “followed one another…in a chain reaction” (Darwiche 1986:127).     
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commenced in the early hours of August 2, 1990, as Iraqi units poured across the border 
into Kuwait.  Coming after many seasons of internal turmoil, the Al-Manakh collapse, the 
unresolved suspension of the National Assembly in 1986, and the continued calls by 
prodemocracy activists for reforms, the regime could not have been in a weaker position 
as it fled the country.  Once in Saudi Arabia, however, the exiled government quickly 
moved to prepare the groundwork for its return.  Politically, it appeased the opposition by 
pledging to restore the constitution (Tetreault 2000:78.79, 82-85) and reinstate the 
National Assembly upon liberation (Zahlan 1998:54).  On the other hand, more pressing 
was the issue of how to reestablish the relations that had endorsed the status quo for so 
long.  To this end, symbolically the regime reached out to the old merchants and selected 
KCCI Chairman ‘Abd al’Aziz al-Saqr to speak on behalf of the people at the October 
1990 Jeddah Conference, an event staged to show the world that the legitimacy of the 
ruling Al Sabah was backed by popular solidarity (Alnajjar 2000:253-254).  
Nevertheless, to regain its grasp on local affairs the government had to do more than 
publicly reconcile with its critics; it had to reaffirm its own prewar function as the 
nation’s unrivaled distributor (Crystal 1995b:178) despite the fact that the invasion had 
erased its capital surplus and driven the regime to seek loans (Ismael 1993:175).  
Accordingly,  
The amir worked hard to adopt the prewar strategy of placating the population 
economically.  Despite severe economic constraints, the government announced it 
would pay all existing consumer loans, car loans and mortgage loans to Kuwaitis, 
pay back salaries to government employees for the occupation period, exempt 
Kuwaitis from utility and other public service charges and rents incurred during 
the occupation, and increase government entitlements in a variety of categories 
(marriage grants, child allowances, aid to orphans, widows and the poor).  In 
March 1992 the government granted a 25 per cent salary increase to all Kuwaitis 




Supplementing this general welfare package for the populace were several initiatives 
intended to rescue and mollify the nation’s commercial establishment.  Included in the 
postinvasion bank bailout was a provision for the government to purchase the debts of 
investment houses.  All told, this would have cost the treasury an estimated U.S. $20 
billion (Ismael 1993:175) and, as to be expected, the KCCI was very supportive of this 
plan.  Later, the National Assembly amended the original proposal (Gause 1994:56) 
although it accepted a revised version from the KCCI in 1995 (Moore 2001:139).  Also, 
in the rush to rebuild the country, the government oversaw several modifications to its 
existing trade policies that appealed directly to the old families’ interests.  Former 
housing minister Ibrahim Shanin was entrusted with approving all reconstruction 
contracts, a task for which he was woefully inept, and many believed that his 
appointment was orchestrated by the country’s merchants to ease their access to lucrative 
state contracts (Tetreault 2000:85-86).  Whether this was actually the case or not, the 
annulment of the Public Tenders Law No. 37 lowered many of the barriers between 
contractors and public monies, particularly the prohibition on direct negotiation for 
tendering that bypassed the Central Tenders Committee’s powers of review (Gerald 
1991:328) that were in place to control the use of government money (Arab Law 
Quarterly 1986:460).  With a price tag of up to U.S. $30 billion (Al Bahar 1991:15) there 
were ample enticements for businessmen to take part in the rebuilding efforts (Tetreault 
2000:86) now that they could operate unimpeded by procedural supervision.   
 Noticeably, the preceding samples are quite illustrative of selective allocation on 
the part of the Kuwaiti government.  Although there are the wide-ranging perks that 
impact the citizenry, such as guaranteed civil service employment (Tetreault 2000:156), 
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particular support is directed towards specific groups like the old merchant families 
(Gause 1994:54-57) and the tribes in the hopes of securing their political cooperation 
(Gavrielides 1987:160).  This foregoing scenario is the basis for conventional rentier 
analysis:  the local distribution of externally-derived rents in exchange for popular 
obedience towards the state (Okruhlik 1999:295-297).  Yet, this also pinpoints exactly 
why the rentier approach demands further treatment.  The unequal disbursement of 
payments and privileges (Cooley 2001:166), rather than breeding passivity and 
contentment, actually cultivates resentment and discord.  In this way, Gwenn Okruhlik 
attests that,  
… [The] long-stated corollary of the observation that distribution replaces 
extraction as the primary function of the state is that oil wealth can be distributed 
and used to placate potential dissent.  Thus, the government can effectively buy 
off opposition.  Yet in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain opposition has arisen 
and with it a discrepancy between the expectations derived from the rentier 
framework and empirical reality.  Not simply the receipt of oil revenue, but the 
choices made on how to spend it shape development…The rentier framework has 
proven inadequate in elucidating the rise of dissent because it reifies the state and 
overemphasizes state resources and autonomy from the social consequences of 
expenditures.  [1999:296-297]    
 
Thus, instead of merely buying the citizenry’s affections, the rentier state’s position as 
the overwhelming source of national wealth places it at the forefront of debates when 
questions arise over its spending habits (Vandewalle 1998:27).  Even in Kuwait, where 
the ruling family has been keen to dispense state monies in accordance with its political 
agendas, these programs have not passed unnoticed.  In 1996, parliamentarian Ahmad al-
Sa’doun spoke out against the Kuwait Investment Authority, accusing the state of 
“simply selling its assets to a select number of Kuwait’s elite” (Tetreault 2000:189).  Just 
a few years earlier the Kuwait Investment Office, chaired by Sheikh Fahd Muhammad Al 
Sabah, could not account for several billion dollars ventured in Spain (Crystal 
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1995b:177).  In the ensuing outcry, National Assembly member Abdallah al-Nobari 
disparaged, “It seems that some members of the Kuwaiti royal family just helped 
themselves to a financial grab equivalent to Saddam Hussein’s invasion” (Cohen 
1993:C1).  Hence, while the rentier framework is suggestive of the state’s immunity from 
its citizenry’s appeals (Krause 2009:20), it cannot assume or guarantee the public’s 
quiescence when the official distributive mechanisms are so skewed in the favor of so 
few (Okruhlik 1999:296-297). 
 Another limitation readily apparent in rentier assessments is the overemphasis on 
a “top-down dynamic” (Moore and Salloukh 2007:59) that leads to assumptions about 
rentierism’s effects on individuals without actually exploring the options available for 
individual agency.  Although the rentier state is not internally extractive it nonetheless 
must be well entrenched in local affairs and not at all be set apart from society (Okruhlik 
1999:308-309); otherwise, it would be unable mete out its surpluses with any degree of 
efficiency.  Yet, in small states like Kuwait with expansive bureaucracies that employ all 
but a fraction of the nationalized populations (Hertog 2010b:286), nearly everyone enjoys 
some sort of privileged access to the state and its resources (Hertog 2005:130-131); from 
ubiquitous civil servants and “paper pushers” (Hertog 2010b:292) to midlevel technocrats 
and administrative fiefdoms (Hertog 2005:131) there are seemingly endless ranks of 
intermediaries standing between citizens and services (Gause 1994:60).  With so many 
opportunities for brokerage and influence peddling, a condition intensified by such 
bureaucratic vastness that proper channels and efficiency are either unforthcoming or 
altogether absent without personal intervention (Hertog 2010b:291, 306), individual rent-
seeking becomes a standardized, day-to-day modus operandi for those who require basic 
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public amenities as well as even more discretionary dispensations (Vandewalle 1998:24).  
Therefore, the rentier image of social dormancy that is presumed to result from the state’s 
distributive munificence is shortsighted and neglects the fact that these civic properties 
are oftentimes guarded within closed, personalized networks (Ledeneva 1998:96, 100-
101) that easily transpose any distinctions between the private and the public (Volkov 
2000:38). 
 
Facilitating Access to the Personalized Bureaucracy 
 In the rentier states found throughout the Gulf the confluence of colossal national 
wealth, limited nonstate productive capacities, and the near total reliance by local 
populations on public services in the forms of jobs and subsidies (Hertog 2010b:285-286) 
have made each of the governments in the region a focal point for their respective 
citizenries.  Indeed, it is certainly plausible that this civic scrutiny is heightened given 
that the state is the sole recipient of all oil-generated rents (Khuri 1980:153) and the 
discretionary dispenser of these revenues (Vandewalle 1998:27) according to its 
inclinations (Gause 1994:43).  Moreover, as the aforementioned Kuwaiti cases illustrate, 
these inclinations are hardly equitable despite any ideals to the contrary.  Not 
surprisingly, “While the development of oil contributed to a tremendous growth and 
proliferation of the economy, it has simultaneously generated all kinds of inequalities” 
(Khuri 1980:152).  These disparities become even more amplified by the arbitrary nature 
of state allocations (Vandewalle 1998:27); a characteristic of rent distribution in the Gulf 
States that is aided by opaque bureaucratic channels and restricted magisterial access 
(Hertog 2010b:292).  Such traits, Alena Ledeneva argues, lead to “closed distribution 
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systems” that “are closed particularly in terms of information.  Whereas privileges are 
common knowledge, there is no open information about the criteria for entitlement, 
services and rations” (1998:100).  Combined with the absence of administrative 
impartiality at any level of government, from the routine daily offices for licenses and 
permits to the more specialized requests that require higher-ranking intervention (Crow 
1966:174-175), it becomes a regular expectation that informal and personalized 
connections must constantly be sought to mediate transactions between the citizen and 
the state (Hertog 2010b:284). 
 This whole process of deploying one’s contacts in order to make some desired 
result come to fruition requires the discriminative use of wasta, a colloquial usage of the 
formal Arabic waseet (Makhoul and Harrison 2004:25),82 the root of which means 
“middle” (Hertog 2010b:289) although in actual practice it functionally denotes “either 
mediation or intercession… [both] the person who mediates / intercedes as well as the act 
of mediation / intercession” (Cunningham and Sarayrah1994:29).  In its most innocuous 
forms, waseet can encompass reconciliatory interpositions (tawassat and yatawassat) 
meant to compel antagonists to find a middle ground (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993:1) 
for the sake of restoring the social order (Antoun 2000:449-450).83  Undoubtedly, this is 
the perspective that Victor Ayoub had in mind when he wrote that in Lebanon, “When a 
dispute severs a social relationship among clansmen, the process of mediation begins to 
function.  A wasta is formed… [that designated] the group of men who at any time acted 
                                                
82 Frederick Charles Huxley also recorded wasita (sing.) and wasayit (pl.) as a Lebanese variation on the 
colloquial wasta (1978:29). 
83 Intuitively, it is understandable that some mediators are not gratified by altruism alone.  Ginat makes 
clear that for the Bedouin of the Negev and Galilee, successful mediation can enhance a man’s status and 
even establish him as a paid adjudicator (1987:79-81).  
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as mediators in a dispute” (1966:109).84  Still, in the Yemeni highlands even now, 
tawassat, or mediation, is upheld as a revered role by the religious elites (sayyids or 
sadah) who stylize themselves as neutral parties that use tactful compromises that 
skillfully avoid degradation to remedy plaintiffs’ injuries (Weir 2007:137-138).85  
 More frequently, though, wasta has taken on a less constructive tone to indicate 
the promotion of individual, private interests that circumvent formal procedures and 
potentially deprives others of their rights (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:7, 18-20).  Wasta in 
this sense entails the deployment of influential liaisons on one’s behalf to secure some 
benefits that, without wasta, might not have been reasonably attainable (Makhoul and 
Harrison 2004:25-27).  While this may, at first glance, appear to insinuate that petitioners 
are always trying to stake their claims to entitlements that are rightfully owed to others, 
although this does happen more often than not (Wickham 2002:55), it is also true that 
supplicants must regularly seek agents simply to find any satisfaction in their legitimate 
dealings with government offices (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:32).  Saud Joseph 
underscored these currents in Lebanon with her findings that without the right wasta, the 
country’s judicial and legal structures remain practically inaccessible: 
The class relationships relevant to working the Lebanese law were manifested in 
patronage ties and legitimated in personal-moral terms.  The law neither protected 
individuals automatically nor operated independently by formal rules.  To make 
the law ‘work,’ individuals needed wasta (brokerage connections to persons in 
power).  By exchanging services, manipulating identities, and evoking moralities, 
individuals created short- and long-term, horizontal and vertical alliances to build 
wasta networks.  [1990:144] 
 
                                                
84 This classification of the actors involved in conflict management was further defined by Antoun wherein 
a wasta “go-between” (1979:156) “is always to be preferred to the self as an effective pleader” (2000:460) 
since this party is thought to be evenhanded and / or well-connected enough to gain acceptable concessions 
(2000:448). 
85 This is not far removed from Goffman’s general depiction of successful mediation as being the avoidance 
of embarrassment for all those concerned without the shame or humiliation of rejection (1959:149).  
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In nearby Jordan, Sa’eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha echoed Joseph’s account but they 
expanded their inquiry to reflect the typical frustration that comes with handling any 
aspect of the national bureaucracy: 
In daily life, Wasta is used to facilitate procedures in state institutions.  People 
resort to Wasta mainly to avoid the waste of time and money on administrative 
procedures, or still, to subdue the disrespect that comes with bureaucracy…an 
aspect that should be further studied since it gives legitimacy to Wasta.  One does 
not have to know influential personalities to use Wasta.  Suffice to know an 
employee at the concerned department or a friend of his/hers to carry out the 
needed paper work or to alleviate the demanded costs.  [2002:18] 
 
Kuwait, too, exhibits its own analogous tendencies whenever there are the inevitable 
meetings that bring the nation’s inhabitants into contact with the state’s hierarchical 
agencies.  As the narratives below reveal, the need for wasta and the admittances it can 
provide permeates every level of Kuwaiti society regardless of citizenship.  In the first 
instance, a national, Khalid A. R., recounts his mother’s ordeal with the healthcare 
system: 
Sometimes you go to the hospital to take a [doctor] prescribed treatment, like a 
[therapeutic] sauna, and you are asked officially right there if you have wasta.  
Wasta speeds things up.  This did not happen to me but it happened to my mother 
during the course of her recovery.86   
 
Staying with healthcare, the experience of Faisal, a very well-connected retiree, 
highlights some of these arrangements as they are used to expedite the government’s 
public coverage of its populous.   
Faisal once held a low-level governmental post and when he was active in his 
position he developed an impressive number of contacts within the different 
ministries.  Today, people visit Faisal precisely for his access to this broad range 
of decision-makers.  Regularly, Faisal finds himself out during the day calling on 
people all at the request of others. 
     One of Faisal’s acquaintances, Abu Bakr, is a good example of his networking 
capabilities.  Faisal and Abu Baker first met one afternoon when they both 
happened to be visiting the Ministry of Health.  In the hallway outside of the 
                                                
86 Khalid A. R.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 22, 2009. 
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personnel offices, Abu Bakr lamented to Faisal that for the past three months he 
had been trying to get his paperwork signed but, regrettably, he did not know any 
of the managers or directors.  Faisal, from his previous work, was on personal 
terms with the director that Abu Bakr needed.  He took Abu Bakr’s papers and 
returned them to him, signed, within an hour.87   
 
Given these complications that the citizenry faces in its maneuverings with the 
bureaucracy, it is not unexpected that for expatriates too, there are considerable barriers 
that hinder those trying to find their way through the state’s immense networks of 
regulatory offices and redundant paperwork.  Like the urban laborers and working classes 
that Saud Joseph depicts in Lebanon, Kuwait’s foreign work force must also confront an 
obstructive bureaucracy as they are burdened by the weight of their substantial 
“handicaps:  lack of time, money and resources, the likelihood of illegal statuses, and 
negative past encounters with public officials” (Joseph 1990:145).  These obstacles, and 
the means by which to resolve them, are all present in the commentary of Tamer M., a 
young Pakistani man from Lahore employed in Kuwait’s private sector as an office 
assistant, who expressed his aggravations with trying to get a driver’s permit: 
If I get my [driver’s] license I will buy a car to get around; it will make going to 
work and coming home easier because right now I have to ride with friends.  I 
have stayed on [at] my new job for nine months and I have my [civil 
identification] card but even with the card it is hard to get a driving license.  I 
have tried many times [to get one] but they want more papers… signed from 
many ministries and offices.88  My friend at work is Kuwaiti and he knows 
someone he can give my papers to.  I think this will take care of it.89     
 
Comments like these by Tamer M., Faisal, and Khalid A. R. make it unmistakable that 
wasta, whether manifest as trustworthy connections (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:20) or 
                                                
87 Faisal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 3, 2007. 
88 Minimally, non-Westerners applying for a driver’s license must collect the necessary forms and circulate 
them amongst their embassy, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Public Health, the 
Traffic Department in Qurtoba, the Licensing Section at the Central Traffic Department in Shuwaikh, and 
the Traffic Department in their residential district.  
89 Tamer M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 17, 2007. 
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outright favoritism (Haladjian-Henriksen 2006:315), defines the junctures where the 
interests of the state, the polity, and the body politic all intersect.  It is, in Frederick 
Charles Huxley’s estimation, the linkage that “operates on and between [the] micro and 
macro levels” (1978:12) of society.  In the testimonies cited above, wasta serves in what 
some authors have called its deceptively egalitarian (Perthes 1997:181) or benevolent 
(Kilani and Sakijha 2002:25) guises; namely, it can provide a conduit by which anyone 
(Sharabi 1988:46), citizen and expatriate alike, can penetrate the regulation-laden state 
bureaucracy and receive satisfaction (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:22, 25).  That is, unless 
one does not have the sufficient wasta needed to outflank all others competing for the 
same spoils. 
  Outside of its equalizing pretexts, when everyday it is called upon to sway 
contests with the bureaucracy over to the sides of the citizenry (Kilani and Sakijha 
2002:21, 22), wasta is disparaged as a stigmatizing (Mohamed and Hamdy 2008:1-3), 
socially divisive, and culpable in forming dependencies (Perthes 1997:181).  In her work 
addressing the symptoms of poverty in Lebanon, Sylvia Haladjian-Henriksen went so far 
as to reproach what she sees as the central role that wasta plays in creating schisms 
between Lebanese social classes: 
In fact, as wasta seems always to be behind social and political power, job 
opportunities, high incomes, educational success, etc. (and even sometimes access 
to healthcare), social classes are more or less constituted around this concept.  
Thus, individuals, and mainly families, who have very strong wasta (very strong 
connections with powerful people) have greater opportunities to be part of the 
upper classes.  At the opposite extreme, those with no wasta at all will in all 
probability find themselves in the lower classes and be identified as ‘the poor.’  
Consequently, social mobility can be considered to be strongly connected to 
wasta gain or loss.  In particular, ‘losing wasta’ would simply mean 




While this statement is plainly reminiscent of the adage that “the people who do better 
are better connected” (Burt 1999:48), though neglectful of the counterpoint that wasta 
can operate vertically to connect socially disparate groups (Joseph 1990:144), it is more 
complete in its conviction that it is the unbalanced circulation of wasta (Perthes 
1997:181) that will disproportionately shape the probabilities for betterment in a 
multitude of arenas.  This is what happened for Rashid A. M. after he submitted his 
employment application with one of the state’s agencies.  He was excited to be called 
back for an interview although, as he quickly discovered, the evaluative protocol was 
little more than a shallow formality. 
At the meeting where the applicants meet the heads of the departments that they 
are applying to, I was told by the man taking me into the room, ‘Do not even 
worry about anything at all if you have wasta.  Don’t be nervous if you have a 
wasta.  Just answer their questions.  Don’t be nervous if you have a wasta.’90 
 
Rashid A. M. moves on from this discussion to another story that is somewhat parabolic 
in its content as if it is intended to show that turning to wasta is hardly exceptional, even 
for the most accomplished, in Kuwait: 
One of my father’s close friends had four sons graduate from college at the top of 
their class in the United States.  At their graduation, they even shook hands with 
[former U.S. president] Clinton.  When the boys returned to Kuwait they told their 
father that they wanted to find jobs on their own without his help and without his 
wasta.  After a year, they came back to their father and said, ‘O.k., help us find 
jobs now.’91   
 
Also, there are two additional principles of wasta that must not be overlooked:  not all 
wasta is equally potent insofar as its capacity to deliver the desired outcome; and, a wasta 
exchange may only be indirect in that it capitalizes on “friends of friends” (Boissevain 
                                                
90 Rashid A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 22, 2009. 
91 Rashid A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 22, 2009. 
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1974:24-25) who serve as “chains… to gain access to a certain resource” (Lin 2001:44).92  
Reflective of this first tenet, that not all wasta is equivalent in its ability to supersede its 
opposite numbers, is the job search that Ali A. K., a Kuwaiti information technologies 
(IT) specialist educated in the United States, executed a few years before he found his 
current employer: 
When I applied for a job at Kuwait Oil Company [KOC], my father had me meet 
with one of his friends who he thought could help me at KOC.  It was nice but it 
did not matter for me and I did not get hired.  [Why?]  Many of the other 
applicants had stronger wasta.  Stronger wasta would be someone held higher in 
the eyes of the company.  For example, a minister.93 
 
Continuing, Ali A. K. details another of his quests, this time for “friends of friends” or 
what he deemed as “small fish wasta” to allude to those secondary contacts that can assist 
with procedural details, like forms and documentation, but ultimately must pass one 
along to someone else with more capable, stronger connections.  In this next excerpt, Ali 
A. K. shows how this practice unfolds.  Despite his use of hypothetical phrasing here, Ali 
A. K. is intimately familiar with the process he describes: 
Any applicant for employment will first want to find [all] the names of a 
company’s managers.  Then, [he can] look for people who might have wasta with 
these managers to help the applicant or an applicant will try to find one of his 
relatives who is close to a manager.  This can move him [the applicant] to 
someone who… [has] stronger wasta.94 
 
What becomes increasingly apparent in these accounts of wasta is that it is infused with 
the qualitative attributes of interpersonal aid.  Although it distinctly exudes the veneer of 
what some have called dependency (Perthes 1997:181) and others have criticized as the 
                                                
92 Needless to say, the presence of one of these conditions does not preclude the activation of the other.  
Ostensibly impotent wasta might easily lead a solicitor to more helpful wasta (Joseph 1990:150-155) just 
as plentiful “friends of friends” are sometimes painfully ineffective in their efforts to achieve acceptable 
results.  
93 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
94 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
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trappings of nepotism (Haladjian-Henriksen 2006:315) or corruption (Kilani and Sakijha 
2002:17), such labels ignore the fundamental centrality that relationships occupy in a 
country like Kuwait.  From the self-framed image at the state level where leadership and 
governance is personified (Zahlan 1998:79) rather than cast in abstract institutions (Al 
Oudat and Alshboul 2010:71), to the complications of “meritocratic individualism” 
(Shryock and Howell 2001:266) in a social climate where “mutual favor-doing” (Bill 
1973:138) is simultaneously a marker of success (Hamzeh 2001:176)95 and a community 
expectation (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:33),96 any boundaries that would delineate 
individual concerns and the dynamics of kinship from the business of statecraft and 
industry (Sharabi 1988:131) are either unclear (Shryock and Howell 2001:249)97 or 
completely negotiable (Kingston 2001:56-57). 
 Eric Wolf surmised as much in his scrutiny of formal power structures and the 
parallel existence of informal groups that challenge the state for its resources, and 
compete amongst each other, but are nevertheless still needed by officialdom for its very 
survival (1966a:1-2).  Here, however, the distinction between formal and informal 
frameworks is far less pronounced as official avenues are enmeshed with, and legitimated 
by, the rhetoric of interpersonal obligations and responsibilities (Rosen 2002:62-71).  
                                                
95 Kilani and Sakijha contend that the sole act of meting out wasta can be convincing enough to signal 
one’s achievements to the wider public (2002:23, 74).   
96 In Crow’s review of public institutional efficiency in Lebanon, he found that for civil servants, 
communal demands and the loyalties of group membership often trumped conceptual administrative goals 
(1966:175).  The was still patently in effect decades later when, in the aftermath of the civil war, Lebanon’s 
environmental conservation efforts were marred by posts being filled based on factional loyalty at the cost 
of professional expertise (Kingston 2001:64). 
97 In this respect it is worthwhile to quote Hisham Sharabi’s thoughts on personalized institutions, or what 
he concluded to be neopatriarchal institutions, in the Middle East:  “For the typical bureaucrat, for instance, 
the workplace (one’s office) is no more than an extension of the place of sociability and relaxation.  There 
is little qualitative difference between what goes on in the office or what goes on in the salon, living room, 
or diwan… This is not just a pattern of local behavior, but an institutionally embodied and socially 
prevalent practice.  Thus bureaucracy – in government, the military, education, business – projects a 
modernized exterior, but internally its structure is essentially patriarchal, animated by an elaborate system 
of personal relations, kinship, and patronage” (1981:131). 
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Shryock and Howell, in their study of prominent Jordanian families and the 
contemporary memories of tribal politics during the early days of statehood, chose the 
phrase “house politics” to explain the conceptual limits of state-society autonomy “by 
exploring the zones in which the processes and institutional objects familiar to 
metropolitan political science give way to… other intimate encounters” (2001:250).  
Further blurring any structural lines that would demarcate where the “webs of 
informality” (Bill 1973:134) end and the offices of state begin is Nazih Ayub’s outlook 
that throughout the Gulf, “Just as the état providence is also an état famille, the raison 
d'état is not easily distinguishable from the raison de famille” (2006:229).  What must be 
added to Ayub’s reasoning is that the synthesis of the raison d'état and the raison de 
famille becomes possible only once the former has been loaded with the same “moral and 
emotional content” (Joseph 1990:144) as the latter.  Whether or not this is signified 
through the lexicon of kinship (Joseph 1993:454)98 or some alternative device99 intended 
to prompt requital, like gift-giving (Bourdieu 1966:204, 206) or visiting (Rugh 1997:218-
219),100 it is the design and management of relational indexes (Padgett and Ansell 
                                                
98 In an interesting piece on the uses of relatedness in workplace practices, Jenny White reported the 
metaphorical use of kinship by underpaid female pieceworkers in Istanbul to extend “the requirements and 
benefits of reciprocity beyond the family and actual kin to a group of unrelated individuals who do what 
kin do” (2000:142).  This corresponds with Larson’s discussion of how, according to context, nonkin might 
be regarded “as if” they are blood relations to validate their closeness (1983:566).  Of course, Lancaster’s 
classic study of the Rwala Bedouin explored the ideas of genealogical hindsight whereby pragmatic 
relationships were explained by manipulating the idioms of descent (1997:32-34). 
99 Marc Bloch, in his expansive volumes on the rise and decline of the medieval European feudal system, 
specified the weakening of protective kinship as one of the main causes that led to a form of vassal 
patronage that, in some ways, reproduced familiar commitments (1961:142, 148, 225).  Henry Rosenfeld 
agreed with this last proposition in his work on Palestinian Arab villages where 19th century landlord-tenant 
relationships were often merged with the liabilities of kinship-oriented reciprocation by the peasants to 
secure allowances from landowners (1974:140-141).  In postindependent Lebanon, Hamzeh isolated 
confessional clientelism as supplanting the Ottoman-era ascriptive foundations of feudal patrons 
(2001:169-170, 176). 
100 Bourdieu makes the point about Kabylian gift exchange that equates giving with the issuing of a 
challenge that demands a riposte (1966:204-206).  This is similar to Mauss’ perspective that offerings 
without repayment can lead to the recipient’s subservience and shame (1954:63, 72).  These types of tests 
compliment Andrea Rugh’s observation that at her field site in Wusta, Syria, there is always an element of 
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1993:1310) like these that collapse the dichotomies of executive duties and customary 
commitments (Rosen 1995:201).  
 Against this backdrop that pervades with what Hisham Shirabi derided as one in 
which, “Public office is a privilege and public service a favor” (1988:132), personalism 
and the cultivation of personalistic ties surface as instrumental in configuring individual 
and group ambitions (Lancaster and Lancaster 2006:349).  Before the Islamic Revolution 
toppled the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979, James A. Bill witnessed the intense pursuit of 
these kinds of relationships by Iranians in their commonplace interactions at every stage 
of society; a preoccupation that, in his view, was practiced with methodical 
tenaciousness: 
The system of persistent and direct personalism pervades all corners of an 
individual’s life.  It dominates, for example, in family, occupational, religious, 
educational and governmental settings.  In such an environment, one is required to 
develop highly refined techniques of perception and persuasion.  An individual’s 
survival and success have often rested upon his ability to make the right personal 
contact and then to be able to use that contact to achieve a certain end… The most 
common expression describing the intricacies of the personal flow of power in 
Iran is pārtī.  This term means to possess connections, to be able to pull strings, or 
to have “pull.”  There is a saying in contemporary Tehran circles that in order to 
achieve any important goal in Iran one must be strong in Vitamin P, i.e., pūl 
(money), pārtī, and pur ru’ī (pushiness).  [1973:136-137]101 
 
It is probably not a coincidence that Bill’s Iranian “Vitamin P” and all of its undertones 
are matched by the pejorative moniker “Vitamin Waw”102 used in Arabic-speaking 
countries to scorn wasta (Mohamed and Hamdy 2008:1) or, as bank employee Yahya 
                                                                                                                                            
tension inherent to social calls for hosts because their visitors usually harbor an underlying expectation that 
they wish to see fulfilled (1997:219). 
101 Javidan and Dastmalchian also add that the deployment of mediators in Iranian society serves to lessen 
the potential for interpersonal disagreements:  “Because Iranians tend to avoid direct confrontation and 
conflict, they prefer to use a third party who is usually trusted by both sides… to facilitate the conversation 
and the resolution of issues” (2003:133). 
102 In this usage “waw” refers to the Arabic letter waw that is at the beginning of the word wasta (Jammal 
2003:108).    
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retorted when asked about it in Kuwait City, to dismiss it euphemistically.103  Even so, 
the words of Ahmad H., a Kuwaiti college student who studied in the United States, are 
genuinely succinct in their appraisal of the primacy that interpersonal obligations are 
given in the country:  “Our life is all about connections… it is not about who I am or if I 
have this degree, it is about who I know.”104  Khalid A. R. qualified this judgment after 
he took a moment to collect his thoughts on how indispensible connections are for 
attaining anything in Kuwait.  In his opinion, 
Our government is strong in the sense that no one can overthrow it… [But] it is 
weak in [its] power… The government and its laws, the legal system, [are] not 
respected or feared.  [It is] respected by those without wasta or relations [because] 
wasta or relations let people get away with things.  [Why?]  [This is a] small 
country, everything is built on relationships.105 
 
Each of the foregoing cases makes it clear that wasta and its subtexts constitute a 
valuable and necessary resource base that almost invariably must be mobilized whenever 
authorization or sanction is needed (Crow 1966:174).  On an abstract level, this 
characterization of wasta bears an undeniable resemblance to the notion of social capital, 
as it was proposed by Pierre Bourdieu, in that it too exemplifies, “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Portes 
1998:3).  Nan Lin further refined Bourdieu’s synopsis of social capital as being indicative 
of, 
…the resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for 
actions.  Thus, the concept has two important components:  (1) it represents 
                                                
103 Yahya also shared that dezah, or push, was a less common but not unknown synonym for wasta in 
Kuwait City.  The example that Yaha provided was, “He had a dezah [push] into his management 
position.”  Yahya.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 21, 2010. 
104 Ahmad H.  Interview conducted in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 11, 2007. 
105 Khalid A. R.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 22, 2009. 
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resources embedded in social relations rather than individuals, and (2) access and 
use of such resources reside with actors.  [2001:25] 
 
Correspondingly, Sandra Franke determined that social capital could not be fully 
comprehended without recognizing that it is located within interpersonal networks and 
that it is not the discretionary asset of lone individuals.  With this formulation, Franke 
advocated that: 
This approach is based on the premise that social capital is neither an individual 
nor a collective property, but rather a property arising from the interdependence 
between individuals and between groups within a community.  Consequently, 
social capital is viewed as a resource that emerges from social ties and is then 
used by members (individuals or groups) of networks.  [2005:2] 
 
Clifford Geertz, a quarter of a century earlier, would even suggest as much in his analysis 
of Moroccan merchants in the suwwaq of Sefrou where he postulated that the 
heterogeneous mixtures of goods, social backgrounds, and information could be partly 
controlled by, “constructing around oneself a personal network of exchange relations in 
which these matters can be given a reasonably determinate, stabilized form” (1979:230).  
Working within the same Maghrebian milieu, Lawrence Rosen emulated Geertz’s 
proposal by explicitly focusing his attentions towards, “the centrality of the individual as 
the fundamental social unit who engages in a series of dyadic contracts within and 
beyond his kinsmen to construct a web of indebtedness that links him to others in his 
world” (1984:91).  Also, as Kenneth Brown pointed out in his historical investigation of 
Salé, securing such linkages was a stipulation for cooperative efforts that occupied both 
the elites and their dependents: 
The basic fabric of this community was held together by cross-cutting ties among 
individuals, and by networks of social relationships.  The elite of the community 
were those important personalities who dominated social networks.  Their 
authority and influence within the community derived from their contractual and 
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kinship ties to other members of society who depended on and supported them, 
and who in turn had their own followers and dependants.  [1976:60] 
 
Yet, in a state system where the government and all of its appendages are at the epicenter 
of nearly every distributional allowance, from support services to economic provisions 
(Crystal 1995a:260, 272), wasta or social capital can scarcely be expected to exist either 
entirely independently or far beyond administrative inducements.  This is especially true 
when the pathways through the bureaucracy are littered with “secondary and tertiary” 
(Jamal 2007:15) intermediaries who are strategically situated in a position to negotiate 
the terms of governmental favors (Farsoun 1970:275-276).  By recognizing the centrality 
of the welfare state’s place in everyday life, these networks, in one way or another, 
eventually lead back to a state-sponsored patron even though the participating actors 
might actually regard themselves as being equivalents in status.  Then again, this lack of 
interpersonal differentiation does not mask the unavoidable fact that in the oil-rich Gulf 
monarchies, “the broader structure[s] in which such relationships are embedded tend to 
be hierarchical, and by and large societal partners function as clients of the bigger 
institution involved” (Hertog 2005:130). 
Without question, the Middle East in general and modern Gulf society in 
particular are not alone in their reliance upon interpersonal associations to navigate what 
are otherwise lethargic bureaucracies (Hertog 2010b:283).106  In fact, a redistributive 
                                                
106 For instance, in China informal connections (guanxi) and “the idea of ‘face’ (mianxi)” (Smart 1993:402) 
emerge as so axiomatic in day-to-day affairs that an “individual with a problem, personal or organizational, 
naturally turns to his or her guanxiwang, or ‘relationship network,’ for assistance” (Hutchings and Weir 
2006:143).  Centered on the exchange of favors, guanxi ties were especially instrumental in Mao’s time for 
factory directors in dire need of supplemental funds from government planners and for party members who 
undertook their career advancement through displays of personal loyalty to their immediate superiors (Bian 
2006:278).  Likewise, Campbell observed that among the Sarakatsani of Greece, the shepherds 
systematically try to align themselves with the village council president to ensure that the latter’s decisions 
will meet with their approval.  To achieve these ends, “the Sarakatsani attempt to draw him [the village 
council president] into some form of personal relationship that will introduce a moral element of mutual 
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welfare economy like that found in Kuwait bears a striking likeness to the allocative 
monopolies that typify command markets (Fitzpatrick 2000:167).  Most illustrative of 
this overlap is the lopsided public employment sector in Kuwait that provides jobs for 90 
percent of the country’s citizenry (Ghabra 1997:361) in concurrence with the government 
being in a position to inundate its nationals with services, subsidies (Hertog 2010b:285), 
and favorable business opportunities (Herb 2009:384-386).  Furthermore, attempts 
towards increased privatization have been staunchly opposed on the grounds that it would 
seriously undercut the massive dispensational benefits that so many Kuwaitis have grown 
accustomed to receiving107 and, it can be supposed, the intercessional capacities of the 
                                                                                                                                            
consideration” (1979:229).  Within the Soviet Union, before its eventual dissolution and the command 
economy’s transformation into privatized operations (Ledeneva 1998:177), blat functioned as a veritable 
“second economy” (Fitzpatrick 2000:166) to augment shortages in the marketplace.  Portrayed as a 
personal exchange relationship, Soviet-era blat allocated state properties outside of formal outlets and 
redirected them into informal networks centered on familiar obligations and gratitude (Ledeneva 2000:184-
188).  Even today in Russia, “Now that the capital and commodity markets work and access to goods and 
services is available, it is access to money, making a living, and getting a well-paid job [that have] become 
the ‘new power’ of personal networks” (Ledeneva 2009:264).  Remaining in the Soviet bloc and turning to 
Kazakhstan’s tenure with the Kremlin, it is notable that for this Central Asian Republic, Russian blat was 
effectively replaced by the idioms of tribal genealogies to handle similar local deficits.  Shortfalls in 
political capital and state resources were mitigated by clan-based linkages that operated in a face-to-face, 
exclusive framework that relied strictly on reciprocity while at the same time curtailing the circulation of 
such services to nonmembers (Schatz 2004:11, 17-19, 70).  The Cuban expression sociolismo also carries 
an equivalent connotation wherein the term embodies “a generalized ‘I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch 
mine’ system that rewards those who are friendly with government officials” (Perez-Lopez 1995:102).  It is 
Damian J. Fernandez’s assertion that in Cuba, the citizenry’s “informalization” of the state’s rigid 
apparatuses via sociolismo represents a realized grassroots mechanism for accommodating, and subverting, 
the regime’s directives:  “The ‘informal’ realm of the private sphere where friends and family interact 
constitute an alternative source of norms to the state and state institutions… These networks form the 
infrastructure of the politics of affection, politics that revolve around who you know, who you love and are 
based on personalism and personal exceptionalism” (2003:231).  Lastly, although numerous other examples 
abound, are the bonds of person-to-person trust (confianza) that flourish between members of Mexico’s 
middle classes and gives them a competitive advantage in seeking executorial support.  Basically, these 
“favors tend to be bureaucratic in nature, consisting usually of preferential treatment in dealing with red-
tape procedures and priority access to the services offered by the state.  This social institution allows people 
to maintain certain privileges, and to have access to jobs and services that the state offers but not always is 
able to provide to all society members” (Lomnitz 1997:119).  
107 Michael Herb indicates that this great imbalance between the public sector and private enterprises is 
fermenting “a distinctive form of class conflict in the Gulf in which salaried citizen employees of the state 
have a jaundiced attitude toward the private sector while the private sector views most citizens as parasites 
on the state and avoids hiring them” (2009:383). 
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well-placed intermediaries who provide these allowances (Hertog 2010a:287-288).108  
This is the point that is the key to understanding the existence of brokerage between state 
and society in Kuwait:  its top-heavy, unnavigable bureaucracy lends itself to an 
abundance of go-betweens who possess insider knowledge of how to satisfy most 
demands (Hertog 2010b:291-292).  However, the state’s absolute control over the local 
economy must be included in any formulations of the parameters of Kuwait’s wasta-type 
intermediation.  What this means is that instead of subjecting one’s own assets to 
petitioners, it is actually the government’s resources that are already destined for eventual 
redistribution that are being sought through the mobilization of these informal 
relationships; the only personal outlay is accessibility (Ledeneva 2000:185, 188).109  Plus, 
these state properties are widely looked upon as belonging to citizenry (Ledeneva 
1998:101) despite the difficulties that come with trying to retrieve these resources 
through formal measures without the right personal backing (Hertog 2010b:303).  All of 
these elements are abundant in Ahmad A. A.’s disclosure of his father’s disillusionment 
with the expectations that were incumbent upon him when he occupied just such an 
intersection that linked nationals and their advocates with the arbitrary magnanimity of 
the regime.   
My father is a doctor and he trained as a surgeon.  He used to work in a position 
for the government where he was in charge of sending citizens overseas for 
medical treatment.  Men from the National Assembly used to always approach 
him so that he could put together the paperwork to send their supporters abroad 
for therapy and care.  These Parliamentarians who came to him would say, ‘This 
man votes for me so make sure he gets papers he needs for treatments here.’  
                                                
108 One of the most notorious liaisons acting between the state and its nationals is a politician who is 
diminutively regarded locally as “Al-Hout,” or “The Whale,” due to, as Taher A. made clear, his ability to 
funnel such large sums of government wasta into his own personal networks.  Taher A.  Interview 
conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 15, 2010. 
109 This description of how wasta operates in Kuwait is closely linked to Alena Ledeneva’s remarks on 
Soviet era blat:  “By helping out, people gave out not goods of their own, but benefits of which the other 
was deprived” (2000:190).  
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Sometimes these patients did not even need medical attention overseas but the 
Assemblymen wanted them to be sent anyways because of their support and the 
government pays for it.  My father grew tired of this type of wasta and quit to 
start his own private practice.  Now he refuses to prepare reports just so that 
political supporters can have government-paid medical vacations to Europe and 
other places.110 
 
Unfortunately, Ahmad A. A. did not divulge what his father was able to gain from his 
tenure in this advantageous position where he could freely authorize the use of public 
funds for either legitimate or more questionable claims.  Nonetheless, Ahmad A. A.’s tale 
does serve to reinforce the utility that connections, brokerage, and wasta afford 
individuals operating within a state-society framework that is rife with patronage, public 
sector overemployment (Hertog 2010a:288, 294), and generous government 
disbursements (Herb 2009:382).  Whereas the country’s “all-pervading welfarism” 
(Delacroix 1980:13) provides the citizenry with incentives for rent-seeking (Krause 
2009:20), its bureaucratic morass gives them a reason for locating skilled interceders 
(Hertog 2010b:284).  To borrow the conclusion drawn by Anton Blok in his closing 
remarks on the transformation of regional powerbrokers in the wake of state 
centralization in western Sicily, “Access to State resources is what counts today.  Without 













                                                








INSTITUTIONALIZING ACCESS IN THE CITY-STATE  
 






Kuwait, like many countries, is home to an incredible assortment of informal 
institutions that populate the associational field that exists between the individual and the 
formal apparatuses of the state.  At the most fundamental level, the sanctity of the home 
and the sacredness of the mosque seemingly offer their attendees some freedom of 
association devoid of governmental regulation (Tetreault 2000:8-9), and these sites are 
complemented by cafés, sports clubs (Aldousari 2004:57-58), neighborhood supermarket 
cooperatives, husayniyat, and professional societies.  Understandably, though, there is no 
strict dichotomy that “freezes [these] interactions into two distinct spheres, namely 
formal and informal” (Keshavarzian 2007:61), as these locations are precisely the points 
at which state and society frequently intersect.  In some cases, such spaces rely upon the 
state to define the legal parameters of their existence (Salam 2002:3-4), whereas in others 
administrative regulations allow for “techniques to observe, register, record, and monitor 
associationalism” (Wiktorowicz 2000:48).  Then again, there is the ever-present risk of 
electronic surveillance on the part of the government, a practice that has been widely 
rumored to afflict private gatherings in Kuwait City (Slyomovics 1998:162).  Aside from 
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the invasive tactics of officialdom there are also the less apparent public-private 
juxtapositions where the multiplicities of individual roles (Bailey 1969:10-12) can be 
manifest within multifunctional institutions (Barnes 1969:107-108).  In one instance of 
the former, Richard Antoun wrote of the ambiguity of office that burdened the village 
mayor in Kafr al-Mar, Jordan, with the simultaneous obligations that were owed to 
kinsmen, constituents, and the state (1979:81-82) that make the realms of the personal / 
informal largely inseparable from that of the institutional / formal (Rosen 2006:166).  As 
for institutional multiplexity itself, Diane Singerman’s documentation of the 
establishment and calculated use of private voluntary organizations, private associations, 
and community centers by Members of Parliament (MPs) in Cairo to collect information 
about their constituents and redistribute government resources to their supporters 
(1995:258) is a clear case of the versatility that can be incorporated into associational 
venues.  
 Given that the line of demarcation that distinguishes where the formal ends and 
the informal begins is vague or negotiable at best, it is not unexpected that the pervasive 
visiting practices that are so often upheld as the hallmarks of sociability throughout the 
Middle East (Vinogradov 1974:3-4) exemplify this overlap.  While visiting easily entails 
community ideals about status differentials based on who visits whom at what duration 
and frequency, not to mention the competitiveness and moral imperatives that complicate 
hosting and visiting, it also visibly reveals to others the nature of interpersonal and 
intergroup relations (Meneley 1996:4-6, 30, 35-37); which linkages are strong, what ties 
are weak, and how bonds are being reconfigured (Benedict 1974:33-34).  At the same 
time, the informality of visitation and networking can serve as a barometer by which 
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public, official decorum can be evaluated for its substance or lack thereof, as Christine 
Eickelman described for women’s gatherings in Oman: 
For example, during one visit a woman of the tribal elite was asked whether she 
often visited the wife of the wali (governor).  She replied that she did not know 
the governor’s wife and changed the subject.  Yet, later in the privacy of the car 
on the way home, she added, ‘You know at the mourning for x’ – she named a 
well-known older woman of the tribal elite – ‘the governor’s wife only came 
once!’  The single visit was a bitter insult, suggesting the governor’s family 
perceived the tribal elite as no more than clients.  Although the tribal notables and 
the governor appeared to have cordial relations at official functions, the women’s 
formal networking suggested underlying tensions.  [1993:663] 
 
Plainly, as Eickelman’s brief account indicates, the rituals of visitation cannot be 
categorized into the unceremonious province of casual entertainment (Meneley 1996:4), 
for these are the very types of acts that bring informality and the more formal fields of 
activity, like governance, into contact with each other (Rosen 1984:100-104).  In many 
ways, this echoes Pierre Bourdieu’s views that capital expended in one area, whether 
symbolic or social, can always be redeemed for economic or political returns in another, 
and vice versa (Portes 2000:2).  This is illustrated in Andrea Rugh’s portrayal of exactly 
how indeterminate the boundaries of informal visits and formal calls can be when a low-
ranking governmental official in the village of Wusta, Syria, fell ill during her fieldwork: 
Almost as tangible were events like illness, where the number and lengths of 
visits substituted for gifts as a measure of friendship.  For example, when Abu 
Abdalla was sick, he knew who wanted to maintain friendly relations with him by 
the stream of well-wishers who came to visit.  Many came not so much out of 
concern for his health as for the power he wielded in his governmental job.  Abu 
Abdalla kept mental note of who came and went, as did Um Abdalla and Um 
George when they discussed the list of visitors each morning at our coffee break.  
Each ‘active’ acquaintance was expected to come at least once during his 
convalescence and would store up more ‘credit’ if he came several times.  
[1997:217-218]   
 
As can be seen in Rugh’s depiction, home and health were not autonomous from the 
patriarch’s identity as an agent of the state; circumstances that loaded any casual stopover 
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with the accountability of a formal appointment.  Here, the extension of Abu Abdalla’s 
governmental rank into his household persona is along the lines of Hisham Sharabi’s 
contention that the office is little more than an appendage to the sociability expected in 
the home (1988:131).  This interconnection becomes heightened in Kuwait’s 
paternalistic, autocratic environment where political support is synonymous with 
government expenditure (Eifert et al. 2003), state spending towards individuals and 
groups can be discretionary, and public overemployment (El-Katiri et al. 2011:12, 26-28) 
can make any social encounter a potential interaction with a member of the bureaucracy; 
again, bringing into question any definite separation of the private from the public or the 
informal from the formal. 
 Furthermore, the institutionalization of visiting practices in the Middle East at 
locales where the dispensation of hospitality, patronage, assistance, as well as the sharing 
of basic camaraderie is an expectation if not an outright requirement (Antoun 1979:72), 
has long served as a point of access bridging the gap between the powerful and their 
petitioners (Bill 1996:510-511).  At lively sites variously labeled as guestrooms, 
guesthouses, reception halls, and the pastoral men’s side of the tent, “the processes of a 
civil society form a seamless web with state processes rather than a sharp dichotomy with 
them” (Antoun 2000:442).  Although much of the ethnographic literature on these 
gatherings tend to accentuate, and take for granted, that such activities are the exclusive 
purview of men, it is shortsighted to overlook women as participants in their own cycles 
of hosting and visiting that are no less valuable for familial politics (Eickelman 
1993:663).111  Still, it is the men’s house that has embodied the perception of a place 
                                                
111 Christine Eickelman’s work in Oman (1993) and Andrea Rugh’s research in Syria (1997) have already 
been mentioned but William Lancaster’s monograph on the Rwala Bedouin accurately conveys how men’s 
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where outside relations can coalesce (Bourdieu 2003:159) and decision-makers can 
always be found.112 
Just before the mid-20th century, British official A. H. Hamilton discovered one 
such congregation of important men when he called upon a diwankhana (guestroom) in 
Iraqi Kurdistan where he was greeted by “the mudir [director] of customs, the 
schoolmaster and the neighboring chieftain, Shaikh Allahadin.  The local ‘bash chaush,’ 
or police sergeant, had hastily donned his full uniform” (1947:127).  As a visiting 
outsider with a title, however, Hamilton’s recollections have to be viewed with care since 
his presence carried the weight of imperial designs.  More reflective of local-level notions 
of statewide brokerage in the company of a guesthouse is Abdalla Bujra’s report from the 
factionalized settlement of Hureidah in southern Yemen.  Interestingly, what might be 
designated as the elites’ informal guesthouses (barzah) could practically double as 
impromptu courthouses, reception halls, and political headquarters.  Thus, it was Bujra’s 
conclusion that, 
To be a host to such important visitors, with the implication of personal friendship 
between host and guest, has obvious political significance especially under a 
system in which the manipulation of individuals is an important means of gaining 
power.  The role of host in Hureidah has since become so closely identified with 
political power that the President of the Local Council is now the ‘official’ host of 
Hureidah, and he has kept aside one of his houses especially for this purpose.  
[1971:136-137] 
 
Continuing, Bujra detailed one specific occurrence in which all of the components of 
local and national authority merged inside a guesthouse setting to validate the host’s 
                                                                                                                                            
and women’s networks might be jointly coordinated for household information (1997:64-65).  Similarly, 
Fatma Haidari’s thesis (2006) on women’s gatherings (yam’ah) in Kuwait sheds light on the country’s 
institutional counterpart to the male diwaniyya.  The Egyptian context for the necessity of female 
sociability for household survival in the face of bureaucratic hindrances has been well studied by Diane 
Singerman (1995) as have the roles of family status and hierarchy within Yemeni women’s networks 
(Meneley 1996, 2007). 
112 Hanan.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 30, 2006. 
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command over his own town as well as demonstrating his influence within the state 
system: 
One morning the D.A. came to Abubakar’s guest room to find out what the 
[Local] Council had been doing during his absence.  He normally comes to these 
sittings whenever he is in Hureidah, but this was a business visit to receive a 
report from the Council. 
The fact that the D.A. came to Abubakar’s house for the report is itself 
significant in that in other places the visit would have been reversed.  After the 
D.A. had sat down and courtesies had been exchanged Abubakar called his son, 
twenty-two years old, to bring the Council files, and then delegated the task of 
reporting to the D.A. to him.  These two withdrew to a corner of the room to carry 
out their business while Abubakar continued to entertain his visitors.  This, of 
course, was a slight… But this treatment of the D.A. produces the ‘right’ 
impression in Hureidah and shows who is the ‘boss’ in the town.  [1971:165-166] 
 
Robert Fernea was also explicit about the capacity of the tribal guesthouse (mudhif) in 
southern Iraq to act as the conduit that linked local leaders with provincial authorities and 
statesmen in Baghdad.  This connection became quite literal, as Fernea witnessed during 
his research in the late 1950s, when the latest technological advancements of the day 
were utilized inside the shaykh’s mudhif to minimize any communicative distances 
between his court and the capital:  “a modern telephone sits behind one of the reed 
pillars, putting the shaykh into immediate communication with the local heads of 
government and, occasionally, the ministries of Baghdad” (1970:20).  For this tribal 
leadership, the guesthouse was unchallenged in southern Iraq as the preferred place for 
“representing the tribe vis-à-vis the local government officials” (Fernea 1970:53).  Lastly, 
departing from the Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East and turning 
momentarily to Turkey, there is Brian Beeley’s study on the spread of coffeehouses in the 
rural eastern parts of the country and the sociopolitical impact that these establishments 
had on the region’s guestrooms as they both vied for a clientele.  Beeley’s description is 
particularly instructive for its treatment of how these guestrooms in the countryside were 
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anything but isolated from the national framework; to the contrary, a guestroom could 
provide an entryway for government appointees to reach the populace. 
The most influential family head (not necessarily the most prosperous) tends to 
attract the leading figures in the community – even where no direct kinship ties 
are involved.  On this basis, if a village is large enough to support more than a 
single guest room, one such room by general recognition fills the role that would 
be accorded to the government-inspired, official village guest room.  Thus the tax 
collector, the army recruiter, or any other bureaucrat would gravitate to the 
principal guest room as a focal point in his dealings with the village as a whole.  
[1970:480] 
 
What all of these excerpts make clear is that there is no perceptible line dividing informal 
groupings from formal proceedings in the Middle East, especially in the context of the 
guestroom or guesthouse forum, and generally within a sociopolitical milieu where “the 
boundary between personal obligation and official duty is not well defined” (Fernea 
1970:60).  Consequently, while this situates the reception rooms outlined above into a 
position to reinforce, substitute, or undermine state institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004:728), it also highlights an institutionalization of the area’s multifaceted “negotiated 
relationships” (Kingston 2001:70) that bind state and society. 
 Despite its efficacy, the guestroom institution has faced difficulties maintaining 
its relevance in the contemporary Middle East.  As early as the 1960s, Fredrik Barth 
noticed a precipitous decline of men’s houses (hujra) among the Swat Pathan chiefs due 
to the concentrated efforts of the government’s administrative centralization in 
conjunction with its commercialization agendas.  Whereas in the past the chiefs 
transformed their perishable inventories of rice into political capital by constantly feeding 
their retainers, once the ruler offered the leaders secure land titles and distant markets 
became accessible via new roadways, strategic hosting lost its appeal as the surplus 
produce could be transported out of the villages (1966:16).  Likewise, Brian Beeley 
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surmised that the Turkish misafir odasi would gradually become extinct in Anatolia with 
the region’s greater integration into the national economy combined with the introduction 
of commercialized agriculture and an increased, mobile population.  This, Beeley 
believed, would eliminate the vestiges of rank based on age and lineage, the requisites for 
authority in the guestrooms, and replace it with status founded on education and wealth to 
lead men to a more equitable meeting place:  the village coffeehouse (1970:475-476, 486-
487).  Other factors, like outright political hostility and the reformulation of state policies, 
have left undeniable impressions on the presence of guesthouses on the institutional 
landscape of the Middle East.  The ascendancy of Syria’s Ba’athist doctrine in the 1960s 
meant land reforms and the political disenfranchisement of the mercantile cotton shaykhs 
which, in turn, stripped the elites of their facilitatory services and reduced their reception 
rooms into nostalgic edifices: 
Once, in the madafa of the late Shaykh Faysal al-Huwaydi, I heard Shaykh Faysal 
himself while playing cards with other men describe the shaykhs’ condition thus:  
‘Bi-hal-ayyum falhit-na li’b al-waraq’ (Nowadays, playing cards has become our 
cultivation, i.e. meaningless occupation).  Bitter statements of this kind reveal the 
shaykhs’ realistic perception of their marginal role in society under the neo-Ba’th.  
It also reflects the ironical nature of the situation in which they found themselves.  
On the one hand wider national transformations had rendered them powerless 
while, on the other hand, their own perception of their shaykhly position 
continued to force them, as it were, to maintain the madafa as a politico-social 
institution even when it had been effectively emptied of its former role.  [Khalaf 
2000:116] 
 
Moreover, it must not be ignored that something as simple as lifestyle changes can play a 
significant role in decreasing guesthouse attendance.  Almost a quarter-century after 
recording the vibrant social activity that surrounded the village guesthouses in Kufr al-




By 1986 nearly every house had a television set (some had two) and men (and 
sometimes women) commuted every day from work in towns or other villages.  
The attractions of the madafa paled in relation to the television screen (in Arabic 
and English).  Men came home tired from work and commuting and like their 
counterparts in the Western world wished to relax in comfort with their conjugal 
families and be entertained without effort rather than take part in the repartee of 
the guest house, which in the new age had become palaver rather than open 
education on the world.  [1997:169] 
 
Even when tribal affiliations enjoyed a resurgence in Iraq after the Second Gulf War, the 
groups’ reconstituted leaderships chose to adopt city apartments for their affairs instead 
of reinstating the customary guesthouses due to their urban livelihoods (Jabar 2000:31). 
 However, the guestroom tradition in Kuwait escaped many of the complications 
that have befallen comparable institutions in the region.  Legally, the country’s 
diwaniyyat are protected from the Public Gathering Law (Law Number 65 of 1979) that 
delineates the conditions under which congregations can meet (Kelly and Breslin 
2010:238).  As domestic family spaces, theoretically these dawawin are private facilities 
that are to be shielded from incursions by the public state (Tetreault 2000:61-62).  They 
are, as one Kuwaiti insisted, “harma, private, forbidden, [and] the government is foreign 
and cannot enter… without permission.”113  This attitude rings true even with seemingly 
innocuous affairs like routine neighborhood upkeep by a municipality’s electricians: 
In a Bedouin area my friend had a diwaniyya that was built illegally over the 
sidewalk.  When electrical work for the municipality had to be done, the workers 
had to access the power lines underneath the sidewalk.  The owner of the 
diwaniyya refused to allow the government into his diwaniyya so that they could 
get to the electrical lines under the sidewalk.  You have to understand that the 
sidewalk is public property that they [government workers] could not get to.  
They had to rewire all of the lines in a route that went around his diwaniyya.  All 
because of one person!114 
 
In actuality, though, these reception rooms have come a long way from being exclusively 
                                                
113 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in A. M. Diwaniyya in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 7, 2007. 
114 Haitham.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 15, 2010. 
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associated with kinship and the government has repeatedly shown a willingness to violate 
the supposed inviolability of the diwaniyyat whenever the institutions have tested its 
control of the public arena.115  So, by avoiding any direct competition with the regime the 
diwaniyyat are relatively free from state interference.  Coupled with this permissive legal 
atmosphere is the postpetroleum economy in which the government distributed its oil 
proceeds without providing enough local investment opportunities (Elimam et al. 
1996:666) given the small size of its private sector (El-Katiri et al. 2011:5).  Unlike the 
Swat Valley where Barth predicted that the availability of markets would drain the 
surpluses that would otherwise have been destined for the chiefly hujra (1966:16), in 
Kuwait it is conceivable that the opposite happened as liquidity surged with limited 
investment outlets (Elimam et al. 1996:666) and resources were diverted into the 
diwaniyyat as symbolic outlays (Bourdieu 2003:180).  Modernization is another feature 
that has thrived in Kuwait and although it is uncertain as to what this ultimately means 
for the guestrooms it has not meant any quantitative reductions.  Expectedly, some young 
people prefer the leisure of technologies like the internet to the rituals of visitation found 
in some diwaniyyat (Wheeler 2000:443) but cyberspace has yet to prove itself to be an 
adequate replacement for the face-to-face verification of news or events (al-Roomi 
2007:144-145) and the cultivation of necessary contacts.  Besides, there are young men’s 
                                                
115 The most recognized incident of this sort concerns the diwaniyyat al ithnein, or Monday Diwaniyyat, 
that developed after the National Assembly was suspended in 1986 and entire provisions of the constitution 
were nullified.  By 1989, former MPs and politicians from the opposition began meeting on Monday nights 
at different diwaniyyat to keep themselves informed of the evolving political situation.  The government’s 
response to this was swift and police squads were deployed to breakup the gatherings (Tetreault 2000:69-
71).  While the Monday Diwaniyyat may rightly be viewed as an exceptional set of circumstances, there are 
also the more common media reports of police raids on diwaniyyat suspected of holding illegal pre-election 
primaries to select their candidates, along with the government’s bold decision in 2008 that led it to start 
demolishing the thousands of diwaniyyat that encroached upon public land in violation of Legislative 




dawawin that bypass the formality required when elders are present116 that offer youthful 
indulgences such as video games, cards, and televised football matches.117  These 
dawawin are often scorned by elders as places that promote frivolity and idleness, but 
they are invaluable for many young men, as was lucidly articulated on one occasion:  “I 
cannot stand to be in my house more than thirty minutes a day… I just eat my lunch there 
and sleep there.  The diwaniyya is my life.”118 
It might appear remarkable that the diwaniyyat of Kuwait have persisted in spite 
of the pressures that could have hastened the decline of such a traditional institution:  the 
influx of petrodollars, suburbanization, and modernization, just to name a few 
(Slyomovics 1998:162).  What this neglects are the contesting factors that have endowed 
the diwaniyyat with their resiliency:  the financial windfall brought by the distribution of 
oil rents (Elimam 1996:666); the utility of connections in an overgrown bureaucracy with 
restricted accessibility (Hertog 2010b:292); the fluidity between the formal and informal 
spheres of activity (Keshavarzian 2007:61); and a legal loophole that allows meetings 
away from state oversight (Tetreault 2000:61-62).  The next section builds upon these 
parameters to present the sudden expansion of the diwaniyyat in the middle of the 20th 
century in historical perspective.  This is followed by a discussion of the Kuwaiti 
guestroom as a site for brokering wasta and navigating the channels of the welfare state. 
 
The Diwaniyya:  Elite Origins to Popular Proliferation 
 As previously mentioned, the dawawin found throughout Kuwait City can be 
somewhat correlated with the occurrence of guestrooms and guesthouses observed in the 
                                                
116 Megbel.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on April 2, 2007. 
117 Farah.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 27, 2006. 
118 Yousef.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on December 13, 2007. 
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wider Middle Eastern milieu.  This classification includes the Jordanian (Antoun 1972, 
2000; Baylouny 2006) and Syrian (Khalaf 2000) madafa, the Turkish misafir odasi 
(Stirling 1966) or oda (Aswad 1967), the Iraqi mudhif (Baram 1997; Fernea 1970), and 
the Pakhtun hujra (Barth 1972; Edwards 1996).  Obviously each of these samples, along 
with the Kuwaiti dawawin, varies in their specific attributes.  Nonetheless, Ali Jihad 
Racy’s brief description of a madafa captures some of the nuances commonly found in 
many guestrooms: 
The emphasis on lineage, social status, and generosity is traditionally epitomized 
by the maḍāfah (guest house) tradition.  A shaykh, or any leading member of the 
tribal group, may have his own guest house, usually a tent next to, or part of, his 
own family tent or house.  The maḍāfah (literally “place of hospitality”) is where 
a chief or an eminent individual receives guests periodically… The guest house 
may serve as a context for socializing, solving political disputes, and seeking the 
chief’s council or arbitration.  In the maḍāfah, hospitality is expressed through a 
well-established social ritual, namely coffee drinking.  Characterized by a set of 
carefully observed etiquettes… this ritual confirms the host’s social prestige and 
consequently his prerogative to exercise generosity.  [1996:407-408] 
 
Clearly, the iconic deployment of mu’azib, or the expectation of hosting and the 
dispensation of patronage (Gavrielides 1987:157-161), marks the centrality of the madafa 
for reinforcing position against the backdrop of socialization in the Levant.  Richard 
Antoun portrayed these ideal types of guestrooms as “first rank” in terms of their 
beneficence (1979:42) for the overall community standing of their hosts (Antoun 
1972:106).  Similarly, Gabriele Vom Bruck went so far as to assert that there existed the 
expectation in northern Yemen that privileged households were required to open their 
doors to their neighbors if they were have their claims to superiority backed by the 
popular recognition of those within the community: 
… [Their] houses were principally open to anyone who desired to visit or to make 
a request or complaint.  There has always been a remarkable absence of threshold 
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fear among low status individuals.  They entered the houses of superiors, acting as 
if patronage were the price for the acknowledgment of high status.  [1999:154] 
 
Employing idioms not too distant from those outlined above, Fahad Al-Naser’s 
depiction of the diwaniyyat in Kuwait reflects Racy’s emphasis upon comportment, group 
solidarity, and the notions of hierarchy and privilege that can define these arenas.  In his 
synopsis,  
[The] diwaniah refers not only to the practice of visiting but also to that part of a 
house [that] is reserved for the entertainment of visitors, especially male 
colleagues, friends, and other guests.  Generally, this place is exclusively for men, 
where they get together and relax after a day of work.  Sometimes the setting can 
be a tent, a pavilion, or an open area inside or outside the house.  It is furnished 
with comforts for sitting and drinking tea, sipping coffee, and smoking so that the 
cliques can chat comfortably for hours.  In general, the size, furnishings, and 
shape of the diwaniah vary.  Some families can afford only a small room while 
the very wealthy may have a large auditorium-like area, with furniture and 
decorations worthy of a palace.  The appearance and comforts of one’s diwaniah 
represents one’s status, wealth, and dignity.  [2001:5] 
 
Departing from the prototypical guestroom summarized by Racy, Al-Naser’s 
commentary reveals the disparate tendencies that are evident in the nature of Kuwait’s 
diwaniyyat; instead of a principal shaykhly diwaniyya in each district or neighborhood to 
which residents are obliged to offer their respect and pay their homage, the Kuwaiti 
dawawin are much more “populist” in terms of their distribution.  This is not to suggest 
that all of Kuwait’s guestrooms are homogenous, or that there is no conception of rank 
amongst the dawawin, as guests are keen to note the differences between the extents of 
various hosts’ outlays and expenditures when it comes to catering to their visitors; for 
instance, in one attendee’s opinion, “meat, not falafel, for dinner”119 is the minimum 
price for his attendance.  Likewise, the diwaniyyat of the well-connected, such as the 
khudamat (services) guestrooms hosted by the so-called “service” MPs who can access 
                                                
119 Tahir A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007.  
  
98 
state resources for their clients,120 are envied almost as much as they are disparaged.  
Contrasted against the guestrooms found in other settings, where such preeminent 
institutions are the hallmarks of local status and the “primary venue[s] for politicking and 
business deals” (Meneley 2007:220), the diwaniyyat of Kuwait are far more dissimilar in 
their orientation.  
 Of course, this was not always the case.  Prior to the exportation of oil from the 
country’s Burgan fields in 1946 (Ismael 1993:78) and the phenomenal sums of cash that 
the government lavished upon its citizenry through its charitable, redistributive welfare 
apparatuses (Tetreault 2000:156), Kuwait existed as an oligarchy of merchant families 
whose interests were guarded by their respective shaykhs (Slot 2003:11) and their 
collective control over the economy (Ismael 1993:35-36).  Within such a highly stratified 
socioeconomic environment, it is not surprising to find that diwaniyyat of this time period 
were correspondingly arranged in a manner that was indicative of these prevailing 
conditions.  While British political resident H. R. P. Dickson designated the men’s 
portion of pastoral tent as representing the “diwaniyah” (1949:191), and some Kuwaitis 
would even go further to claim that tent-based hospitality is the basis for all 
contemporary ideals of communal generosity,121 it is actually Dickson’s notations on 
what he called the majlis that are most recognizable as a diwaniyya of the historic, pre-oil 
town: 
A casual visitor in Kuwait town who drops into a shaikh’s or prominent 
merchant’s morning majlis or reception apartment, will be given a cup of coffee 
on arriving, and another ten minutes after, which is then followed by the passing 
                                                
120 Tahir A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
121 Those who adhere to this line of thought typically contend that the men's side of the Bedouin bayt sha'ar 
(literally “house of hair” or goat hair tent) as once found in the Arabian Peninsula is the structural and 
functional precursor to the modern diwaniyya.  Abdul Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait 
on June 30, 2006. 
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round of frankincense or scented wood ‘udh, placed on top of a small quantity of 
lighted charcoal and handed round in a mabkhar or hand censer.  That is the 
signal that he should take leave.  [1949:197] 
 
It is during this maritime phase of Kuwait’s past, especially before the transition to its 
hydrocarbon-based export economy, that the origins of the contemporary diwaniyya 
become more strongly associated with what some believe are its hadhar, or town / urban 
dwelling populace (Peterson 1977:298), roots.  Longva gives this category more meaning 
in her explanation that, “In present-day popular speech, the term hadhar designates those 
Kuwaitis whose forefathers lived in Kuwait before the launch of the oil era (1946) and 
worked as traders, sailors, fisherman, and pearl divers” (2006:172). 
 Expectedly, many of those with hadhar pedigrees are quick to pinpoint the 
heritage of the dawawin within their own, personalized historical experiences.  For 
example, Abdul, the current patron of a long-established Kuwaiti merchant family, cites 
his present diwaniyya as the continuance of a tradition that his ancestors started along the 
shores of the Gulf in Kuwait Town during the 1780s.  Accordingly, Abdul’s recollections 
of the diwaniyyat mirror his family’s seafaring background and their involvement in 
regional trade: 
The diwan is a gathering [from when] men’s lives were based on the sea and 
people sailed to India and West Africa.  Sailors would join captains who advanced 
them money for their families.  Pearl divers would return with pearls to repay 
these merchants and captains for the advances.  This would result in gatherings to 
discuss the division of pearls.  Also, the diwan was a place to gather to wish hajj 
pilgrims off as well as to welcome them back… In the past, all of Kuwait’s 
dawawin were concentrated on present day Arabian Gulf Street between today’s 
American Hospital and the British Embassy.  Thus, in the past the dawawin were 
in a centralized location… There are [still] specialty dawawin that are the 
continuation of tradition.  These include fisherman, ship builders, and carpenter 
dawawin; even though the descendants of these professions may no longer 
practice these trades, they still meet as their ancestors once did.122 
 
                                                
122 Abdul.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 11, 2006. 
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This same maritime theme for the genesis of the Kuwaiti diwaniyya is echoed in the 
account given by Yousef, a local historian who specializes in the country’s prepetroleum 
legacies.  However, Yousef’s narrative is much more explicit in its recognition of the 
class interests that were embodied by the early dawawin, insofar as the rituals of 
hospitality were considerably beyond the means of the average inhabitants of Kuwait 
Town: 
A diwaniyya was a place for people to meet and a place for guests to stay 
overnight.  The higher classes did not want to visit tea or coffee houses, [so] in the 
past coffee was roasted in front of the guests so they could smell it and people 
[even] used to compare which diwaniyya had the best coffee.  During the pearl 
diving era, it was the merchants who hosted and owned the dawawin; not the 
sailors.  [This was a] place to exchange market information… the owner of the 
diwaniyya would read telegrams in his diwaniyya informing him that his ship or 
ships arrived safely at a distant port, for example, Bombay.  [These early] 
dawawin [were a] focal point for a neighborhood, [there was] usually only one per 
district owned by the wealthy who could afford to entertain guests.  After the 
Second World War, the diwaniyya were a place where men would listen to the 
radio to learn of events… The dawawin on Gulf Street were once the great ones 
and they used to sit right on the shore before the land was reclaimed.  Now, they 
sit facing the street.123 
 
Another motif for the beginnings of the diwaniyya is embedded in the political 
knowledge that prior to Kuwait’s emergence on the world stage as an oil exporting 
nation, the ruling Al Sabah dynasty was limited in its capacity for economic self-
sufficiency; it was confined to the authority dictated by the merchants (Longva 1997:22) 
in exchange for the tariff fees their activities generated (Crystal 1995b:21) and the near 
total employment that they offered the settlement.  Thus, the pre-oil Al Sabah style of 
rule was limited locally to resolving disputes (Shuhaiber 2003:102-103) and the provision 
of an administrative structure that reinforced domestic labor relations between the 
merchants and the rest of the community (Tetreault 2000:36).  When questioned about 
                                                
123 Yousef A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 28, 2007. 
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the precursors to today’s dawawin, Ahmad, a longtime diwaniyya host with political 
ambitions, answered in a way that very lucidly affirms this institution’s historical 
importance due to its former position at the crossroads between the oligarchy and the 
sovereign: 
People gather through the diwaniyya.  Kuwait [is] historically an open and diverse 
community; a merchant community and a seafaring community.  Historically, 
Kuwaitis gathered together to protect themselves; the diwaniyya allowed 
connections and the exchange of information for safety [from] Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia.  In this way, the diwaniyya of the past was an archaic media form [that] 
fostered the exchange of information.  Historically, the exchange between the 
Emir and the people was facilitated through the diwaniyya.  The Emir had to 
listen to the merchants because the merchants controlled the country’s economy 
before the oil era.  All of this communication took place in the diwaniyya.  
[These] early diwaniyya [were] only for distinguished families and the rich and 
powerful.124   
 
Hence, it can be seen that these hadhar chronicles of the origins of the Kuwaiti 
diwaniyyat are fairly uniform in terms of their treatments of the social, political and 
economic conditions that fostered the rise of the early guestrooms:  they were established 
by the commercial establishment during times of favorable trade as far back as the late 
18th century (Delmas 2007:3) in an era when ordinary laborers could not afford the costs 
associated with extending such hospitality on a regular basis.  These reception rooms 
were also the sites where the reigning authority of the Al Sabah was balanced against the 
perceptions of what the oligarchy held to be in their best interests. 
 Understandably, the discovery of oil and its later exportation forever changed the 
social, political and economic arrangements upon which the country’s maritime status 
quo had been created and, consequently, this had profound repercussions for the future 
popularization of the Kuwaiti dawawin.  First, the redistribution of oil revenues stripped 
the notables’ of their control over the economy and supplanted it with general civil 
                                                
124 Ahmad A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 28, 2007. 
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employment (Ghabra 1997:361) that led to an unprecedented rise in personal income 
(Hill 1975:537).  With its petrodollars, the Al Sabah regime emerged as the state’s sole 
economic patron and in the process it absorbed the citizenry in its entirety into a new 
relationship of welfare clientelism (Shah 1995:1018).  After the Kuwait Development 
Board eradicated the old township’s structures in the 1950s and 1960s (Mahgoub 
2008:154-156) in favor of modernist plans of steel and concrete (Dickson 1971:191), the 
coastal city that materialized (Ansari and Qutub 1983:52) looked more like a foreign 
architectural import (Mahgoub 2008:164) that scarcely resembled anything from its 
earlier heritage (Al Bahar 1985:65).  For the diwaniyyat of pre-oil Kuwait, their numbers 
were reduced from one historian’s count of 250 to the six that remain today along 
Arabian Gulf Street.  Apparently, it took the intervention of Shaykh Jaber Al Ahmad Al 
Sabah (r. 1977 – 2006) to spare these last structures from the designs of modernization 
(Abdullah 1995:28). 
 On the other hand, the virtual disappearance of the community’s pre-oil 
diwaniyyat did not necessarily translate into fewer dawawin on the landscape of the new 
post-oil settlement.  The expansive development of orderly residential districts replete 
with stylish Western-inspired villas (Al Bahar 1985:63), while innovative for the local 
populace, was hardly a complete break with the past as the diwaniyyat were rapidly 
incorporated into the city’s architectural realignment (Mahgoub 2007:82).  In this regard, 
Yagoub Y. Abdullah pointed out that, “Interestingly, most of the families who held 
diwaniyyas continued to build new diwaniyyas, even after the discovery of oil and the 
subsequent economic development and prosperity” (1995:28).  It can be surmised that the 
families that Abdullah referred to can only be the mercantile elites since they were 
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unchallenged in their capacity to absorb the financial outlay that hospitality demanded in 
pre-oil Kuwait.  Further still, the spatial expansion of Kuwait City and the 
suburbanization of its residential areas meant that diwaniyya visitations would require 
more mobility than before when the neighborhood dawawin were the norm.  The effect of 
this urban transformation on customary visiting practices is noted by Abdulrasool Al-
Moosa: 
A long-standing feature of social life in Kuwait has been the gathering of 
neighbours and friends in the evening in a specially adopted part of the house 
called the diwaniyya.  Diwaniyya meetings have been much altered by changes in 
the geographical distribution of the population.  Formerly, diwaniyyas served their 
local neighbourhoods.  Redistribution of the population since the 1950s has meant 
Kuwaitis forsaking attendance at their local diwaniyya in favour of traveling long 
distances to join groups having no links with the residential districts within which 
they live.  A large percentage of Kuwaitis (77.8) still frequent diwaniyya 
meetings.  [1984:50] 
 
It cannot be overlooked that this matter of the mobility required to meet one’s diwaniyya 
obligations in the burgeoning rentier state is more than an issue of personal logistics, as 
entire diwaniyyat may be relocated when their hosts decide to move their households into 
different quarters while leaving their guests behind in the process.125 
  The redistribution of the nation’s oil proceeds did more than reconfigure the 
options available for the prepetroleum diwaniyyat of the merchant elite; it also introduced 
sweeping changes throughout Kuwaiti society that allowed nationals of modest means to 
replicate what was once seen as a prohibitive token of high social status.  With the 
government’s allocation of jobs that are only “nominally tied to services rendered” (Herb 
2009:382) and a myriad array of entitlements (Crystal 1995b:79), allowances, social 
services (Al Qudsi 1981:401), stipends, and public assistance (Longva 1997:53), 
discretionary incomes increased (Elimam et al. 1997:90) to such a degree that prolific 
                                                
125 Essa A. A.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 19, 2007. 
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hosting and visiting became a viable reality for the populace at large (Al-Kandari 
2002:68-69) and especially for the growing ranks of the educated classes (Delmas 
2007:3).  This radical adjustment in local hospitality is markedly clear in the observations 
of two men old enough to have witnessed these events: 
In the past, in the 1930s and 1940s, [there were] few rich people with the money 
to support a diwaniyya, so few diwaniyya existed.  The increase in diwaniyya in 
the country resulted from the economic growth with oil.126 
 
After the country’s oil wealth was distributed to the population it became popular 
for more families to have a diwaniyya.  A diwaniyya is a sign of prestige and 
people want a diwaniyya simply to say that they have one.127 
 
With this spread of the dawawin to the households of most Kuwaitis, the institution 
morphed from being solely the preserve of the elite to now representing a variety of 
pursuits and identities:  young men’s recreation, professional affiliations, interest 
groups,128 family responsibilities (silat al-rahim),129 sectarian, or bedu and hadhar 
distinctions.130  In effect, it is not an exaggeration to assume that, “Nowadays, nearly 
every household has a diwaniah; although the size and structure may vary according to 
financial position and the availability of space” (Al-Naser 2001:11).131 
 As the outwardly symbolic markers of success now within the budgetary 
allowances of most of Kuwait’s nationals and at the center of most facilitatory endeavors, 
as will be discussed in the next section, the diwaniyyat are near-universal commodities 
for homeowners.  So ubiquitous are the dawawin that, “Most houses have a diwaniyya 
                                                
126 Ahmad A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 28, 2007. 
127 Abd Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 26, 2007. 
128 Farah A. N.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 27, 2006. 
129 Mishari A. F.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 5, 2006. 
130 Zaid.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 29, 2006. 
131 To give some numbers to support this assertion, there is the directory, Diwaniyya; The dawawin and 
diwaniyyat in the State of Kuwait (diwaniyya; al dawawin wa al diwaniyyat fi dawlat al kuwayt).  Issued 
every year since 2003 during Ramadan by Delta Group Publishing, the 2005 edition listed 3,522 dawawin.  
However, this catalog is far from complete and many proprietors’ establishments are not included.  
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but not all are in use.  It is an extension of the house that people have in case they do ever 
need it.”132  Yet, unlike the diwaniyyat of the pre-oil merchant elite, these postpetroleum 
reception rooms are visibly different in their presence on the modern Kuwaiti cityscape.  
Noticeably, these new diwaniyyat do not always conform to the architectural models of 
the past that would have had these rooms attached to the main household either directly 
or encompassed within the household’s courtyard (Islam and Al-Sanafi 2006:85, 90-91).  
In the post-oil designs, a number of diwaniyyat began appearing as entirely separate 
structures that were unconnected to the principal residence: 
The diwan, or social gathering place for men, is still a desired space, although it is 
incorporated in only a few of today’s residential designs.  Quite often, the diwan 
is built as an independent structure in the garden of the residence and more 
popular in use are those which exist independently on a separate land lot, 
detached and often not related in design to the dwelling… The diwans vary in size 
and spatial configuration, although they are almost always one level… They are 
usually built as independent units in one corner of the garden.  [Al-Bahar 
1985:72] 
 
There are two premises in Al-Bahar’s observations that should be further clarified 
because they are very distinct occurrences.  The diwaniyyat which “exist independently 
on a separate land lot” (1985:72) are the large, palatial, freestanding reception rooms 
operated by wealthy families who own the lots on which they are built.  Some have 
speculated that this style became fashionable for the elites beginning in the 1980s and 
that it has proliferated ever since as a display of status compounded by rampant 
competitive consumerism.133  Without question, the costs associated with these 
extravagant diwaniyyat make them less common than the other variety presented by Al-
Bahar, the diwaniyyat “built as independent units in one corner of the garden” (1985:72).  
Aside from the obvious expenditures that differentiate these more humble structures from 
                                                
132 Mishari A. F.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 29, 2006. 
133 Dhari.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 11, 2007. 
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the aforementioned opulent stand-alone type, the questionable legality of the smaller 
constructions has even fueled recent discord over their existence in Kuwait City’s 
residential areas. 
There is no precise record documenting the timeline or circumstances that 
encouraged the building of new diwaniyyat in such a way that suddenly broke with earlier 
conventions; nevertheless, there are a few possible explanations.  One position contends 
that after the 1980s, a reduction in the size of property lots left little remaining space for 
the construction of a diwaniyya.  Real estate agent Fadahlah Nasser expressed this same 
sentiment when quoted in the local media during the debates surrounding the illegally 
constructed diwaniyyat, “In the eighties, a landowner may have owned 1,000 square 
meters and have been able to build a house and a diwaniyya all on his land – but now 
houses are built on 300 to 500 square meters and landowners are using every square 
meter just to build their house” (Al-Khaled 2008:3).  The implication here is that reduced 
property lot sizes drove homeowners to erect their diwaniyyat on public land outside of 
their estates’ boundaries.  Another frequently given reason for the growth of the illegal 
diwaniyyat focuses on the period immediately following the Iraqi occupation (Ibrahim 
2008:4) when the surrounding desert was still too littered with mines to permit camping.  
To avoid these dangers, some Kuwaitis built faux tent-like structures (khaima) that, 
ignored by the government despite their illegality by being unattached to the household 
and located on public grounds, evolved over the years into permanent diwaniyyat; 
sometimes, these structures were still built well after the Gulf War and into the 21st 
century.134  Legally, these faux tents and any other illicit constructions on state land are 
subject to removal by authorities at any moment.  Yet, as one host of a pseudo-tent 
                                                
134 Abd Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 26, 2007. 
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diwaniyya confessed only a few months before the 2008 enforcement of the Public 
Property Law enabled municipality teams to remove these guestrooms, “No one cares too 
much even though everyone knows.”135  Regardless of the precise circumstances, it is 
irrefutable that a long, protracted “silent encroachment” (Bayet 2002:19) took place as 
citizens staked their claims to state properties without censure over the course of several 
decades.136  The episode detailed below is a perspective that is not too uncommon 
amongst proprietors of diwaniyyat unlawfully built on public land; namely, that the 
arbitrariness of earlier enforcement (Heydemann 2007:27-28) led to an expectation that 
legal action would never be forthcoming: 
Before the [Iraqi] invasion my regular diwaniyya was inside the house.  After the 
invasion, I built a diwaniyya outside of the house.  This [second] diwaniyya was 
for neighborhood news but it is gone now.  After the invasion laws were looser 
and [people] began building diwaniyya outside their houses.  When I first built my 
house, I never imagined building a diwaniyya on that land [outside it].  But for 
two or three years I saw that everyone else built these so I got the idea and 
thought, “Why not?”  The idea for my [outside] diwaniyya was for gathering 
everyone in the neighborhood.137 
 
What this last discourse shows, apart from the blatant illegality of the proprietor’s 
guestroom, is the diversity of Kuwait’s contemporary diwaniyyat structural legacy that 
ranges from unpretentious “small, cheap… [diwaniyya that] ministers and businessmen 
would not visit”138 to those which cost hundreds of thousands of dinars and are 
considerable investments for their hosts.  Here, the formality or informality of the 
structure only describes the processes involved in its construction (Yacobi and Shechter 
                                                
135 Abdul.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 10, 2007. 
136 The office of Saud Al-Khatrash, the coordinator charged with removing all illicit structures on state 
property beginning in 2008, estimated that by November 2010 it had demolished 13,000 illegally 
constructed dawawin.  These numbers were delivered to the author by the office of Saud Al-Khatrash by 
fax on November 28, 2010.   The document provided is an overview of all demolitions titled, “Total 
Number of Removals of Unlicensed Structures” (ahsah bi’adda ezalat al ghuraf al kharjiyat).  The 
specifics for the dawawin sum were given as a handwritten addendum by Al-Khatrash’s staff.   
137 Hasaawi.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 9, 2010. 
138 Taher.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 15, 2010. 
  
108 
2005:511), the actual content and the privileges that are manifest by socializing in the 
diwaniyyat are hardly indifferent. 
 
The Diwaniyya:  The Ascent of Institutionalized Social Capital 
The state’s munificence with its oil rents provided more than simply the 
disposable fiscal capital with which its citizens could invest in imitating the symbolic 
capital (Bourdieu 2003:195) of the pre-oil elites by constructing their own diwaniyyat and 
displaying the kinds of hospitality that used to be reserved for only a few privileged 
families (Al Kandari 2002:68-69).  Rather, these institutions have become transformed 
into indispensable resources for providing attendees with the avenues needed to access, 
trade, and apply influence in its various guises.  The most straightforward explanation for 
this is that the Kuwaiti diwaniyyat regularly bring together so many bureaucrats, 
supplicants, and bureaucratic brokers in a familiar environment beyond the confines of 
official oversight (Tsai 2006:125-127).  All of this maneuvering requires locating the 
right gatekeeper, someone who controls access “not to something owned by the 
gatekeeper, but to benefits external to both the gatekeeper and the client-gatekeeper 
relation” (Corra and Willer 2002:180).  Here, as in other brokerage contexts, facilitation 
is the resource that is being pursued and not personal materials or individual wealth.  If 
any ultimate costs are incurred, they are shouldered by the state since it is the holder of 
whatever is being sought (Ledeneva 2000:185, 190).  
It is within the institutional setting of the diwaniyyat that contacts (wasta) can be 
accessed to expedite, circumvent, or legally secure (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:7, 18-20, 32) 
state entitlements that might otherwise prove elusive.  Each of these traits is distinctively 
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identified as guestroom commodities in the opinions of a young urbanite lawyer who 
worked in a private firm.  This man was prideful of his hadhar roots and he held a very 
jaundiced view of what he believed transpires in the Bedouin diwaniyyat; tribal 
transactions that he conveyed to be in stark contrast to what he saw as the justified 
exchanges necessary for the urban community: 
 The tribal shaykh diwaniyya, city Kuwaitis are against this.  [Why?]  The only 
 purpose is to help tribesmen in exchange for [National Assembly] votes, not to 
 help the larger Kuwaiti community.  Tribal Bedouin diwaniyya would not assist 
 hadhar Kuwaitis, not part of the tribe.  But, a city Kuwaiti may go to a diwaniyya 
 to get their lawful rights.  The Bedouin diwaniyya helps tribesmen access goods 
 and services that they do not deserve, like elevate someone in a job who is not 
 qualified.139 
 
Even at face value, the lawyer's comments do not deny that the diwaniyyat can be used to 
service the needs of any Kuwaiti; his only issue is about the types of privileges that are 
traded.  In his estimation, the Bedouin misuse their diwaniyyat to solidify their political 
base in exchange for ill-gotten advancements and favors, whereas the hadhar Kuwaitis 
approach the guestrooms to sublimate administrative wrongdoings.  Of course, this is not 
the case, as almost every male Kuwaiti of any background is aware, and this statement is 
more reflective of the general “hadhar claim that the badu are alien elements in Kuwaiti 
society... [trying] to lay their hands on welfare goods and services” (Longva 2006:172).  
 A more balanced impression is to be found in Valerie Marcel's overview of the 
diwaniyyat as fulcrums for wasta, brokerage, and favoritism and the ramifications of 
these practices for the Kuwait Petroleum Company: 
Diwaniyyas are the channel through which wasta is exercised and special favors 
are granted.  Wasta can help KPC by enabling its professionals to appeal to MPs 
in these informal networks and counter pressure from other, interfering MPs.  The 
diwaniyya practice has strong potential applications to the extent that it allows 
informal relationships across the formal hierarchy.  It is also a place in which to 
                                                
139 T. A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
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raise awareness of problems, to debate issues and to promote a better 
understanding of the needs of the oil industry.  On the other hand, some favors are 
detrimental to the NOC because they are won through the diwaniyya – wasta 
channel and bypass regular management processes.  For example, favors 
sometimes involve granting a job to someone who is not qualified.  Thus it is 
important for KPC to insulate its management decisions from the social pressure 
of these networks.  [2006:61] 
 
Certainly, the ascent of the dawawin into commonplace forums has contributed to these 
reception rooms becoming the country’s unrivaled marketplaces where brokers with 
accessibility can negotiate their petitioners’ requests.  Moreover, it is important to note 
that this does not occur at the level of solitary individuals but through an institution 
where membership or attendance can confer the valued credentials (Portes 1998:4) 
needed to tap into the repertoire of privileges that the paternalistic rentier state can 
provide.  Or, in one guest’s appraisal, creating the perception that one is a member of the 
“closed circle”140 of a diwaniyya is sometimes enough in itself to suggest the possession 
of invaluable wasta endorsements: 
The diwaniyya reflects its owner.  Sometimes, someone will attend a diwaniyya so 
that others will think that he has connections.  The host of the diwaniyya may not 
help you, but others will think that you have access to the wasta in that 
diwaniyya.141  
 
While this review is initially unfavorable from this interviewee's vantage point, what is 
communicated in this passage bears a striking resemblance to the classic argument that 
weak ties are actually instrumental for bridging the gaps between socially distant 
individuals and groups (Granovetter 1973:1370-1371).  It is entirely possible that the 
visitor in question and the host can link others in a way that is more beneficial than their 
personal positions would suggest to the disinterested observer (Boissevain 1966:24-25).  
Besides, an attendee might not require wasta directly from the host since he can 
                                                
140 Hanan M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 30, 2006. 
141 Dhari.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 11, 2007. 
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capitalize on his fellow guests who all have an unknown number of contacts outside of 
the diwaniyya that they are visiting on any given night.  This is in fact the amorphous 
feature of the diwaniyyat, with their countless ranks situated between the individual and 
the state's administrative allocations, which allow for the everyday “raw material of 
politics” (Barnes 1969:107) to unfold. 
 It is in the spheres of Kuwait's high politics that the country's diwaniyyat become 
most visible.  During election cycles, the guestrooms are essential for putting candidates 
and constituencies into contact with each other.  This is true whether the contests are for 
seats on supermarket cooperative boards, sports clubs, or for representation in one of the 
municipalities.142  Yet, all of these smaller elections pale in comparison to the 
contentiousness that surrounds the politicking that takes place for the National Assembly 
and the roles that the diwaniyyat play in this process.  Although tales abound about vote-
buying, the use of “dinar-packed Chanel handbags” (Tetreault 2006) to sway the female 
vote, and voter registration fraud (Tetreault 2000:124), the diwaniyyat are not immune to 
the electoral intrigues that neatly bind the community to the apparatus of the state. 
 The most infamous tactic is the illegal pre-election primary when diwaniyya 
attendees will select who they will vote for before going to the polls.  The tribes and 
those with badu pedigrees are usually accused of employing this strategy to consolidate 
their strength in the National Assembly (Gavrielides 1987:166-170) and this is a common 
theme in Kuwaiti hadhar depictions of how Bedouin politics work. 
Only the tribal areas have diwaniyya voting; it is frequent in places outside 
Kuwait City, like in Jahra.  Members of a diwaniyya will decide to all support one 
candidate to increase at least one person’s chances of winning an election.  This is 
especially true if there are several candidates from a specific diwaniyya.  This way 
                                                
142 Muhammad.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 8, 2006. 
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the diwaniyya does not split the vote and guarantees itself at least one of its 
members will be in Parliament.143 
 
Others, however, have been less dismissive of this phenomenon amongst the hadhar and 
readily detect it as an expected feature of the country’s sociopolitical mechanisms.  Prior 
to the redistricting of Kuwait's electoral districts in 2006, Mary Ann Tetreault tied the 
casting of “one-eyed” ballots by voters back to pre-arrangements that had been made in 
the guestrooms.  The goal of this procedure was to concentrate the members' votes on one 
candidate at a time when voters could select two.  As a result, the diwaniyya voters 
ensured that they did not unwittingly defeat their own interests by boosting an opponent's 
returns through secondary voting.  Tetreault implies that there are rewards for diwaniyya 
supporters of a successful National Assembly candidate but she does not specify what 
these are: 
Kuwait’s small, two-member districts offer closely knit diwaniyya communities 
the opportunity to affect elections directly.  Members pledge support to a favorite 
candidate and sometimes, to increase his chances of winning, agree to cast “one-
eyed” ballots.  By selecting only one candidate instead of two, these diwaniyya 
members increase the concentration of the vote for their favorite and thereby the 
chance that he will win – and be grateful for their support.  Diwaniyya members 
are sure to be the first to inform him of that, too.  [Tetreault 2003:38] 
 
While unstated, the payoff for hosts and guests is not ambiguous:  support in these 
circumstances is wagered under the assumption that government wasta will be 
forthcoming from the appreciative officeholder.  For some, this might be along the lines 
of, “Get my son a job at Kuwait Oil Company and I will get you twenty votes.”144  Yet, 
for a whole collectivity there is the belief that parliamentarians in the good graces of the 
regime can mediate of the behalf of everyone in a diwaniyya that aided a victorious 
campaign: 
                                                
143 Hanan M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 30, 2006. 
144 Tahir.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
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 People believe that the government controls the MPs and the National 
 Assembly as a whole by having MPs who are loyal to the government.  For their 
 loyalty, these MPs have government wasta in different ministries.  As a result, 
 this allows supportive diwaniyya hosts to be rewarded by the winning candidates 
 that they supported during the elections.  These diwaniyya hosts and their guests 
 have access to their MP's wasta, say for access to employment openings.145 
 
Still, unanticipated outcomes are far from impossible and it is not unlikely that a 
diwaniyya will put their efforts towards backing what ends up being an unrewarding bid 
for the National Assembly.  At first glance, it could appear surprising that in one instance 
when this happened, when support was miscalculated, voting en masse remained 
preferable to individual balloting and the status of the diwaniyya host remained 
unscathed: 
 My uncle told his guests that this politician played games and next time they must 
 be more careful.  This did not hurt my uncle as a host because the guests feel that 
 they have more of a presence in politics if they act as a group... Also, the 
 diwaniyya guests are loyal to their host and respect his decisions [and] the guests 
 believe that the host has been right more times than he has been wrong.  These 
 guests know that their host has the relations, the connections, the wasta to 
 advance the needs of the group and they do not have this as individuals.146 
 
What can be seen here, though, is that the host's misguided efforts were forgiven when 
his mistake was weighed against the benefits that come from his contacts.  Moreover, his 
guests risk undercutting one of their own sources of wasta if they haphazardly cast their 
votes in a manner that deprives their host of his connections.  This is the interrelationship 
between hosts and guests that matters in elections and makes the diwaniyyat so alluring 
for candidates who seek a support base; “power groups are not interested in individuals 
per se, but in the numbers an individual can mobilize” (Rosenfeld 1972:69). 
  For guestroom proprietors, an adequate guest roster is crucial for attracting the 
attention of politicians who can make the channels into the state less formidable.  
                                                
145 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
146 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
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Basically, “An owner of a diwaniyya is respected by members of parliament if the 
diwaniyya is large enough.  The owner has many friends and many votes around him, and 
the owner has influence over members.”147  Such a host who can marshal many guests 
into a voting bloc is called an “election key” (al-mufta al-intikhabi).  Nicolas Gavrielides 
claimed that this was a novel phrase when he encountered it, in the parliamentary 
elections of 1985, when it was used to describe “persons with wide social and economic 
contacts who acted as campaign managers” (1987:178).  Today, Gavrielides' definition 
fits the ideal image of the diwaniyya host who wants to use his position to further his 
political, social, or economic ambitions148 by brokering votes for candidates and 
arranging bureaucratic favors for guests. 
A host with good relations inside and outside of his diwaniyya usually has a large 
group of people who highly regard his opinion.  This man may be the head of a 
family, but he is seen as an “election key” because he is a host of a diwaniyya.  A 
candidate for the National Assembly will visit a host’s diwaniyya before an 
election to discuss ideas with the host and build relations with the host.  If the host 
is convinced by the candidate, the host will move to persuade his diwaniyya 
guests to support this candidate because the host is campaigning for this 
candidate.  If elected, the candidate is now an MP, but if this MP makes decisions 
in the National Assembly that are unpopular to the diwaniyya host and his people, 
the host will support another candidate in the next election.  This is the power of 
the [diwaniyya] host.149 
 
Categorized in the standard rhetoric of patron-client exchange, “election key” proprietors 
are strategically positioned to remedy the shortages of a broad clientele (Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1984:167) by rallying support for politicians and providing administrative 
inroads for visitors.  This is not a rigid patron-client relationship between “election key” 
hosts and their guests, as it is not exclusive or compulsory (Wolf 1966b:87), since all 
parties are probably circulating through multiple diwaniyyat during the week.  The lack 
                                                
147 Reyadh.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 5, 2006. 
148 Haya.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 1, 2006. 
149 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
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of a “clear hierarchy between the parties involved, who rather act like partners or friends” 
(Hertog 2010:130) is a popular perception of how these transactions occur but this does 
not alone disqualify these relationships from being clientelistic.  Declarations of 
interpersonal obligation, solidarity and equality cannot conceal the asymmetrical 
advantages (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:48-49) that “election key” hosts enjoy in terms 
of the bureaucratic access that is bestowed by grateful MPs.150  Visitors, for their part, are 
incorporated not in the sense that their host is their protector.  Instead, the moral 
indebtedness that comes with hospitality is more accurate; ethical reciprocity (Herzfeld 
1987:79-80) substitutes for political imbalances and can disguise the existent power 
differentials (Edwards 1996:152) between “election keys” and their guests under the 
rubric of gracious demeanor (Shryock and Howell 2001:255). 
 There is no reason that politicians have to use the guestrooms of “election keys” 
to funnel bureaucratic gifts to members of their electorate.  The roles of the 
parliamentarian, “election key,” and diwaniyya host do not have to be segregated and 
there is no mutual exclusivity implied for those who choose to engage in such activities.  
Indeed, for these are the “service candidates” who trade, 
 Favors for favors, measured in votes as well as in direct campaign  contributions, 
 are the province of the “service candidate” who acts both as ombudsman and 
 benefactor to individual constituents in his district… Constituents who approach 
 service candidates find it easier to obtain scarce and selective benefits… than if 
 they were to apply through regular bureaucratic channels.  [Tetreault 2000:115] 
 
It is just as convenient for these politicians to host their own diwaniyyat as it is for them 
to visit other proprietors.  Victorious “service candidates” are regarded as “service MPs” 
with the disparaging khudamat (services) label carried over to their guestrooms; hence, 
the “service diwaniyya” or, more simply, just “services” for the reason that these are the 
                                                
150 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
  
116 
sites where bureaucratic privileges are most easily dispensed to solicitors from the very 
politicians who have the accessibility that is required.  This is succinctly explained by 
Tahir, a well-informed but intermittent diwaniyyat visitor who is very attuned to the 
mechanisms of Kuwaiti politics: 
 The “service diwaniyya” – khudamat – is new [and it came] after oil [and is] 
 based on “service” National Assembly members.  There are “position” National 
 Assembly members who stand on principles and issues for the public good, not 
 the individual.  “Service” National Assembly members service the needs of 
 individuals and not the community.  These National Assembly members provide 
 favors and offer favors, these favors are provided in the National Assembly 
 member's diwaniyya.  Favors are exchanged to individuals for votes when the 
 elections are held.151   
 
It can be added to this synopsis that the “service diwaniyya,” and the “service candidate” 
for that matter, is only useful due to the structural inefficiencies of the Kuwaiti 
bureaucracy.  Its particularistic distribution of privileges (Cooley 2001:166), its bloated 
public service sectors, and the absence of regulatory transparency (Hertog 2010b:292) 
means that the administrative arenas are unnavigable without facilitatory relationships 
(Joseph 1999:67).  Furthermore, “service candidates” and their khudamat guestrooms are 
not accidental.  Progovernment MPs are known to have silent partners in the regime who 
compensate obedience with graft to protect their allies at the polls (Tetreault 
2000:115).152 
 Methods like vote-buying can bypass many social complications for a candidate 
with deep enough pockets.  In the 2006 elections, it was rumored that the going price for 
                                                
151 Tahir.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
152 Saud Joseph proposes that this same degree of personalized political power in Lebanon is so pervasive 
that, “the norm of operation was intervention – so much so, that government agencies had difficulty 
working at all without the personal intervention of political leaders” (1990:145).  Many in Kuwait would 
view this as indistinct from their own administration. 
  
117 
votes was around KD 2,000 (U.S. $7,000.00) per ballot,153 which is no different from the 
sum recorded for the 1985 campaign (Gavrielides 1987:178).  This can simplify life for 
an elected official by limiting his responsibilities once he is in office due to the finality of 
the exchange closing the potential for an open-ended, enduring relationship (Toren 
1989:143-144).154  With money, there is no need for a politician to dispense state favors 
or carefully budget his wasta privileges because the transaction is immediately concluded 
(Parry and Bloch 1989:5-7).  While there is no way to know for certain what the success 
rates are for vote-buying candidates, their overtures can be speculative at times when they 
are presented before the audience of a diwaniyya: 
 Members of parliament campaigning in elections, these members of parliament 
 may speak to [the] guests of a poor diwaniyya, a diwaniyya in a poor state of 
 repairs, and they have been rejected by its members.  So, to win them over, the 
 candidates have offered to repair the diwaniyya in order to gain the support [the 
 votes] of the guests.  In the two cases of this that I witnessed, the candidates were 
 asked to leave, run out of the diwaniyya, and told by the host that, “This 
 diwaniyya is too good to host people like you.”  But, this may work better in a 
 diwaniyya that is small and close-knit.  It is more difficult in a large, formal 
 diwaniyya where the host may not know, or be close to, all of his guests.155  
 
There are several issues that are raised by this ploy aside from it blatantly insulting the 
host's hospitality and drawing attention to his guestroom's inadequacies.  Primarily, it 
puts a price on the geniality of the diwaniyya and violates the etiquette of reciprocity in 
the same vein that, “one should not reciprocate an invitation to dinner at someone's home 
with a cash payment” (Granovetter 2007:154-155).  More detrimental to the attendees, 
                                                
153 Miq.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 7, 2006. 
154 Frederick Charles Huxley observed this exact conundrum with vote-buying in Lebanon.  What makes 
this interesting is that, like Kuwait, Lebanon is a country where politics and wasta frequently intersect and 
voters have to weigh long-term gains against their short-term needs.  Huxley's comments are very 
applicable here:  “The contrast between exchanging votes for money as opposed to exchanging votes for 
wasita is quite striking.  Surely this is a clear example of the difference between economic exchange, which 
does not establish any further obligations or relationships but is terminated by the transaction, and social 
exchange, where the parties involved in the transaction establish a more enduring relationship based on the 
obligation to make future returns” (1978:36).   
155 Muhammad.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 3, 2007. 
  
118 
however, is that this technique declares that further social relations are undesirable 
(Sahlins 1981:278, 298), which in turn betrays the internal facade of status equivalence 
that is shared within the diwaniyya.  By turning a social encounter into a mere payment 
for services (Malinowski 1984:181), the pretense of solidarity between equals who help 
each other out is commoditized into a market transaction devoid of any future sociability 
(Granovetter 2007:161).  Much like a bribe, the offer of, “Material payment in return for 
favors... means the absence of any possibility of a personal relationship or of having 
friends in common... [It] is an acknowledgment of social inferiority, like accepting a tip 
or gratuity” (Lomnitz 1988:44).  Yet, despite the prospect of these social pitfalls 
compounded with the shame of being “run out of the diwaniyya,” the story does not 
completely disavow that this tactic might appeal to a small enough gathering sitting 
together in the right diwaniyya. 
 More frequent, though, are the diwaniyyat that exist outside any functional 
capacity that would allow them to be branded as khudamat.  Also, most proprietors are 
not in any position that would allow them to be legitimately recognized as “election 
keys” by candidates or by their communities.  This does not discount the fact that former 
MPs can be as instrumental as incumbents for relaying requests from diwaniyya guests to 
current officeholders156 although these facilitators can still be called formal political 
actors due to their personal expertise (Palmer 2002:212) about the state's legal and 
bureaucratic framework (Cohen 2004:5).  However, in the guestrooms of the rank and 
file who are not overtly political and who do not barter their votes for administrative 
favors, networks of informal relations are crystallized to produce, reproduce, and 
maintain the social inroads of connectivity needed in Kuwait to ensure that the benefits of 
                                                
156 Jamal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on April 4, 2007. 
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the rentier state do not remain too far out of reach.   
 Therefore, these “neutral” guestrooms, named as such only because they stand 
apart from the kinds of direct electoral racketeering that typify “services” in all its forms, 
are still venues for a population that is literally a “nation of bureaucrats” (Herb 2009:375) 
even when the brazen patronage of “election keys” and khudamat is missing.  This 
distinction means that the flow of favors inside these diwaniyyat are increasingly 
horizontal (Lomnitz 1982:53-54) with more generalized and indefinite expectations for 
repayment (Sahlins 1981:194).  Because these diwaniyyat are based on notions of 
kinship, friendship, and workplace ties instead of political expediency157 they exhibit a 
style of interaction that is more akin to social support than it is to cliency.  The 
relationships that bind these members to each other are made up of a mixture of 
ingredients that combine “emotional aid, services, financial aid, companionship, or 
information” (Wellman and Wortley 1989:277).  Participation can be as informal as 
dropping by when one has free time to the obligatory attendance that some men who host 
expect from their sons and nephews.158  Seemingly innocuous, these diwaniyyat represent 
all that is ordinary and routine about guestroom visitation in Kuwait; coincidentally, this 
is also the characteristic that makes them all the more emblematic of the normalcy that is 
attached to their utility for accommodating brokers. 
 It is often said in Kuwait that, “You may not know the person you need but you 
know the diwaniyya you need to find him,”159 and, “People can be contacted through a 
                                                
157 This is not to say that there cannot be overlapping interests within a single guestroom.  A “service” 
politician or “election key” can also be a kinsman, a co-worker, and a friend; thus, making it difficult in 
these cases to draw a line between pure “services” and uncalculated aid.  The point here is that the majority 
of diwaniyyat are not khudamat and do not host elected politicians or appointed officials.    
158 Tahir.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
159 Yousef A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on April 2, 2007. 
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diwaniyya.  If you want to locate someone find the diwaniyya where he sits.”160  What 
these refrains underscore is how important Kuwait's guestrooms are for providing a 
medium of access that puts individuals into contact with others that, given the nature of 
many of the favors, make the state into an interpersonal asset (Joseph 1990:144).  These 
remarks also hint at ways that difficulties can be taken care of by searching through 
guestrooms that are reputed to host certain visitors; for example, employees of particular 
ministries, municipalities, or departments who know how to move past bureaucratic 
roadblocks (Singerman 2006:17) and who have the credentials that are only supplied by a 
personal touch (Hoodfar 1997:229-232).  The encounters that Fahad has gone through 
illustrate this trend quite well, and at the same time they reflect the casual indifference of 
a practice that has become imbued with everydayness:  
I do not enjoy my father’s diwaniyya because little important information is 
exchanged, just the normal, “How are you?” and “Oh, fine.”  But I do attend the 
diwaniyya held by the men on my mother’s side of the family.  [Why?]  Wasta.  If 
I need anything I go there and ask.  If I have a problem with a ministry, I go there.  
They [the guests] say, “Oh, what do you need?  We will talk to them.”  And, 
everything will be taken care of and there is no problem.  So, I go there instead of 
to my father’s [diwaniyya].161 
 
As this case indicates, Fahad, like so many others, finds that the connections that can be 
activated by attendance in a diwaniyya serve as an outlet to a broader spectrum of 
contacts that can help him in his search for redress.  Plus, Fahad is not swapping his 
political autonomy for assistance by way of a khudamat or an “election key.”  His kinship 
network is viable enough that he does not have locate “services” as long as he fulfills his 
familial obligation to visit where his maternal relatives sit. 
                                                
160 Samer.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 8, 2006. 
161 Fahad.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 11, 2007. 
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 This last narrative brings up a final topic, and that is that neutral diwaniyyat, 
khudamat, and “election key” guestrooms are not intrinsically unique as far as the favors 
that their attendees can hope to procure; there are no inherent first or second order 
resources (Boissevain 1974:147-148) that delineate one diwaniyya from another or define 
why a visitor would choose an “election key” over a sitting with family members.  The 
differences lie in the range of contacts that reside within, and radiate out from, a specific 
diwaniyya.  It is preferable to resolve problems without resorting to “services” since 
doing so avoids “a very definite obligation” (Boissevain 1966:22) but this scenario is not 
always possible.  If it was, then there would be no need for khudamat guestrooms and 
bargains with “election key” hosts.  However, Kuwait's welfare regime expresses its 
ubiquity by selectively dispensing privileges and rights through personalized channels 
that empower local gatekeepers (Tetreault 2000:115).  These gatekeepers are approached 
in the diwaniyyat and the real choice between a neutral guestroom, a khudamat, and an 
































 The case studies selected here demonstrate the diverse array of options that are 
possible for any Kuwaiti male seeking an evening in the company of his peers, relatives, 
or colleagues.  With few exceptions, these pretenses must not be mistaken for casual 
informality.  Instead, as these chronicles indicate, nearly every diwaniyya, from the most 
humble to the more extravagant, provides its attendees with an indispensible forum for 
accessing, trading, and applying influence in its various manifestations.  Indeed, these are 
the country’s veritable marketplaces where brokers with resources negotiate their 
petitioners’ requests. 
 There are a couple of significant points of context that cannot be neglected when 
weighing the implications of these examples.  Foremost is that these dawawin are not 
special nor are they incomparable to any others.  They are purely sound exemplars of 
some of the possibilities that are available to men of all ages in Kuwait City.  There are 
such innumerable amounts of variations in terms of intentions, personalities, means, and 
general wherewithal that any indiscriminate diwaniyya model would invariably be 
intellectually dishonest.  Nevertheless, the cases that follow are still familiar enough to be 
instantly recognizable to anyone with even minimal exposure to these guestrooms; 




 Secondly, though of equal importance, is that those present in a diwaniyya at any 
given time do not necessarily act in unison as a harmonious, holistic entity.  Definitely, 
there are planned programs with speakers, topics or candidates scheduled, whereas on 
other occasions an individual with a dominant disposition might carry the evening’s 
conversation.  Even so, at the opposite end of the spectrum there are those frequent 
moments when multiple conversations are taking place all at once between different 
groups of varying sizes.  The aim of this clarification is to underline the fact that while a 
particular diwaniyya can be perceived externally as an amalgamation of its members, 
internally there is less certainty about the robustness of these ties.  Therefore, careful 
attention is given to the precise interactional setting since “the diwaniyya” can encompass 
an ill-defined collection of relationships.    
 
Case Study Number 1:  Introduction 
 This first review is a departure from the later analyses of Kuwait’s diwaniyyat in 
that it offers a unique perspective of the country’s guestrooms.  Rather than exploring a 
diwaniyya from a participant’s point of view, neither a host nor an attendee will appear as 
the central focus.  At the core of this incident is a demonstration of how the ambitions of 
one man, Uncle Ali, are kept in check by the communal interests of an institution that he 
blatantly ignored:  a diwaniyya composed of local elders. 
 In addition to the interactional politics between Uncle Ali and the unnamed 
guestroom that eventually reversed his personal objectives, this episode serves to 
highlight the intersection at which actors, diwaniyyat, and national representation all 
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come into contact.  Specifically noteworthy here is the role that a diwaniyya assumes in 
filling the social space existent between an individual and the state; a gap that has been 
called the “raw material of politics” (Barnes 1969:107) to denote the utility of ostensibly 
nonpolitical institutions in shaping political outcomes. 
 Finally, Uncle Ali’s encounter with his neighborhood elders’ diwaniyya illustrates 
the tactical use of wasta, interpersonal connections, and social capital to mediate local 
differences and simultaneously acquire government resources.  Hence, by deploying the 
necessary wasta, a community-level dispute over a state-level competition is defused by 
funneling public assets into a private coffer; thereby validating the stations of all parties 
involved by confirming one side’s ability to give and the other’s willingness to receive 
(Mauss 1954:10-11). 
 
Case Study Number 1:  Uncle Ali’s Bid for Parliament162 
Amongst his peers, Uncle Ali is quite often heralded as the quintessential portrait 
of modern-day success in Kuwait City.  In the realms of traditional values and customary 
virtues, Uncle Ali enjoys a strong reputation within his community and he boasts a large 
family that is widely recognized for being in fine standing.  Uncle Ali also owns a 
lucrative construction business that he runs with the assistance of his two sons.  
Unmistakably, Uncle Ali’s repute through the years as a respectable patriarch and an 
adept entrepreneur has earned him a considerable amount of local goodwill, or at least the 
reverence of others. 
 When the Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah, dissolved the National Assembly 
                                                
162 This example is based on an interview with one of Uncle Ali’s relatives that was conducted in Kuwait 
City, Kuwait on November 5, 2007. 
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(majlis al-umma) on May 21, 2006, Uncle Ali saw this as an opportunity to set his sights 
on a different objective:  he decided that he would campaign for one of his district’s two 
seats in the general elections scheduled for June 29, 2006.  However, there is a crucial 
detail that must be taken into account to fully understand Uncle Ali’s course of action; 
primarily, the fact that he had no political platform, no legislative agenda, nor any 
economic scheme.  Moreover, he held no illusions that he would ever have to develop 
such an inventory to effectively contend for a place of his own in the National Assembly, 
and there are several reasons for Uncle Ali’s cavalier attitude towards his prospects in 
Kuwait’s electoral cycle.  First, Uncle Ali harbored no desires to ever become a career 
politician.  His overriding motivation was that he yearned for the prestige that he 
assumed came with holding office and he coveted the title that would have signaled his 
triumph to everyone:  naeb majlis al-umma (Delegate of the National Assembly).  
Essentially, Uncle Ali’s aspirations at this juncture in his life stemmed from the 
realization that he was satisfied he had fulfilled all that was possible for both his family 
and his business.  Outside of the esteem that he envisioned for himself in the National 
Assembly, Uncle Ali could not picture any other way to garner more accolades than 
through an elected position.  Lastly, and just as important for Uncle Ali’s dismissal of 
prototypical electoral protocol was his fervent belief in the reliability of his networks of 
extended kin.  He was confident that the strength of his good name amongst his kinsmen 
and their connections would be enough for him to collect the votes he needed on the day 
of the elections.  Further still, Uncle Ali anticipated that by virtue of his proprietorship of 
a well-known company he could count on some extra ballots to be marked in his favor.  
Altogether, Uncle Ali viewed himself as a competitive candidate and he fully expected to 
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be an MP in the next parliamentary session.163 
 Not surprisingly, there was another parliamentary hopeful in Uncle Ali’s district 
who was dismayed about the prospects of facing him in the upcoming elections.164  
However, unlike Uncle Ali, this opponent had already rallied the members of a 
neighborhood diwaniyya to the side of his campaign in an advantageous maneuver meant 
to add legitimacy to his bid for office.  More significantly, though, was that Uncle Ali’s 
adversary had not sought backing from one of the more common diwaniyyat composed of 
card players, family members, or even coworkers who regularly meet to commiserate 
over their professional woes.  Instead, Uncle Ali’s rival chose a diwaniyya of impeccable 
status; it was the diwaniyya where the elders from the district’s most venerable families 
sat together weekly to discuss a variety of subjects ranging from politics and trade to 
marriages and household news.  Aside from these topics of conversation, what really 
mattered was that these were men of substance whose opinions carried weight far beyond 
the confines of this one diwaniyya.  Once Uncle Ali’s opponent succeeded in convincing 
the elders that they would benefit from his plans for office and that his victory would 
                                                
163 To provide numerical context to Uncle Ali’s ambitions the final tallies for the second seat winners give 
an idea of the minimum number of votes that he would have required.  At the time of Uncle Ali’s bid, there 
were 25 districts and each had two seats in the National Assembly that were awarded to the two candidates 
from each constituency who received the most votes.  Therefore, in the 2006 election Uncle Ali would have 
needed anywhere from a low of 1,461 (District 2, Al-Murqab) to a high of 7,085 votes (District 15, Al-
Farwaniah), with an average of 3,759 ballots, to secure his electoral district’s second parliamentary seat.  
Of course, this is speculative and assumes that Uncle Ali’s candidacy could simply have matched the 
numbers generated by other successful second-place district officeholders without accounting for the 
variables that a novel candidate introduces into an election.  Nonetheless, this count does place Uncle Ali’s 
objectives in perspective by indicating the level of support that he expected to be able to generate based 
solely upon his kinship and business affiliations.  All election figures were compiled from Michael Herb’s 
Kuwait Politics Database at http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfh/database/database.htm, accessed on March, 06, 
2011; and the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) at http://www.kuna.net.kw, accessed on March 06, 2011. 
164 Every district produced multiple candidates beyond the two who would go on to represent each 
constituency.  Several areas (District 7, Kifan; District 15, Al-Farwaniah; District 23, Al-Sabahiya; and 
District 25, Umm Al-Haiman) yielded the fewest contestants (six) while District 10, Al ‘Adiliyah, 
witnessed the most with 16 challengers who contested for a spot in the National Assembly.  On average, 
ten candidates were listed on the ballots for each district.  These figures are derived from the results 
reported by Michael Herb in his Kuwait Politics Database at http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfh/database/ 
database.htm, accessed on March 06, 2011. 
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ultimately further their interests, a clear distinction from Uncle Ali’s undefined docket, 
all that remained was one final obstacle:  Uncle Ali. 
 Even without the support of such a prestigious diwaniyya located right in the 
middle of his own district, Uncle Ali was still poised to be a formidable contender as the 
elections approached.  This perhaps explains why he never tried to secure the elders’ 
sponsorship before embarking upon this undertaking.  Whatever Uncle Ali’s reasons 
might have been, he could not shield himself permanently from this particular 
diwaniyya’s influence after its cohorts had settled on who was to be their candidate for 
the National Assembly.  One day, following the acceptance of his proposal to the 
diwaniyya, Uncle Ali’s challenger visited him to inform his counterpart that it was he, 
and not Uncle Ali, who had won the elders’ endorsement.  With this revelation, the 
opponent kindly requested that Uncle Ali withdraw from the race; but not before first 
asking Uncle Ali if there was anything, absolutely anything, which he required to make 
his departure more amicable for those concerned.  Uncle Ali merely retorted, “No, 
nothing.”   
 Uncle Ali’s rival returned to the diwaniyya to report to the elders what had 
transpired and how he had failed to come to terms with Uncle Ali.  The opponent 
explained that he attempted to reason with Uncle Ali and negotiate a sound offer that was 
supposed to have prompted him to retire from the elections.  Yet, all of this, he argued, 
was in vain because of Uncle Ali’s stubbornness and his refusal to acknowledge the good 
judgment of others.  Obviously, this account was troubling to the elders and if this issue 
was not resolved it could completely derail not only their outlook for the election itself 
but their collective presence as powerbrokers in the local community if it should become 
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known that their will can no longer be brought to bear its intended results.  Without 
hesitation, the elders quickly notified Uncle Ali that they wanted to meet with him at their 
diwaniyya. 
 Uncle Ali arrived at the diwaniyya with his two sons by his side and their entry 
was met with the familiar rounds of greetings and salutations that typically accompany 
any guest’s appearance in one of these establishments; although, the circumstances for 
this visit were far from the expectations that normally characterize a routine social call.  
Soon after dispensing with these niceties, the elders moved on to the more pressing affair 
that had brought them all together on this night:  Uncle Ali’s recalcitrant stance regarding 
his candidacy for the National Assembly.  The elders, along with their own nominee who 
was present for this meeting, wanted Uncle Ali to clarify why he continued to cling so 
desperately to his National Assembly ambitions when their man was such a viable 
alternative for the vacancy.  Also, they needed Uncle Ali to tell them in no uncertain 
terms why he had flatly rejected his rival’s efforts to reach a compromise once he learned 
that this opponent was acting on behalf of their diwaniyya.  Of course, these questions 
were not put forth with the intention that Uncle Ali would ever be able to answer them in 
a manner that could have assuaged the elders’ worries since they had already selected 
their candidate.  Rather, this was a gesture proffered to Uncle Ali so that he might have a 
chance to respond; this was not a reprimand or a scolding, it was an inducement to renew 
talks and make sure that all parties were given the liberty to justify their positions.  Only 
then, with everyone’s rationales made as forthright as they cared to advertise, could the 
real query begin:  What would it take for Uncle Ali, with the elections drawing near, to 
accept the preferences of this diwaniyya and abandon his pursuit of a seat in the next 
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National Assembly?   
Despite the diwaniyya’s façade of congeniality coupled with its ambience of 
hospitality and egalitarianism, Uncle Ali was truly humbled in the presence of such 
concentrated social pressure.  It had been easy for him to send his opponent away empty-
handed the time they had spoken together privately, face-to-face, but on this evening the 
situation was more delicate.  Uncle Ali either had to personally turn his back on all those 
before him in the diwaniyya, and be scandalized for his obstinacy by their censure and 
backbiting in any number of his future endeavors, or he could entertain another sequence 
of negotiations that could bode well for all involved.  In this instance, before the watchful 
eyes of those gathered in the diwaniyya, Uncle Ali turned to his sons and asked them if 
they could think of any aspect of their business that was suffering and could use some 
help.  His sons replied that for nearly six months they had been trying to obtain 
construction permits for two of their seaside properties but all of their efforts had fallen 
short.  At that moment, Uncle Ali faced his opponent and told him in front of the elders 
that if he gets these licenses he will leave the race and vacate his bid for the National 
Assembly. 
 Two days later, Uncle Ali received two permits that cleared the way for his 
company to start its building project.  As promised, Uncle Ali withdrew his candidacy 
and his challenger clenched one of their district’s seats in the National Assembly.  Still, 
apart from these tangible political inroads and work certificates Uncle Ali acquired a less 
concrete, albeit equally substantial, gain.  The men of the prominent diwaniyya now see 
Uncle Ali as a sensible, rational individual who is willing to downplay his own aims and 
acquiesce to mediation.  Through this lens, Uncle Ali has elevated his stature to that of a 
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man who listens to the appeals brought by others and is open to reconciliation.  Simply 
stated, Uncle Ali is not one who is going to limit the range of options that he has 
available. 
 
Case Study Number 1:  Discussion 
 Uncle Ali’s brief flirtation with Kuwaiti parliamentary politics provides an 
insightful look at one particular interchange where local-level interests impinge upon 
state-level delegacy.  However, Uncle Ali’s tale is not entirely exceptional and it fits 
neatly into the wider context of the country’s electoral maneuverings.  As early as the 
1986 election, exactly 20 years before Uncle Ali’s aborted campaign, Nicolas Gavrielides 
already noted the chronic absence of any issues or principles from National Assembly 
candidates: 
The vast majority of the candidates had no platforms or programs.  Some justified 
this by saying that a platform restricts a candidate, reduces his flexibility and 
makes him a slave of his words.  Others simply published their picture and name 
claiming that people know who they are and where they stand.  Yet others 
claimed that platforms belong to political parties which have no place in a small 
country like Kuwait which is after all ‘one family.’ [1987:174] 
 
Apparently, Uncle Ali planned to utilize this same strategy of relying on his array of 
contacts to mobilize a voter base that was already knowledgeable of his personal, family, 
and business attributes; or, phrased another way, Uncle Ali’s approach illustrates some of 
the means by which “social capital serves to enhance human capital on the cheap” (La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt1998:581).165  Plus, the intervention of group solidarities to 
                                                
165 There are countless instances recorded elsewhere of these types of techniques for collecting electoral 
support.  For example, in the Moroccan countryside Lawrence Rosen described a local election in terms 
that could easily be applied here:  “Throughout the course of the campaign, then, each of the candidates 
concentrated on forging and solidifying a wide range of personal ties rather than on making any direct 
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restrict the pool of candidates contending for the National Assembly is a well-tested, 
though formally outlawed, device in Kuwait.  While the tribal primaries, a process where 
members of tribes meet to preselect their candidates in order to eliminate the weakest and 
improve the tribe’s chances at the polls (Alnajjar 2000:245-246), easily attract the most 
attention (Gavrielides 1987:166-170), comparable nontribal mechanisms (Al-Kandari and 
Al-Hadben 2010:278) are no less prevalent.  Mary Ann Tetreault, in her description of 
diwaniyya voting, underscores this trend for those without tribal affiliations:   
…diwaniyya voting is not unusual in Kuwait.  It is a strategy that works like a 
tribal primary or a family council where participants agree ahead of time on one 
or two candidates as a way to concentrate their votes and improve the likelihood 
that their choices will win.  [2000:118] 
 
Although there is no certainty as to whether or not Uncle Ali would have won an 
available seat in his district’s election, when he canceled his bid he increased the odds of 
the diwaniyya’s candidate emerging victorious by allowing the elders to condense the 
field of nominees. 
 Uncle Ali’s case also features another theme that frequently arises in local 
statecraft:  land, property development, and building licenses.  Ever since the highly 
criticized government redistribution schemes in the 1950s and 1960s, land has remained a 
contentious issue in the eyes of many Kuwaitis (El-Katiri et al. 2011:9-10), especially in 
light of the fact that the state still owns anywhere from 90 – 95 percent of the country 
(McClenaghan 2007:57-61).  It is for this reason that almost any construction project 
requires securing state land and the proper certificates; and success with the former does 
not necessarily imply that the latter will follow.  The way this works is that the 
government will lease land on a build, operate, transfer basis, allowing for private 
                                                                                                                                            




development and earnings, until it takes over the venture when the contracted timeframe 
expires.  The problems for developers emerge when they try to steer their projects 
through the required agencies:  there are obstructions derived from the “parliamentary 
suspicion that major contracts unfairly enrich merchants who gain them through 
corruption and influence” (Herb 2009:386-387); and, to introduce further delays there is 
the ever-present swollen bureaucracy with its sluggish licensing procedures 
(McClenaghan 2007:57-61).  These are the very hurdles that confronted Uncle Ali and 
his sons in their commercial activities and they proved to be enough of a hindrance that 
Uncle Ali was willing to wager his political future on the possibility that he could put 
these items to rest. 
 Yet, at the heart of this anecdote lies the institution, a revered diwaniyya, which 
presided over a clash between individual desires and group sentiments to satisfy district 
representation in the National Assembly by offering a remedy for Uncle Ali’s dilemma 
with the state’s convoluted construction licensing protocols.  All of this came to fruition 
with the nimble treatment by the diwaniyya elders of what Richard Antoun coined 
“institutionalized deconfrontation;” whereby, 
The encounters-by-mediation are not in fact encounters; they are institutionalized 
deconfrontations:  issues are resolved in the guest house by manipulating the 
idiom of blame and honor… At the end of the process a fiction of amity is 
established; it is unclear who has “won” and who has “lost,” since intangible 
rewards (honor, respect, prestige) are balanced against tangible rewards in a 
skillful manner, and the parties resume social relations.  A process that began as a 
political process, a competition between clearly delineated opponents for scarce 
resources and prizes, has ended as a process of social control in which men are led 
to subordinate their interests for the sake of the wider social unit.  [1979:156] 
 
When Uncle Ali’s opponent resorted to the members of the diwaniyya, the politics of 
etiquette (Antoun 1997:159) left Uncle Ali with few choices aside from the inevitable:  a 
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“person-to-person, open give-and-take… managed by the elders” (Antoun 2000:450).  
While Uncle Ali’s story deviates from Antoun’s Jordanian model in some of its elements, 
the mediators are not neutral but are interested parties and there was no conflict in the 
sense of a trespass by either Uncle Ali or his challenger (Antoun 2000:447-448), 
Antoun’s depiction is still a useful analytical foundation for examining how 
reconciliation was achieved one night in this diwaniyya.  In this trial, the challenger 
revealed the extent of his network of supporters (Rosen 2006:169) and Uncle Ali yielded 
to the wishes of the group, but not before he was allowed to name the price for his 
compromise.  At the conclusion of all “the tactical facades – the bluffs, grand postures, 
and imperceptible dodges – so common to tournament settings” (Shryock and Howell 
2001:255), everyone involved was justly rewarded and, drawing from Antoun’s 
deductions (1979:156), there were no losers:  Uncle Ali gained his permits and for his 
conciliation he even furthered his own reputation; his opponent earned a spot in the 
National Assembly; and the elders of the diwaniyya got their man into office to reinforce 
their influence in local affairs. 
 
Case Study Number 2:  Introduction 
 The following narrative revolves around the advent of a multifamily diwaniyya, 
the Al Abbas Diwaniyya, and traces its trajectory beginning with its conception and 
ending at the point of its implementation.  Like other diwaniyyat, its membership readily 
endorses its overt persona and this instance, Al Abbas Diwaniyya is put forward as a 
conglomeration of individuals whose families are all descended from a common ancestor, 
Mahmoud bin Abbas.  This statement of purpose is immediately evidenced upon entering 
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Al Abbas Diwaniyya as an oversized genealogical chart greets every caller and shows 
how those present are related.  Presumably, these relatives have elected to gather together 
regularly so that they may restore their former kinship ties and rectify what had become a 
state of familial disunity. 
 Less obvious and more concealed are the conflicts that have arisen over the 
components of prestige that complement attachment to any Kuwaiti guestroom like Al 
Abbas Diwaniyya that can boast a broad base of supporters.  Outside of Al Abbas 
Diwaniyya, not all of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ heirs have accepted this arrangement and 
these malcontents have made no secret of their suspicions of the motives of one 
participating family:  the Al Najjar.  Anwar Al Haddad, whose course of action will be 
subsequently summarized, is infamous amongst his kinsmen in this regard.  Also 
internally, some descendants have privately voiced their unease over the growing 
influence of the Al Najjar, a form of power that has only been possible through the efforts 
of all families agreeing to meet in a cooperative setting.  The story of the Karami – cum – 
Al Muallim illustrates an attempt by one lineage to adjust this prevailing balance of 
authority inside Al Abbas Diwaniyya. 
 The analysis of Al Abbas Diwaniyya will demonstrate how the construction of 
this guestroom was formulated to accommodate deviations in its genealogical makeup.  
Not unexpectedly, a few lineages are absent from the gigantic, decorative family tree 
exhibited in the foyer and are largely unmentioned in the popular narratives indicative of 
the fellowship that binds the rank and file in Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  Likewise, in another 
departure from the strict observance of genealogical rigidity, one line, the Al Basir, has 
been elevated to a level on par with the lineages stemming from the first generation of 
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Mahmoud bin Abbas’ descendants.  Lastly, the general notions of power that the Al 
Abbas Diwaniyya supposedly imparts upon its devotees will be examined with specific 
attention given to how the reunion of these five lineages can become a manifest symbol 
of social ascendancy in Kuwait City.  This will also shed light on why Haitham Al Najjar, 
the implicit host of Al Abbas Diwaniyya, is such a contentious figure for some of his 
relatives. 
 
Case Study Number 2:  The Invention of the Five Family Diwaniyya: 
An Expression of Sentiment or the Manipulation of Tradition?166 
 
The extended Al Najjar family gathered in 2000 for the solemn occasion of a 
funeral for one of their revered matriarchs.  In addition to these immediate relatives, 
members from four other lineages with whom the Al Najjar share a kinship tie made 
customary appearances so that they might offer their condolences and pay their respects.  
These extended mourners represented the families of the Karami, the Al Basir, the bin 
Abbas, and the Al Haddad.    
 Yet, very early in the course of the three day bereavement period all of those who 
were present took note of an unmistakable realization:  To their surprise, with so many 
faces from multiple generations of descendants in attendance, they found that they simply 
did not know each other.  The vagaries of time had served to separate these five families 
despite their common progenitor and now they could scarcely identify one another in an 
intimate setting.  Three elders from the Al Najjar, recognizing this as an inexcusable 
shortcoming to their ideal of familial closeness, discussed amongst themselves a way to 
                                                
166 The data for this case were compiled from observations and interviews at Al Abbas Diwaniyya between 
2006 and 2008.  Guests and family members were also interviewed away from Al Abbas Diwaniyya over 
the same time period. 
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remedy their collective negligence.  At this small meeting, it was proposed that perhaps a 
diwaniyya formed under the auspices of the apical lineage that united all of the families, 
that of Mahmoud bin Abbas, could bring everyone together.  After subtly inquiring with 
the others about the feasibility of such an undertaking, on the last day of the rites held to 
honor their deceased matron, the men from Al Najjar publicly asked that all five families 
join together in a concerted effort to renew their lost ties; a summons that culminated 
with an impassioned speech from one of the esteemed Al Najjar seniors encouraging a 
restoration of familial communion. 
 In the summer of the following year, 2001, the first meeting was organized by the 
Al Najjar in the home of one of their elders with the men from all five families under the 
pretense of rebuilding the bonds of kinship.  Tariq Al Najjar, one of the original three 
who initially envisioned reuniting the lineages under a joint banner, estimated that 
roughly 120 attendees from the Al Najjar, Karami, Al Basir, bin Abbas, and the Al 
Haddad were present for this preliminary session.  Of those who were there, 20 signed a 
pledge signifying their intent to participate in a combined diwaniyya meant to strengthen 
their families’ overall position vis-à-vis each other and the community at large.  
However, calling upon the families to collaborate was hardly a novel approach as proven 
by several earlier attempts.  During the 1970s, a regular diwaniyya was extended to all of 
the descendants of Mahmoud bin Abbas but it failed when members from each of the five 
families instead chose to start their own separate diwaniyyat.  Later, in the 1980s, a 
patriarch from the Karami opened his diwaniyya to all of the heirs of bin Abbas.  After a 
few years, this diwaniyya also closed due to a combination of factors:  the host’s erratic 
work schedule limited the time that he could devote to operating the diwaniyya along 
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with what some in the family have postulated as the Karami diwaniyya’s apparent lack of 
goals or objectives.  To overcome these previous shortfalls, and to make sure that these 
mistakes were not repeated, the founders of this latest incarnation of a bin Abbas 
diwaniyya have strived to emphasize the links of kinship and the commonality of 
interests that should ideally accompany this lineal heritage.  Furthermore, its originators 
focused on a series of organizational principles that can most appropriately be described 
as adhering to a corporate-type structure. 
The tradition of decent promoted by the Al Najjar for this diwaniyya draws its 
membership from the five families identified as successors to the legacy of a shared 
forebear, Mahmoud bin Abbas, an 18th century religious functionary167 who lived in what 
is now southeastern Fars Province in Iran where he held several area villages as part of a 
waqf endowment.  Towards the end of the 1700s, bin Abbas left home with his four sons 
and stopped in Kuwait en route to Mecca to perform the hajj.168  While in Kuwait, bin 
Abbas made preparations for his sons to remain in the town and await his return.  Yet, 
this was the last time that the sons would see their father again; Mahmoud bin Abbas died 
at some point on the pilgrimage and never made it back to Kuwait.169 
 The five families that comprise today’s Al Abbas Diwaniyya distinguish 
themselves as the direct descendants of the sons that stayed behind when bin Abbas 
departed Kuwait two centuries ago (see Figure 5.1).  Their relatedness to each of 
Mahmoud bin Abbas’ sons is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  With the exception of the line of 
                                                
167 Unfortunately, the specifics of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ religious position are unknown and whether or not 
he was a part of the orthodox clerical establishment are speculative.  Hence, his role could have been 
informal, like a teacher, caretaker, or muezzin.     
168 As early as 1709, Kuwait was already noted by regional travelers as a stopping point for pilgrims on 
their way to Mecca (Haarmann 2003:30, 37).  By 1907, these hajj caravans became a source of tax revenue 
for Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah (Alghanim 1998:139). 
169 For Muslims, death in fulfillment of one’s religious duties is an auspicious event that signifies 




Figure 5.1:  Mahmoud bin Abbas (d. late 18th century) and His Sons 
 
 
Ahmad bin Abbas, who have retained the ancestor’s name, and the Al Basir, literally 
translated as “the wise,” these family names reflect the occupations that Mahmoud bin 
Abbas’ progeny adopted in Kuwait Town:  carpentry (Al Najjar), blacksmithing (Al 
Haddad), and teaching (Al Muallim).  Noticeably, Karami (generosity) is included in 
parentheses under Mahmoud b. Mahmoud bin Abbas’ lineage and this is due to a lack of 
familial coherence dating back at least dating to the 1960s.  At various intervals, different 
households within this patrilineage have given themselves the moniker Al Muallim, 
Karami,170 and Mahmoud, with some families freely switching between these either 
separately or in combination.171  Most recently, in 2010, some of the Karami have 
officially changed their surnames by registering with the government as Al Muallim and 
they are encouraging others, for reasons that will be discussed next, to follow suit.  Yet, 
this is precisely the predicament that was conveyed by a senior from the Al Najjar:  once 
the state made all nationals register family names, the bin Abbas became divided when 
they chose to select surnames derived from the occupational statuses that connected their 
                                                
170 Karami, as a family name, was created in the 1970s by members of the Al Muallim who wanted to 
distinguish themselves from the others.  The basis of the name is founded on the idea that a teacher 
(muallim) like their ancestor must surely have been generous (karim) and was probably often referred to as 
karami. 
171 An example of this can be seen with the use of the first name “Ahmad,” a hypothetical descendant of 
Miq Al Muallim b. Mahmoud b. Mahmound bin Abbas.  Depending on his family’s disposition and the 
nature of their relations both internally and externally in regards to their lineage, “Ahmad” could assume 
several surnames that are all able to convey similar notions of descent.  The fictional “Ahmad” could be 
known as Ahmad Karami, Ahmad Karami Mahmoud, Ahmad Karami Mahmoud Abbas, Ahmad Al 
Muallim, and so on.   
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different branches to Mahmoud bin Abbas’ sons.  Recast in another way, bin Abbas is put 
forth as the indicator that is forever permanent, whereas all subsequent manifestations are 
demoted as being merely transitory. 
 Since its inception, the membership of Al Abbas Diwaniyya has been arranged 
into different committees, subcommittees, councils, and boards.  In part, this is to prevent 
it from collapsing like its predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s; also, it is hoped that this 
attention to orderliness will enhance the guestroom’s presence on an already crowded 
field of diwaniyyat.  After the pilot meeting in 2001 to gauge the potential appeal of a 
collective diwaniyya composed of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ heirs, the 20 signatories who 
expressed interest were commissioned to collect genealogical and contact data for their 
families.  At their first few gatherings, every member of the “Committee of Twenty” 
(lejenet al-ashreena) wore nametags to overcome the unfamiliarity that had embarrassed 
them at the funeral just a year earlier.  Then, once all of the family information was 
compiled, the Committee of Twenty was dissolved and a seven-person team took its 
place.  Known as the “Blessed Seven” (saba al-mubaraka), this group was tasked with 
putting together a constitution, determining the rules for spending any monetary 
contributions given to the diwaniyya, and creating more committees and posts as well as 
the obligatory regulations that govern these positions.172  At the same time that the 
                                                
172 The Blessed Seven eventually constructed a 26 article constitution that defined membership for the 
diwaniyya as based on descent from Mahmoud bin Abbas; designated the diwaniyya as the site for male 
heirs of Mahmoud bin Abbas to meet and named the diwaniyya Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  In addition to these 
formalities, the constitution established a Board of Directors composed of one elected member of at least 
18 years of age from each family; it set up a Consultative Committee made of one elder from each lineage 
to resolve major crises like family disputes; and it founded a ten-person Diwaniyya Committee (chairman, 
vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, three financial officers, and three information center posts) with two 
members from each family, each of whom must be 21 years old or older.  With the exception of those on 
the Consultative Committee, who are appointed for life, most positions are five year terms awarded by 
nomination and consensus.  This process was witnessed in 2004 at the trials for the first ten-member 
Diwaniyya Committee when there were a total of 11 aspirants but one withdrew to prevent any feelings of 
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Blessed Seven labored to organize the diwaniyya, its roster already began meeting 
weekly in the ground floor of a house dedicated for the purpose by Haitham Al Najjar.  
Haitham lived in the other levels with his family and was one of the three Al Najjar 
elders who, while in the process of mourning his late aunt, had sought opinions for 
guidance on this very project.  When the Blessed Seven at last submitted their 
recommendations to the personnel of Al Abbas Diwaniyya, their tenets were accepted 
unquestionably and without debate. 
 In spite of the outward displays of unanimity that characterized the Al Abbas 
Diwaniyya in its formative stages of development, there were deep-seated concerns about 
the nature of the newfound power of those involved with it.  Particularly, from the outset 
some kinsmen have harbored anxieties over what they viewed as the dominance of a 
single lineage, the Al Najjar, that they argue manipulated familial sentiments to broaden 
their own base of supporters.  These detractors reinforce their case by pointing out that 
while three Al Najjar were solely responsible for the whole Al Abbas Diwaniyya scheme 
in the first place, presently one of their numbers, Haitham, is both on the Board of 
Directors and acts as the Chairman of the Diwaniyya Committee.  Of course, the location 
of the diwaniyya is also in Haitham Al Najjar’s home and, his critics complain, he 
postures as the de facto host of Al Abbas Diwaniyya when it is actually supposed to be an 
egalitarian assemblage of families.  Because some of the important heads of these 
families attend Al Abbas Diwaniyya, the dissenters grumble that Haitham’s 
                                                                                                                                            
ill-will from developing within the diwaniyya.  Most of these committees meet as their members deem it 
necessary and posts are only vacated prematurely in the event of voluntary departure or missing three 
consecutive meetings or in the case that five absences are recorded in the span of one year.  Annually, the 
Diwaniyya Committee will present a review to the entire Al Abbas Diwaniyya of its activities for the 
previous 12 months.  However, the Diwaniyya Committee is ultimately charged with elevating the 
community profile of Al Abbas Diwaniyya and networking with other diwaniyyat.  
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pretentiousness is turning their collective weight into his personal influence; to protest, 
several prominent descendants have promised to boycott the Al Abbas Diwaniyya for as 
long as they perceive the Al Najjar to be in charge. 
 Undoubtedly, Anwar Al Haddad is the most notorious abstention from Al Abbas 
Diwaniyya.  Years ago, Anwar’s sister married into the Karami line and currently her 
husband and one of their adult sons are active members in the Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  
Nevertheless, Anwar’s own descent from Mahmoud bin Abbas coupled with the 
attendance of his brother-in-law and beloved nephew have not been enough to sway his 
attitude; to the contrary, Anwar remains not only dismissive but openly hostile towards 
the five family conglomerate.  Although other members of Al Abbas Diwaniyya regularly 
host their own diwaniyyat on the evenings that they are free, Anwar conspicuously set up 
his diwaniyya so that it convenes on that same night.  Publicly, this is a blatant 
declaration of irreconcilably because Anwar, by scheduling his diwaniyya on the exact 
day as Al Abbas Diwaniyya, reduces the likelihood that he or Haitham Al Najjar will ever 
be able to visit each other since they are both concurrently hosting visitors.  Moreover, 
Anwar’s ploy can potentially divide Al Abbas Diwaniyya’s guests since his maneuver is 
a clear message to anyone who would consider meeting under the guise of Mahmoud bin 
Abbas:  “Come to my diwaniyya instead of his;” in this instance, the usage of “his” 
denotes Haitham Al Najjar, who Anwar believes is really controlling Al Abbas 
Diwaniyya behind the scenes.173  Needless to say, the split between Anwar’s diwaniyya 
and Al Abbas Diwaniyya generates a great amount of family gossip and intrigue, but 
Anwar is adamant that he will continue to oppose the Al Abbas Diwaniyya until the Al 
Najjar family relinquishes their hold over it. 
                                                
173 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 19, 2007. 
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 Even within the Al Abbas Diwaniyya itself, regardless of its mission statement 
that all members are equals as heirs of Mahmoud bin Abbas, there are ongoing contests 
for status, rank, and recognition.  The transformation of the Karami back into the Al 
Muallim is one such case in point.  In the four decades since some of the Al Muallim 
changed their names to Karami, more than a few of the converts admit that those who 
stayed the course as Al Muallim have done well for themselves.  Further still, there are Al 
Muallim in Kuwait unrelated to Mahmoud bin Abbas’ lineage who are held in high 
admiration and have made the moniker “a good, respectable name.”174  The Karami, on 
the other hand, have remained practically unknown beyond the ties of their immediate or 
extended kin.  They hope by reclaiming the Al Muallim surname that they too might 
become associated with the wider reverence that the label enjoys in Kuwait City, a 
condition that they fully expect to transfer to their advantage in the Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  
According to this line of thought, if the Karami can unify themselves by reverting to the 
more established Al Muallim family name, they will be able to elevate the profile of the 
Al Abbas Diwaniyya while improving their own standing inside it.  As it is now, the Al 
Najjar are the paramount leaders in Al Abbas Diwaniyya due to their line’s social 
visibility and its preeminence in its commercial dealings; if the Karami want equivalence, 
they will have to realign behind a similarly compelling standard:  Al Muallim. 
  
Case Number 2:  Discussion 
A few points about the Al Abbas Diwaniyya’s genealogy warrant mention here, 
the most obvious of which is that not all of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ patrilineal heirs are 
included in the Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  For instance, the lineages of Mubarak Al Salem, a 
                                                
174 Muhammad.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 18, 2007. 
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direct relation of Husayn Al Najjar, and that of Muhammad bin Mahmoud are excluded 
without a reason or explanation being provided.  Without hazarding too much speculation 
as to why this might be the case it should suffice to say that any range of possibilities, 
from Peters’ “area of ambiguity” (1960:41) that allows for a degree of practical 
adaptation to adjust the genealogical framework and permit “each element in this 
scheme… to move in its own orbit… [and] combine in different ways” (Marx 1979:125) 
to Cuisenier’s antagonistic lineage fragmentation (1976:147-148), could plausibly 
account for these omissions. 
Another observation is that the five family mythos of the Al Abbas Diwaniyya 
stems from its namesake’s children despite the fact that he sired only four sons.  In this 
case, the Al Basir are accorded recognition as a distinct, independent lineage even though 
they are lineal descendants of Husayn Al Najjar, one of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ sons and 
the progenitor of the Al Najjar line of affiliation.  Hence, patrilineally, the Al Najjar and 
Al Basir are closer to each other than they are to either the Karami, bin Abbas, or the Al 
Haddad; and, to be exact, the Al Basir should be incorporated into the Al Najjar lineage 
as revealed by their own genealogical understanding of their relationship to Mahmoud 
bin Abbas.  Therefore, the structure of birthright that unifies the members of the Al 
Abbas Diwaniyya is selectively based on ancestry to four of Mahmoud bin Abbas’ sons 
and one of his grandsons.  Some lineages are ruled out, as seen with those of Mubarak Al 
Salem and Muhammad bin Mahmoud; while another, that of Talal Al Basir, is actually a 
sublineage afforded the generational equivalence of one of the original four sons.  This is 
how five families came to be linked through four sons to their common forebear and it is 
the rationale for membership in the Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  
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 Then again, genealogical accuracy is far less consequential for the attendees who 
sit in, or the families who abstain from, Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  Rather, the questionable 
intentions behind the Al Najjar’s desires to create the Al Abbas Diwaniyya are the real 
sources of hearsay and rumor.  These arguments have a tendency to express angst over 
Haitham Al Najjar’s exploitation of what Richard Antoun classified as ideological 
resources:  the “symbolic gestures of unity” (1979:43) that emerge when familial 
obligations incumbent upon individuals serve to bring a larger group of kinsmen together 
(Antoun 1979:43-44).  Preceding the founding of Al Abbas Diwaniyya, the funeral of an 
Al Najjar matriarch offered just such a compulsory occasion (Altorki 1977:281-282) that 
united Mahmoud bin Abbas’ legacy, and continuing to this day the guestroom of the five 
families is frequently vindicated as an enduring tribute to her memory.  Yet, since the 
creation of Al Abbas Diwaniyya some of its members have reluctantly conceded that 
their diwaniyya is devoid of any genealogical equivalence and that despite their hadhar 
backgrounds, Haitham Al Najjar has become the embodiment of a badu councilman.  In 
the words of one Al Muallim kinsman who routinely sits in Al Abbas Diwaniyya, 
[Haitham Al Najjar]… is a leader by his personality and is like a Bedouin 
councilman even though he is not… [He] is the head man.  Bedouin families are 
called tribes and this man, the councilman, rules the tribe.  [The traits of this man] 
include success, power, a respectable age of 40 years or older, and he is selected 
by popular opinion or agreement.  His opinion effects group and tribe voting.175 
 
It is the very prospect that Haitham Al Najjar used his wealth to donate a furnished space 
for a diwaniyya replete with domestic servants, and utilized a cunning emotional ploy to 
manufacture a following, that some relatives now find unsettling.  The skeptics, a few of 
whom do not abstain from Al Abbas Diwaniyya, contend that Haitham has conveniently 
positioned himself to represent the reunited families by virtue of having crystallized a 
                                                
175 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 5, 2006. 
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collectivity (Krause 1998:7) whose interests he can claim to champion.  From this 
perspective, Haitham Al Najjar’s magnanimity is reminiscent of Peter Blau’s “paradox of 
social integration” (1967:44) whereby the benefits of social attraction are confounded by 
the “fears of [social] dependence” (1967:43).  Here, Haitham is attractive for the time, 
resources, finances, and disposition he has at his disposal to support a weekly diwaniyya; 
the uncertainties and doubts lie in the undefined, expected acquiescence that is typically 
associated with such lavish hospitality (Herzfeld 1987:77, 86). 
 What remains unresolved, however, are the vague references to Haitham Al 
Najjar’s burgeoning influence that his foes fear is being built on the backs of their 
families’ reputations.  The issue of greatest concern is Haitham’s role as a host to the 
respected elders from the other four lineages who regularly visit Al Abbas Diwaniyya.  If 
Haitham is viewed as a leader rather than a peer amongst equals, as understood by the 
membership, outsiders will give more substance to his words due to the belief that he 
carries clout with multiple groups of kinsmen.  Minimally, this perception might allow 
Haitham Al Najjar to enjoy favorable business opportunities since he could possibly 
epitomize a point of access to an extensive base of consumers or investors.  At the other 
end, though, are the gains that Haitham can accrue by parlaying his status as a diwaniyya 
host into that of an “election key” (al-mufta al-intikhabi) for parliamentary candidates in 
order to open “the gates for them to reach certain families, tribes and other social groups” 
(Gavrielides 1987:178).  This support comes with the expectation that a successful 
candidate will channel the rewards of his office, his government-sanctioned wasta, back 
to those who endorsed him during the elections; that is, the diwaniyya hosts who 
mobilized their guests into voting blocs.  Consequently, the availability of MP wasta can, 
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as one visitor to Al Abbas Diwaniyya phrased it, elevate hosts into men who “can make 
things happen… they have power in the country.”176  At the moment, this power is the 
subject that fuels the opposition to Haitham Al Najjar’s standing as the veritable host of 
Al Abbas Diwaniyya by bringing into question his desire to establish a supposedly 
egalitarian guestroom without projecting the outward appearance that the other lineages 
are merely serving as his clientele. 
 
Case Study Number 3:  Introduction 
 This next case addresses the rapid ascent and precipitous fall of Diwan Al Redha, 
a diwaniyya founded for the explicit purpose of raising awareness of patients’ rights in 
Kuwait and combating bureaucratic misappropriations of medical resources.  Its 
proprietor, Abd al-Aziz Al Redha, is a longtime promoter of healthcare reform in the 
country and he brought together a cadre of likeminded individuals to aid him with his 
cause.  Mostly unrelated to each other, the central bond that united Abd al-Aziz’s guests 
was their interest in improving Kuwait’s standards of medical coverage.  Based on these 
characteristics, Diwan Al Redha clearly fits the profile of a political association (Bailey 
1969:24) even though it could easily be classified as a clique (Boissevain 1974:174, 179).    
 Soon after Abd al-Aziz’s diwaniyya commenced its operations, he parceled out 
the duties for its day-to-day functions, along with matching titles, to his most intimate 
confidants.  Subsequently, Abd al-Aziz extended his ambitions to a second diwaniyya, 
what he termed the Area Five Diwaniyya, and he began to envision a political future for 
himself.  However, it was precisely at this point in time that Abd al-Aziz’s aspirations 
took an unexpected turn. 
                                                
176 Ali.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
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 For the time that it lasted, Abd al-Aziz was at the forefront of all of his 
diwaniyya’s initiatives, making its presence known throughout Kuwait by broadcasting 
its agenda when it suited him and overseeing Diwan Al Redha’s collective shunning of 
projects by similar groups if they neglected to issue him a formal invitation.  Still, despite 
all of his tireless lobbying, self-promotion and zealous networking, Abd al-Aziz failed to 
take into account the sentiments of his own supporters.  By his own reckoning, Abd al-
Aziz imagined that he was the face of Diwan Al Redha and thus an irreplaceable activist 
for overhauling the country’s healthcare administration.  Contrastingly, Abd al-Aziz’s 
guests did not share his vision of leadership as they actually viewed themselves to be the 
real driving force that gave Diwan Al Redha its substance.  At this impasse, Diwan Al 
Redha’s brief existence was brought to an end after only a few short years, and it is for 
this very reason that it is such a remarkable record.   
The rise and decline of Diwan Al Redha aptly illustrates the symbiotic 
dependencies that exist between hosts and guests (Meneley 1996:104) and how 
dissatisfaction can engender dissolution.  It also shows the plasticity that single-stranded, 
single-interest ties can provide for members of a group when there are no overlapping 
obligations that must be considered (Wolf 1966b:81-83).  In this sense, Abd al-Aziz’s 
visitors did not rely exclusively on his services, and in the absence of any other 










Case Study Number 3:   Dissention within the Ranks and the  
Collapse of a Special Interest Diwaniyya177 
 
 Abd al-Aziz Al Redha has spent most of his life as an outspoken advocate for the 
restructuring of his country’s healthcare system.  Since as early as the late 1980s, he has 
been involved with an assortment of ministries and parliamentarians in an attempt to 
eliminate the bureaucratic hurdles, administrative grafts, and other questionable practices 
that plague the state’s medical services.  Particularly, he has campaigned against the 
relatives of the sick who try to use their convalescent relations for their own 
governmental benefits, such as monetary payouts for family member caregivers who see 
the infirm as a source of regular income.  Although Abd al-Aziz is now a retired 
pensioner operating a small shop specializing in medical devices, he once presided over a 
prominent national guild devoted to patients’ rights until the moment that his political 
fortunes were suddenly reversed. 
 Away from the public eye for years, though always working behind the scenes to 
help his friends, associates, neighbors, and family, Abd al-Aziz at last answered the calls 
of his supporters to reclaim his role as a community activist.  To announce his return, 
Abd al-Aziz opened a diwaniyya in his name, Diwan Al Redha, and he posted signs in his 
neighborhood directing visitors to his home.  At the launch of Diwan Al Redha, Abd al-
Aziz used his old contacts with the media to make sure that this event did not pass 
unnoticed.  He even went so far as to have Shaykha Fariha Al-Ahmad, the sister of the 
Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah, oversee the inaugural ceremony for his diwaniyya.  Much 
of this fanfare can be attributed to the mission statement that Abd al-Aziz heralded for 
                                                
177 All of the information presented for this case was collected via observations and interviews at Diwan Al 
Redha between March and December, 2007.  Interviews outside of Diwan Al Redha with its members were 
conducted during this same period. 
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Diwan Al Redha:  it was a special interest diwaniyya dedicated exclusively to promoting 
equal access to state healthcare services and ending the abuses that tarnish the system, 
especially the efforts by those who divert resources away from patients and into their own 
personal accounts. 
 Abd al-Aziz’s weekly guest list was comprised of individuals he had directly or 
indirectly aided at one time or another and the companions who shared his concerns.  He 
appointed a few of these closest companions to volunteer positions within the diwaniyya:  
a secretary who recorded minutes, attendance, and contact information for attendees; a 
diwaniyya manager who supervised refreshment inventories and maintenance; two public 
relations officers who circulated announcements via short message services (SMS), kept 
track of other diwaniyyat, and notified members when Abd al-Aziz would be visiting 
another diwaniyya; an accountant who was in charge of donations to offset members’ 
medical expenses and listed obituaries when needed; and a computer administrator who 
digitalized all materials related to Diwan Al Redha.  All of these posts were indefinite in 
their duration and could have been reassigned if vacated for some reason or if Abd al-
Aziz deemed that a change was in order.  It must also be noted that these appointments 
were not mere honorary titles; Abd al-Aziz insisted that an orderly division of labor was 
necessary if his diwaniyya was going to operate efficiently.  Moreover, Abd al-Aziz saw 
to it that Diwan Al Redha adopted the appearances of an official organization and a trip 
to a print shop provided all of the paraphernalia required to convey legitimacy:  business 
cards, stationary, letterhead, invitations, and greeting cards to send to MPs during 
Ramadan.  Further still, Abd al-Aziz instituted a dress code to discourage causal, Western 
attire.  On the premises, dishdashas were mandatory but ghutras and igals were labeled 
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as optional, albeit strongly encouraged, accessories.  He called this their “uniform”178 and 
it was meant to maximize the visual impact that Diwan Al Redha imparted upon outsiders 
and to ensure that its roster was never taken too lightly. 
The level of involvement that Abd al-Aziz invested into Diwan Al Redha cannot 
be quantified but it would not be an overestimation to conclude that he spent at least part 
of every day performing some task or favor under the pretext of attending to his 
diwaniyya’s affairs.  One of the responsibilities that he and his cohorts fulfilled was 
locating weekly speakers who would commit to scheduling a visit to the diwaniyya on its 
regular meeting night.  As soon as a visitor was confirmed, all members, as well as 
anyone else in the diwaniyya’s registry, were informed of the impending occasion by text 
messages dispatched by the diwaniyya’s PR personnel.  Typically, these special guests 
were politicians, delegates from the National Assembly, doctors, or ministerial 
executives.  Oftentimes, newspaper reporters and television crews were invited to 
publicize the latest happenings at Diwan Al Redha as they pertained to policymaking and 
its effects on the healthcare establishment.  Not infrequently, Abd al-Aziz monopolized 
these opportunities in the limelight to pronounce his thoughts on the topics at hand and to 
express what he perceived to be the immediate needs of the community. 
 When he was not hosting his diwaniyya on its official night, Abd al-Aziz went out 
calling on the diwaniyyat of legislators, representatives, statesmen, and other sundry 
authorities who might wield some form of political influence.  Ostensibly, Abd al-Aziz 
wanted to inform these lawmakers of the inadequacies of Kuwait’s medical system.  
However, Abd al-Aziz’s visits were never without a degree of prearranged showmanship:  
he never ventured alone on his outings because, in his words, to prove one’s power in 
                                                
178 Abd al-Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2007. 
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Kuwait, “you must have people with you,”179 and this was a chance for Abd al-Aziz to 
demonstrate that he had such a following.  Also, at the conclusion of these formal 
appointments Abd al-Aziz prompted his hosts not to forget to repay his visit, an 
obligation that he undoubtedly capitalized on by always summoning the media to cover 
these impending engagements at his diwaniyya.  For Abd al-Aziz, this was just another 
part of his efforts to further bolster the public visibility of the diwaniyya that bore his 
name. 
 Within a year of starting Diwan Al Redha, Abd al-Aziz broke ground on another 
guestroom south of Kuwait City.  Owned by one of his Bedouin associates whom he had 
traded favors with before, in private talks Abd al-Aziz nonetheless referred to it either as 
his diwaniyya or as a branch of Diwan Al Redha.  In his public discourse, Abd al-Aziz 
portrayed it simply as mintaqat hamsa (area five), a designation based on this 
diwaniyya’s location in Kuwait’s fifth electoral district.  According to Abd al-Aziz, he 
was worried that if he was too specific with this diwaniyya’s moniker, then it might be 
perceived as exclusive to only certain residents.  For example, if it was called “Mangaf 
Diwaniyya,” perhaps people in Riqqah and Ahmadi would not feel welcomed.  So, to 
maximize the potential number of guests, Abd al-Aziz dubbed it the “Area Five 
Diwaniyya” to attract the entire electorate.180  This way, he explained, the Bedouin who 
are concentrated in the fifth district could attend his diwaniyya without the 
inconveniences of a long drive into the city; if the Bedouin cannot come to his diwaniyya 
then Abd al-Aziz promised that he would take his diwaniyya to them. 
                                                
179 Abd al-Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 3, 2007. 
180 This district includes the residential areas of Mangaf, Riqqah, Ahmadi, Fahaheel, and Sabahiya. 
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 Still, Abd al-Aziz’s admitted hadhar, or as he phrased it his “downtown roots,”181 
were a liability for him at the Area Five Diwaniyya because he lacked the requisite badu 
credentials needed to draw a Bedouin crowd.  It is for this reason that the Bedouin owner 
of the property hosted the Area Five Diwaniyya; the Bedouin, Abd al-Aziz asserted, are 
more apt to patronize one of their own.  As for Abd al-Aziz, he anointed himself the 
“Spokesman” (al mutahadith) for his diwaniyya and the “Committee Chairman of Diwan 
Communications” (ra’is lejenet diwan al-tawasul)182 for both locations. 
 The unveiling of the Area Five Diwaniyya coincided with Abd al-Aziz sitting in 
with the Municipality Council (al-majlis al-baladi) as a consultant for improving the 
quality of healthcare beginning at the local level.  Abd al-Aziz’s fundamental agenda was 
to petition the Council to implement building codes that would incorporate new 
accessibility standards for the elderly and the disabled.  Around this same period, Abd al-
Aziz decided to test the political climate to see if he could resuscitate his earlier career as 
a solicitor for patients, but this time he set his sights on a subsection within the National 
Assembly.  Quietly campaigning to get his name back into circulation after more than a 
decade in retirement, Abd al-Aziz had quickly broadened his range of allies from the very 
day that he introduced Diwan Al Redha to his coterie.  In fact, a bulletin board installed 
on the wall of Diwan Al Redha proudly notified visitors, and reminded members, of Abd 
al-Aziz’s accomplishments; the newspaper clippings, photographs, and miscellaneous 
accolades all served as testimonies celebrating his meteoric revival. 
 Yet, abruptly and without any pronouncement, the lights at Diwan Al Redha were 
extinguished and the door was locked.  Initially, Abd al-Aziz claimed that he temporarily 
                                                
181 Abd al-Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 27, 2007. 
182 Abd al-Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 27, 2007. 
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closed the diwaniyya so that he might take advantage of the pleasant weather to go 
camping in the desert.  Later, he blamed the co-owners of a restaurant, one of whom was 
his cousin, for bringing him in to mediate a dispute that they were having over the 
eatery’s finances.  His role in resolving this discord, Abd al-Aziz professed, deprived him 
of his evenings.  Even on the nights that Abd al-Aziz was still to be found at his 
diwaniyya, he was reclined on one of the benches outside of it in the company of his 
confidants, the officeholders of Diwan Al Redha, and the occasional passerby.  At this 
time, Abd al-Aziz embarrassingly confessed that he lost the key to his diwaniyya and 
chose to cancel it rather than subject himself to the ridicule that advertising his absent-
mindedness to his guests would surely have generated. 
 Ghanim, one of the insiders at Diwan Al Redha, tells quite a different story.  As 
he recounted, Abd al-Aziz’s ambitions to once again secure his place in Kuwait’s 
political arena had inflated his ego so much that it caused a rift to develop amongst the 
guestroom’s peers.  Accordingly, many of the members of Diwan Al Redha came to 
believe that Abd al-Aziz was claiming too much personal credit for the collective 
endeavors put forth by everyone at the diwaniyya.  It was the general opinion of these 
members that they were just as deserving as Abd al-Aziz in terms of the successes 
achieved by Diwan Al Redha.  More tellingly, there were several aspirants within the 
ranks who estimated that they could sufficiently replace Abd al-Aziz and perform all of 
his functions if he continued with his denials of their contributions. 
Faced with these threats, Ghanim says that Abd al-Aziz lashed out at his accusers 
and declared, “Fine, if you think you can do this, then do it!”183  Thereafter, Abd al-Aziz 
barred the entrance to Diwan Al Redha and effectively closed it down.  Ghanim 
                                                
183 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on December 13, 2007. 
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maintains that Abd al-Aziz did this to send the clear message to his detractors that he 
alone protected the interests of Kuwait’s patient population and there was no one else in 
the country capable of filling this role.  At the same time, Abd al-Aziz wanted to 
reinforce the notion that Diwan Al Redha and the activities associated with it were 
entirely of his making.  Instead of dispelling his challengers’ accusations, Abd al-Aziz 
was trying to prove to them that he garnered all of the recognition because ultimately 
everything rested solely upon his shoulders.  Afterwards, as the weeks passed Abd al-
Aziz talked less about his future with the National Assembly and, with the exception of 
the core group of backers who still rallied around him, Abd al-Aziz’s former guests left 
him and dispersed elsewhere.  
 
Case Number 3:  Discussion 
 Abd al-Aziz’s short-lived experiment owning and operating Diwan Al Redha 
bears an unmistakable resemblance to Bailey’s classic definition of a political association 
in which members share only a civic awareness with one another and little else 
(1969:24).  By the same token, Diwan Al Redha can just as conveniently be labeled a 
clique if Jeremy Boissevain’s criteria of a band united by common interests with 
membership designated according to core, primary, and secondary followers is applied 
(1974:174, 179).  Alternatively, Baylouny’s research on the recent growth of kinship 
organizations in Jordan could also pertain to Diwan Al Redha with only minor 
allowances:  participants are not limited to kinsmen although it is a service-oriented 
alliance with an organizational model based on the older, more recognizable form of the 
local guesthouse (2006:353).  The point here is not to compartmentalize Diwan Al Redha 
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because it obviously has traits that can extend into a number of classificatory schemes.  
On the other hand, it is the nature of Abd al-Aziz’s relationships with his followers that 
might better explain his fleeting notoriety. 
 Abd al-Aziz created Diwan Al Redha out his desire to combine patient advocacy 
with his own personal political objectives.  He never stated as much but his sequence of 
actions leads to this conclusion:  Abd al-Aziz was a former political actor whose fall from 
grace was momentarily suspended when he presented Diwan Al Redha to the public just 
as he privately moved to market himself throughout Kuwait City.  Unfortunately for Abd 
al-Aziz, the bonds that were manifest between him and his supporters were noticeably 
deficient in their multiplicity; they were all solely invested in reforming the healthcare 
system without any other substance upon which to base their rapport.  Diwan Al Redha’s 
heavy reliance on a single component to demarcate their affairs left Abd al-Aziz 
vulnerable (Wolf 1966b:81-83) to defections when he could not marshal the trust or 
moral compulsion for his roster to stay the course with him (Cohen 2004:89).  This is the 
exact kind of flexibility that Dresch had in mind when he wrote of the tribesmen in 
northern Yemen, “Nor are they pinned down by a shaykh’s access to funds from 
elsewhere; just as one can choose his arbitrator, so one can choose one’s patron, protector 
or leader.  A shaykh’s following can therefore grow and shrink quite freely with 
circumstances” (1984:42).   
 In a related scenario, it is entirely possible that Abd al-Aziz exhausted the social 
credits, or at least the influence that he proclaimed to possess (Bailey 1972:40), that he 
depended on to make his entourage materialize in the first place.  If this is the case, Peter 
Blau eloquently expounds on the repercussions: 
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Superior status that empowers a person to command a variety of services from 
others enables him to gain many advantages.  But if securing these advantages 
requires making too stringent demands, he depletes his power and endangers his 
status for several reasons.  The costly services he forces others to supply to him 
may make it profitable for them to relinquish the benefits on which his power 
rests in favor of the lesser benefits that can be had from another person at lesser 
cost.  If he must often prod others into furnishing services to him, moreover, it 
shows them that he is dependent on them and thus reduces his power over them.  
[1967:136] 
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that if Abd al-Aziz was drained of his instrumental 
value, his initiative of delegating diwaniyya tasks and his eager consumption of the 
praises lavished upon Diwan Al Redha conflicted with his members’ sense of 
accountability.  Again, once Abd al-Aziz was devoid of any substantial credit and unable 
to call forth the “interchangeability of obligations” (Rosen 2006:169) that accompanies 
multiplex bonds of reciprocity (Peters 1972:183), his utility evaporated and he was 
compelled to unceremoniously shutter his diwaniyya. 
 
Case Study Number 4:  Introduction 
 This final case study is a series of vignettes that reflect a few of the more frequent 
themes that emerge when Kuwaitis talk about the diwaniyyat and the purposes that they 
serve in the country.  The first two items, “Workplace Permits” and “Making the Grade,” 
portray the guestroom as the locus of intercessory dealings despite the fact that the 
supplicants are not regular guests but unexpected visitors (Stirling 1966:240).  These 
callers sought the familiarity of the diwaniyya to plead their cases to their arbiters; in one 
instance this is a host and in the other it is an occasional member. 
 In “Community Charity,” a couple of prominent dawawin are described as 
veritable arenas for conspicuous displays of hospitality, generosity and largesse.  
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Certainly, hosts are not bound by altruism alone and they are fully aware that their 
donations are scrutinized by their guests, a realization that is not overlooked by 
petitioners.  Lastly, “The Pastimes of Youth” explores a young men’s diwaniyya 
(diwaniyya al-shabab) that was started when its proprietor and his classmates returned to 
Kuwait City after studying in the United States.  Because these youth diwaniyyat are 
typically dismissed by Kuwaiti elders as wastes of time, the inclusion of the Jalal Al 
Nafisi Diwaniyya provides an interesting glimpse at the socialization of young adults on 
their own terms. 
 In spite of what may initially appear to be a divergent survey of guestroom topics 
that ranges from negotiated settlements to youthful distractions, there is a common thread 
that connects each of these narratives to one another:  the need to create, maintain, or 
access networks of informal relations outside the boundaries of official institutional 
settings (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:283, 297).  Moreover, as the profiles below plainly 
reveal, all of these networks are dependent upon the diwaniyyat to serve as their outlets to 
a broader spectrum of contacts. 
 
Case Study Number 4.1:  Favors in the Diwaniyya: 
Workplace Permits184 
 
Isa and Aziz are two young professionals, each in his mid-twenties, employed in 
Kuwait’s private sector.  Both were educated in the United States where they received 
their degrees in engineering and now they are coworkers at the same construction firm.  
During their absence from Kuwait, Isa and Aziz admit that they lost touch with the rituals 
of diwaniyya visitation that characterize male Kuwaiti social life.  Aside from the weekly 
                                                
184 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 17, 2006. 
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family diwaniyya, which seems to them more useful for kinship obligations than anything 
else, neither Isa nor Aziz developed much of a diwaniyya routine until the demands of 
their workplace took over. 
When a Member of Parliament failed to approve their company’s building project, 
Isa and Aziz were asked to talk to the politician since they had been so instrumental in 
developing the plans and were in the best position to explain its parameters.  After some 
deliberation, Isa and Aziz decided that the most prudent approach would be to sit with the 
MP in his diwaniyya.  Once they found out the details of the diwaniyya; its location, the 
day of the week that it meets and its hours, Isa and Aziz visited the parliamentarian’s 
diwaniyya on one of its regular, formal nights.  On their first call, Isa and Aziz introduced 
themselves, the company that they represented, and gave the MP a brief summary of the 
construction job.  They returned the following week and were able to spend a little longer 
with the politician, this time talking more about the building proposal as well as some 
casual topics. 
Back at their offices, before Isa and Aziz even had a chance to entertain the 
possibilities of another visit to the MP’s diwaniyya, one of their managers informed them 
that the company’s project had received its necessary approvals.  In a show of 
appreciation, later in the week Isa and Aziz made a brief appearance at the diwaniyya to 
convey their personal gratitude to the MP.  Although they have no intentions of becoming 






Case Study Number 4.2:  Privileges in the Diwaniyya: 
Making the Grade185 
 
 Yousef rarely, if ever, visits his family diwaniyya.  He is a university student with 
a vibrant social life and he prefers the companionship of his fellow age-mates in any 
number of the coffee shops spread throughout the city to the deferential setting he finds 
in the diwaniyya of his elder male kinsmen.  Without question, for Yousef an evening of 
cards, playing contentious hands of kout bo sitta interspersed with relaxing inhalations of 
flavored shisha, easily trumps the pageantry and restraint that he associates with the 
diwaniyya. 
 However, a phone call that Yousef received from one of his friends, Fou’ad, 
caused him to temporarily change his usual nightly schedule of studying and spending 
time with his companions because over the course of their conversation it was made 
painfully clear that Fou’ad was in dire straights.  Fou’ad had just spent the last two years 
at a local vocational school (al-maahad al-tatbiky) studying to be an accountant but now 
the completion of his certificate was in jeopardy; for the fourth and last time, Fou’ad 
failed his final accounting exam and he would not earn his credentials.  Out of a sense of 
desperation, Fou’ad reached out to Yousef for one apparent reason:  Yousef’s uncle, 
Zayd, was Fou’ad’s accounting professor. 
 Yousef invited Fou’ad to accompany him to his family’s diwaniyya on its formal 
meeting night so that they all three might discuss this matter in a more congenial 
environment than that offered by an uncomfortable college office.  Yousef also arranged 
for Zayd to be there since his uncle only periodically drops by from time to time.  
However, when Yousef revealed to his uncle the purpose of their appointment so that he 
                                                
185 This entire episode, from being with Yousef the moment the initial phone call was received to the 
meeting at the diwaniyya, unfolded in the author’s presence in Kuwait City on March 8, 2008. 
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could get an impression of what to expect, Zayd positively replied, “If he is your friend, 
do not worry.  I will give him an A.”186  That evening, Yousef, Fou’ad, and Zayd sat 
away from everyone else in the diwaniyya and huddled together talking in hushed tones 
with lighthearted mannerisms that gave no indication of the seriousness of the question at 
hand.  In under a half-hour it was all over.  At that point, they all stood, cheerfully shook 
hands, and Fou’ad left.  According to Yousef, on that night Fou’ad passed his exam. 
 
Case Study Number 4.3:  Hospitality in the Diwaniyya: 
Community Charity187 
 
 It is not uncommon for large, prestigious diwaniyyat to be patronized by the 
destitute and the needy, especially for alms and sustenance during celebratory periods 
such as Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, and Eid al-Adha.  Oftentimes, many dawawin may leave 
their doors unlocked and stock fresh, light foods like flatbread, dates, butters, and jams 
throughout the week for members and outsiders alike.  At other intervals, someone from 
“off the streets”188 might even come forward with a far more considerable request. 
 Bilal’s family’s diwaniyya is an enormous, free-standing, multistory palatial 
structure that is nowhere near any of its members’ residences.  Built in the 1980s, Bilal’s 
family diwaniyya was funded with proceeds provided in the will of his late great-
grandfather, a man who envisioned all of his kinsmen one day meeting together under the 
same roof.  However, this ostentatious display frequently invites the attention of the less 
well-to-do in the neighborhood who are, for a variety of reasons, desperate for immediate 
assistance. 
                                                
186 Yousef.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 8, 2008. 
187 This case study is comprised of observations and interviews at Bilal’s family’s diwaniyya on November 
5, 2007, and an interview conducted with Bilal in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 3, 2007. 
188 Bilal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 3, 2007. 
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 Most people can find out by word-of-mouth when Bilal’s family convenes for its 
official night at the diwaniyya.  This is when everyone is present but more importantly it 
is when the host of the diwaniyya is expected to be in attendance.  For those who require 
some form of aid, this formal gathering of the diwaniyya members is the most pragmatic 
moment for visiting because a host does not wish to look bad in front of his guests.  
Hence, a request made of a host in the company of his guests is likely to be granted, 
either out of genuine concern for the petitioner or out of the desire to maintain 
appearances before one’s peers. 
 To illustrate these tendencies, Bilal relates several occasions when indigent 
strangers sought help at his family diwaniyya.  For instance, there was the man who, upon 
entering the diwaniyya and being greeted by the first elder in the room, instantly asked 
this senior for 600 KD (U.S. $2,150.00).  Although this caused a degree of 
embarrassment for the host, since the request was directed to his guest instead of to him, 
he nevertheless rapidly dispatched one of his brothers to sequester the new arrival to an 
adjacent chamber.  Inside, the man confessed that he owed his bank this sum for a loan 
and that a lawsuit had already been filed against him.  He feared that if he could not come 
up with the money, he faced losing everything.  The host’s brother gave the visitor the 
full amount and he left without further incident.  No one from the diwaniyya has ever 
heard anything from this man again. 
 At another renowned diwaniyya that Bilal visits, the host is a local landlord who 
owns several properties in the area.  One evening, Bilal stopped by to briefly catch up 
with some of the regular guests who he knew would be assembled.  At some point, a man 
from the Levant, possibly bilad al-sham, entered the diwaniyya and presented himself to 
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the host.  This visitor rented an apartment from the host and he had fallen behind by two 
months on his payments.  Right there, in front of everyone, the renter begged the host to 
forgive his debt, to think of the family that he has to feed, and to let him start over fresh 
with a new beginning.  The host nodded his head and conceded to his tenant’s request to 
expunge the outstanding balance.  At the conclusion of this scene, the proprietor insisted 
that his renter remain at the diwaniyya so that he might take a serving of tea with the all 
the other guests. 
 
Case Study Number 4.4:  Camaraderie in the Diwaniyya: 
The Pastimes of Youth189 
 
 Every year, countless Kuwaiti students travel abroad to pursue degrees and 
academic credentials.  Thus, it is hardly exceptional that Jalal spent his entire 
undergraduate career in the United States where he specialized in architecture at the 
University of Kansas.  While there, he befriended several other Kuwaitis who were 
studying in the same department.  After he graduated, Jalal returned to Kuwait and started 
working for a private engineering conglomerate.  However, he never lost contact with his 
former classmates; some completed their education at the same time as Jalal, and moved 
back into the country and into the job market when he did, whereas others made their 
way home at a later date. 
 Initially, once in Kuwait, Jalal and his fellow alumni began meeting weekly at a 
diwaniyya hosted by the brother of one of his schoolmates.  This arrangement did not last 
long because Jalal’s group felt that they lacked any bonds with the other participants.  
                                                
189 This narrative is based on observations and interviews held at the Jalal Al Nafisi Diwaniyya on July 12, 
2006.  Two interviews with guest Samer were conducted away from the guestroom on July 8, 2006, and 
July 13, 2006.  
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The graduates, with their newly minted diplomas, wanted to rejuvenate the camaraderie 
that united them in their previous experiences overseas and this diwaniyya could never 
fill that yearning for them.  So, they agreed that they would convene regularly at the 
guestroom in Jalal’s family’s house, a decision that marked the birth of the Jalal Al Nafisi 
Diwaniyya. 
 Jalal’s diwaniyya met for only a short period before it outgrew his family’s 
household.  Rapidly, it expanded its ranks to include more Western-educated workplace 
colleagues who had professional training similar to that of Jalal and his original cast of 
cohorts.  To accommodate this increase, and to relieve his family from any more of the 
nighttime outbursts that are a common feature of his congregations, Jalal moved his 
diwaniyya to a prefabricated building that was constructed exclusively for this purpose 
adjacent to the family home.190  Costing roughly 10,000 KD (U.S. $35,000.00), Jalal’s 
parents shouldered most of the outlay so that no expense was spared:  granite tiles, glass 
basins, carpets, and a humongous flat screen television.  Furthermore, Jalal’s mother and 
father are supportive of his diwaniyya because, like so many parents in Kuwait, they are 
comforted by the peace of mind that comes with knowing exactly where their son is in 
the evenings. 
 The nature of interaction at the Jalal Al Nafisi Diwaniyya is deliberately informal 
and it readily dismisses the ceremonial luster that exemplifies the behaviors found in 
more established diwaniyyat.  Noticeably, salutations are circulated without any fanfare, 
clothing is a mix of dishdashas and Western casual wear, and two guests usually sit glued 
                                                
190 Jalal admits that this is technically illegal because it is a structure that is unattached to the main 
household.  However, this technicality is often ignored since it is rarely enforced.  What mattered for Jalal 
was gaining the permission of his neighbors so that his family would not be reported to the municipal 
authorities.  To secure their consent, Jalal agreed that his diwaniyya would not have any windows on the 
side facing his neighbor’s property. 
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to the latest version of FIFA Soccer for the Sony PlayStation.  In sharp contrast to the 
family diwaniyyat or traditional guesthouses, there are no seating arrangements according 
to status or age, nor are there any domestic servants to tend to the guests; and the host, 
Jalal, scarcely commands any distinctive courtesies.  If anything, some families are wary 
of their sons’ nocturnal habits at Jalal’s diwaniyya due to the inexistence of any kinship 
ties that would inform them of the type of people that Jalal comes from.   
Yet, this is the precise rationale that inspired the formation of the Jalal Al Nafisi 
Diwaniyya:  a mutual expatriate encounter coupled with an occupational cohesion that 
could not be contained by local categories.  So, it is quite normal to find Jalal and his 
guests getting together at the diwaniyya to relive their days in United States by watching 
American football games or keeping track of NBA scores.  Simultaneously, though, for 
those who are fixtures at the Jalal Al Nafisi Diwaniyya, the work-related concerns that 
they share are an added source of unity that can offer empathy following bad days, 
provide information and prospects on job vacancies, and give guidance and suggestions 
for overcoming any assortment of professional difficulties. 
 
Case Number 4:  Discussion 
 The circumstances that brought Isa and Aziz, the junior engineers, as well as the 
conditions that conspired to gather Yousef, Fou’ad, and Zayd, the respective nephew, 
pupil, and professor, are relatively straightforward:  the need for intercessory patronage to 
“weave in and out of the bureaucracy, the offices of politicians… workplaces… [and] 
schools… in order to fulfill individual and collective needs” (Singerman 2006:17).  For 
Isa and Aziz, the habitually elusive permissions required for construction projects (Herb 
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2009:386-387) necessitated a personal appeal to the MP responsible for blocking their 
firm’s venture.  This sort of errand is not an unknown practice for lobbyists who must 
turn to those MPs who operate the so-called khudamat guestrooms or simply “services.”  
Mary Ann Tetreault’s observations about this kind of politician are succinct and to the 
point:  bureaucratic favors are exchanged for votes with constituents who cannot navigate 
the administrative channels on their own (2000:115).  What can be added to Tetreault’s 
synopsis is that Isa and Aziz, like so many solicitors, found that their quest for favors led 
them directly to the nighttime facility where their claims would be given more careful 
consideration:  a service diwaniyya. 
 Fou’ad’s situation also led him to a diwaniyya as he tried to salvage a grade that 
would allow him to complete his accounting diploma.  Unlike Isa and Aziz, though, 
Fou’ad’s networking took him on circuitous route through a friend and to that friend’s 
uncle, two contacts who could not be further from the typical diwaniyya regulars.  In 
spite of this, a diwaniyya was still chosen as the site where Fou’ad would resolve his 
dilemma.  For Fou’ad, Yousef, and Professor Zayd, the diwaniyya provided a familiar, 
reassuring location that alleviated any misgivings or anxieties that the parties may have 
been harboring.  The diwaniyya, as a location, afforded each of the participants with 
some feeling of security since the whole engagement would transpire in a predictable 
setting (Goffman 1959:92, 95) with commonplace conventions (North 2004:6, 25, 34-
36).  Moreover, the neutrality of the venue was enhanced by the absence of any host – 
guest asymmetry (Oldenburg 1999:xvii) that, when combined with gifts and favors on the 




 Bilal’s stories of hospitality in the upper echelons of Kuwait’s diwaniyyat are 
insightful for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which is that the public does not 
hold all guestrooms in the same regard.  Just as Richard Antoun discovered with the 
guesthouses (madafa) in Kufr al-Mar, Jordan, some dawawin can be classed as “first 
rank” for their beneficence (1979:42), the quality of guests they can attract (Benedict 
1974:38), and for their hosts’ repute within the community (Antoun 1972:106).  With an 
esteemed guestroom like Bilal’s family’s diwaniyya, the host’s reputation for generosity 
is critical if he is to reaffirm his own claims of social worth and the noblesse oblige that 
his renown rests upon (Edwards 1996:67).  Although this exposes the host to the risks of 
negative reciprocity if his charity is willfully manipulated to weaken his position 
(Rosenfeld 1974:151) or to gain concessions that would otherwise be refused without an 
audience, it avoids a shameful refusal (Deshen 1984:215) due to expectations that are 
analogous to those of the privileged households depicted by Vom Bruck in northern 
Yemen where patronage is a prerequisite for those families that wish to have their high 
rank recognized by others (1999:154).  Among some of Kuwait’s elites, this price is 
negligible since dispensing patronage and “feeding the people” (Anderson 1978:182) in 
the diwaniyya still stand as hallmarks of social legitimacy. 
 The Jalal Al Nafisi Diwaniyya represents a visible departure from the usual 
standards of hosting and hospitality in the guestrooms of Kuwait City.  Primarily, it 
deviates from the adult male-oriented diwaniyya and all of the supervision, deferential 
displays, and tahashsham (modest or controlled behaviors) that the presence of one’s 
elders demands (Abu-Lughod 1999:108, 112-113).  Thus, in the milieu of the 
prototypical diwaniyya with its mixture of senior and junior attendees, 
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… [Young] men have less autonomy and must defer to senior men like their 
fathers, uncles, lineage elders, elder male cousins, and older male in-laws, those 
men who represent the patricentered system’s interests and have authority over 
them.  That is, young men must tahashsham too; they must do many of the same 
things that women must do in front of senior men -- like refraining from smoking, 
talking, and laughing and avoiding any mention of love or sexuality.  [Abu-
Lughod 1986:164]    
 
In Jalal’s diwaniyya, though, any mode of respect based on age-sequencing is missing 
from the candor that animates its late-night activities, and this is one plausible 
explanation for why these youth diwaniyyat are frowned upon with such disapproval by 
the country’s patriarchy.  Yet, it is the inescapable component of dislocation among the 
participants of the Jalal Al Nafisi Diwaniyya that is immediately evident:  each member’s 
extended educational sojourn imparted a sense of “chronic uprootedness” (Levi-Strauss 
1961:58) that the attendees hope to remedy by reveling in the nostalgia of their times 
abroad.  Unsatisfied with conventional diwaniyyat, Jalal and his companions share a bond 
of temporary expatriation that cannot be too different from Salman Rushdie’s own 
reflections on displacement:  “[We] are now partly of the West.  Our identity is at once 
plural and partial.  Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures; at other times we fall 


























 This study started with the very basic objective to understand why Kuwaiti men 
choose to visit any number of the country’s countless guestrooms.  At a superficial level, 
it is quite possible to imagine these diwaniyyat as vestigial institutions that have been 
transferred from some moment in Kuwait’s distant pre-oil past to populate its current 
postpetroleum urban landscape (Al-Naser 2001:6).  With the disappearance of so many 
analogous institutional forms in the Middle East during the latter half of the 20th century, 
due to mixed combinations of political, economic (Khalaf 2000:114-115), and social 
changes (Antoun 2000:452), it is not difficult to see the diwaniyyat as historical 
anomalies that have defied the odds to persist well into the present era.  This fragility of 
diwaniyya-like establishments in the contemporary Arabic-speaking world was witnessed 
by Richard Antoun who, when reflecting on waning numbers of madafas in Kufr al-Mar, 
Jordan from 1960 to 1986, concluded that, “The weakening of kinship ties, the decline in 
multiplexity, and the development of differences in social status have taken their toll on 
the guest house” (2000:452).  Undoubtedly, this same mixture of transformative elements 
can be said to apply to Kuwait in the context of its postpetroleum existence (Al-Naser 
1986:1-3).  Yet, while guestrooms in other communities have withered under the 
pressures of modernity and a variety of changing circumstances, the diwaniyyat of 
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Kuwait have not only endured but proliferated to a point of unimaginable ubiquity across 
its cityscape. 
 The simplest explanation for the survival of the diwaniyyat is that the structural 
causes that have eliminated comparable guesthouses elsewhere cannot be applied to 
Kuwait.  An obvious distinction is that whereas most previous academic efforts have 
focused on the mechanisms of hospitality, power and influence in rural guestrooms,191 the 
diwaniyyat have long existed in a metropolitan environment and have been tightly 
intertwined with the apparatuses of official governance.192  So, the economic and political 
realignments that Barth saw in the Swat Valley that redirected local investment and 
authority towards the cities to undercut the village men’s houses (1966:16-17), or the 
introduction of outside wage-earning opportunities for landless peasants that Kanaana 
viewed as detrimental to the continuation of Palestinian landlords’ diwans (1975:10-11), 
have no parallel in the developmental track that laid the foundations for today’s Kuwaiti 
diwaniyyat.  Nor has Kuwait faced anything like the planned political displacements that 
unseated rural elites who were unnecessary, or even a dangerous challenge, to the logics 
of new regimes; a process Sulayman Khalaf recounts for Syria at the outset of its 
                                                
191 For a sample of some of this scholarship, there is Antoun’s aforementioned work in Jordan (1972, 1979, 
2000); David Edwards’ inclusion of the Pakhtun guesthouses in his monograph on Afghanistan (1996); 
Fredrik Barth’s Pakhtun men’s houses in the Swat Valley (1966, 1972); the Turkish depictions provided by 
Paul Stirling (1966) and mentioned by Barbara Aswad (1967); and the diwankhanas in Edmund Leach’s 
(1940), Fredrik Barth’s (1953), and William Masters’ (1954) analyses of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Van 
Nieuwenhuijze, in a generalized portrait of “typical” village life in the region, even included guesthouses as 
an expected characteristic of rural communities across the Middle East (1962:298-299). 
192 This does not mean that participants, particularly hosts, in rural guesthouses are detached from broader 
political processes.  As Robert Fernea correctly points out, tribal authority in southern Iraq often depended 
on a shaykh’s abilities to mediate with state functionaries on the behalf of his fellow tribesmen, and it was 
not uncommon for these negotiations to occur within a mudhif.  However, moving past these local officials 
to higher-level authorities was more infrequent (1970:20, 53).  With so many resources, political and 
material, located in urban centers (Chaichian 2009:17), formerly it was possible for enterprising men of 
influence from the countryside to simply relocate to cities to expand their range of contacts and improve 
their positions vis-à-vis their petitioners (Lancaster 1997:81-82, 116).  For the members of Kuwait’s 
hadhar merchant class, the physical proximity of their diwaniyyat to the powerbrokers of the regime has 
never been problematic. 
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Ba’athist transition:  “Populist socialist policies touched on the material base of cotton 
shaykhs and wealthy lineage heads and politically marginalised them from meaningful 
participation in the political process.  For some shaykhly families the downfall of their 
position was dramatic” (2000:116).  Not surprisingly, once Syria’s provincial “cotton 
shaykhs” were rendered politically impotent, their madafas became little more than 
nostalgic reminders of their lost dominance (Khalaf 2000:116) in a manner that is 
strikingly similar to the irrelevance of village landowners’ diwans in Palestine in the 
years after 1948: 
 The former landlords, however, continue to keep the diwan open, the coffee 
 hot and ready, and the whole routine intact, as if the village men and the guests 
 are about to arrive – but neither the village men nor the guests do any more… 
 because the landlords have lost all the leadership functions which used to attract 
 the village men and the other guests to their diwan.  Only members of this class 
 still play the game by the old definitions:  they treat each other as chiefs and 
 leaders, and hold unreal conversations about topics that are irrelevant in terms of 
 space, time or even function – about chiefs, emirs, or kings from the past, about 
 their exploits in raids against other tribes, their generosity to their guests, their 
 courage, and amusing anecdotes about their experiences.  [Kanaana 1975:11] 
 
However, this type of disenchantment, that of an undermined, disaffected class of nobles 
when there is a disruption to the administrative status quo, is actually contrary to the Al 
Sabah’s style of management.  From the time that Kuwait’s first oil revenues were 
collected, co-optation and appeasement have all but been forced upon the prehydrocarbon 
notables (Crystal 1995b:76-77), whether these were tribal luminaries from the desert or 
merchant patricians settled in the town (Gause 1994:54).  Hence, the diwaniyyat were not 
impelled to become outmoded relics symbolic of an obsolete aristocracy mired in 




 As a matter of fact, both oral and published accounts confirm that almost as soon 
as the petroleum-enriched national treasury grew and the state’s distributive apparatuses 
began disbursing its rents, the diwaniyya was rapidly adopted (Al-Naser 2001:10-12; 
Abdullah 1995:30-32)194 by Kuwait’s emerging class of salaried public servants.  With 
the pre-rent relationship between the government and the elite preserved, if not solidified 
to an even greater degree, after the proceeds from the initial oil boom began to accrue 
(Gray 2011:12), the institutional legitimacy (Dacin et al. 2002:46-47) of the diwaniyyat 
was not threatened by power shifts towards “new organizational forms” (Rao et al. 
2000:249).  Thus, the guestrooms, the pre-oil “signs of position” (Goffman 1951:304), 
were readily appropriated by the civil service bourgeoisie (Leys 1965:228) of the rentier 
nation to convey “the ideal of enlightened consumption” (Grier 1988:94).  Just as being a 
person of standing in Kuwait before petroleum exports necessitated taking part in men’s 
hosting and visiting circuits (Al-Naser 2000:7), with the exception of the poor seeking 
alms or other kinds of support,195 the rentier incarnation of the diwaniyya can oftentimes 
                                                
193 Andrew Shryock makes an interesting observation about the sometimes contentious move from the past 
into the present for a diwan in Jordan.  A man who has preserved his standing, Shaykh Sa’ud, seems to 
celebrate, or objectify, his own continuity by outfitting his diwan according to two halves that represent this 
transition:  a “Bedouin authentic” (1997:53) section and a contemporary half, both of which send the 
message to all visitors that, “I am Sa’ud Mani’ Abu l-‘Amash.  Inheritor of two worlds, master of each” 
(1997:54).  This same impression is difficult to escape in many of the diwaniyyat of established families in 
Kuwait where dhow and baghlah models might signify a merchant lineage’s guestroom, or parlor murals of 
village scenes from Failaka Island or the Al-Hasa skyline in Saudi Arabia can be proud pronouncements of 
their hosts’ pedigrees.  Like in Shryock’s example, though, these declarations of the past sit adjacent to 
modern conveniences:  flat screen televisions, Western furnishings, and entertainment centers.  Not 
unexpectedly, upstart diwaniyyat appear to frequently lack such ancestral décor with its historical 
confirmations. 
194 Abd Aziz.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on October 26, 2007.  Ahmad.  Interview 
conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 28, 2007.  Yousef.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, 
Kuwait on July 2, 2006. 
195 A. B.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 4, 2007. 
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carry the connotations as the place where “decision makers,”196 “family power,”197 and 
“respect”198 all converge.  Simultaneously, though, it must not be overlooked that the 
popularization of these parlors has, in the eyes of some, diluted their former pretenses as 
Kuwait’s premier institutions.199  Of course, the means for this mass hospitality and the 
leisure required to pursue it on such a remarkable scale have only been feasible because 
of the regime’s allocative welfare schemes200 coupled with its relatively relaxed attitude 
regarding private gatherings (Tetreault 2000:61-62). 
 Clearly, as briefly outlined, modernity has a plurality (Englund and Leach 
2000:225-226) that is neither inherently facilitatory nor inhibiting for guestrooms; rather, 
the precept that “global modernity is often reproduced as local diversity” (Sahlins 
1993:2) suitably shows that what decimated the closest correlates of the diwaniyya, sites 
like the abovementioned madafas and diwans, is woefully inapplicable to the case of 
Kuwait.  Yet, the institutional durability of the diwaniyya and its continued vitality into 
the present-day is in no way an indication of it being a static, unaltered curiosity 
(Gluckman 1968:221-223) left over from the age of seafaring mercantilism.  Today, what 
were sanctuaries of exclusivity share the field with establishments that range from the 
                                                
196 Hanan.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 30, 2006. 
197 E. A.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 3, 2006. 
198 Reyadh.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on July 5, 2006. 
199 This sentiment is expressed in various ways.  One occasional host of a guestroom was dismissive of 
smaller establishments, claiming that:  “They do not represent the diwaniyya… They do not belong to the 
big families.  They are not real diwaniyya.  They are small, they do not have history” (Fahad A. N.  
Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on November 4, 2010).  Another man, an intermittent guest, 
was forthright with his and his uncle’s mocking dismissal of “middle class” diwaniyyat for what they 
deemed to be second-rate hospitality (Tahir A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 
24, 2007).  Comments like these almost echo Erving Goffman’s thoughts on the flows of status symbols 
between social groupings:  “As a result of the circulation symbols, however, a sign which is expressive for 
the class in which it originates comes to be employed by a different class – a class for which the symbol 
can signify status but ill express it” (1951:304). 
200 Ahmad A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 28, 2007. 
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humble to the palatial and exhibit gradations of parochialism and inclusiveness.201  Still, 
acknowledging that it is a very specific state of affairs and mannerisms202 that has 
permitted Kuwait’s diwaniyyat to flourish after the influx of oil monies does not explain 
why these parlors keep attracting visitors through their doors on a nightly basis.  The 
argument proffered by this research is that the Kuwaiti welfare system has provided 
another reason, either intended or inadvertent (Bill and Springborg 2000:14-18), for men 
to vigorously socialize and cultivate contacts:  a swollen, over-staffed, underperforming 
bureaucracy in which personal references are far more persuasive (Farah 1989:111) than 
formal tenets (Weber 1964:343) or notions of procedural impartiality (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008:170).  The premise here is that guestrooms within this rentier climate of 
rampant patronage can accommodate supplicants and benefactors by straddling the 
“culture / state nexus” (Steinmetz 1999:3) and collapsing the two into a coherent network 
of interpersonal exchanges (De Sardan 1999:41). 
 
Guestrooms for Bureaucrats 
 One of the more commonly held misconceptions about rentier nations is that 
when governments’ depend on external sources of revenue that do not tap into their 
citizenries’ personal budgets, a wedge is formed that serves to distance the populations 
from the workings of statecraft (Gray 2001:1-6).  The alleged result of this fiscal 
independence for the state is that it is freed from any expectations that it will be held 
accountable its public (Ross 2001:332-333).  Plainly put, the rentier government’s 
message to its citizenry is clear:  “Instead of ‘no taxation without representation,’ the 
                                                
201 Tahir A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
202 Ahmad A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 28, 2007. 
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rentier state says ‘no representation without taxation’” (Okruhlik 1999:296).  This is the 
lack of political responsiveness, which is nothing more than a poorly conceived 
derivative of economic autonomy, that is presumed to define all of the rentier state’s 
interactions with its respective social actors (Rosser 2006:20-21).  Fortunately, scholars 
are gradually beginning to move away from this reductionist stance (Gray 2011:10), with 
its reliance on “the size and nature of countries’ natural resource endowments” (Rosser 
2006:7), as a comprehensive breakdown of how states and societies are supposed to 
encounter each other in rentier economies.203  Part of this revisionism demands the 
inclusion of local specificities (Gray 2011:12) precisely like the Kuwaiti diwaniyya for its 
role as a “bridging institution” (Furger 2001:219) that is as much a piece of the country’s 
social fabric as it is an extension of the state, albeit informally with intermittent 
monitoring and policing by the regime to ensure that the guestrooms stay within their 
legal limits (Redman 2012:38-39).204 
 A substantial component of this dynamic, the proposition that Kuwait’s 
guestrooms are more firmly bound to the government’s maneuverings than they might 
casually appear, entails a careful evaluation of what the state’s presence in Kuwaiti 
society translates into for everyday practices (Gupta and Sharma 2006:278-279).  This is 
not to discount the already known occurrences of politicians using these parlors to reach 
their constituents during the election cycles for national or municipal offices (Stephenson 
                                                
203 Recent studies by Michael Herb (1999, 2002, 2009), Steffen Hertog (2005, 2007, 2010b, 2011), and 
Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) exemplify this new direction in rentier thought.  Also, Matthew Gray (2011) traces 
this transition from what he terms the “‘Classical’ Rentier State Theory” of the 1980s and 1990s to 
contemporary “Second Phase” and “Third Phase” adjustments to rentier theory. 




2011:188).205  Yet, these “service candidates” with their self-styled “service 
diwaniyyat”206 are the numerical exceptions to the many thousands of guestrooms that fill 
the country’s neighborhoods.  So, to refine how access to the state and its resources is 
arranged for an ordinary petitioner with a routine request, attention has to be devoted to 
the company held within the walls of the sundry, run-of-the-mill parlors.207  With these 
guestroom stipulations in mind and turning to the state, from a day-to-day perspective it 
is hardly an exaggeration to label the Kuwaiti governmental framework as pervasive.  A 
portion of its all-encompassing portfolio of benefits for citizens includes free educational 
opportunities, health services, public pensions, insurance, loan forgiveness, marriage 
funds, utility subsidies, housing awards, and periodic Emiri grants for discretional 
spending.  To this limited sample of individual privileges it can be added that 
infrastructural projects, a sovereign wealth fund, monetary transfers to civil institutions, 
private sector subsidization, and low or interest-free corporate loans (El-Katiri et al. 
2011:6-24) are further indicative of the state’s societal entrenchment via its “paternal 
largess” (Hertog 2011:3). 
 However, demonstrating the Kuwaiti government’s “embeddedness” (Granovetter 
1985:493) by way of its bestowments to the citizenry is only a partial picture of where 
state and society intersect.  A key claim of this analysis is that reifying the mere existence 
of welfare without due consideration for its channels of distribution is a simplistic and 
very myopic interpretation of the realities of allocative rentierism.  In actuality, the 
regime’s massive employment of its nationals in order to pay out additional rents (El-
                                                
205 It should be recalled that such formal politicking is itself is a complex of techniques that can involve 
anything from participatory politics to outright regime-backed patronage for some candidates (Tetreault 
2000:115).  
206 Tahir A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
207 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on February 25, 2007. 
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Katiri et al. 2011:19-20) and “use… bureaucratic employment as a patronage resource” 
(Hertog 2011:5) has placed much of the daily functioning of the state directly into the 
hands of its citizens.  While it is true that the dynastic Al Sabah family has systematically 
monopolized the highest ranks of government (Herb 1999:8, 30, 68-69), the tangible 
operation of the state and the processing, hindering, and hastening of the regime’s 
entitlements is left to the populous.  It is therefore reasonable in this synthesis of 
Kuwait’s rentier machinery that if the state’s entry into society is precipitated by virtue of 
its welfare practices (Horn 1988:403), and creating dependencies over time (Hertog 
2011:4-5), there is a counterbalance that has been fueled by society’s encroachment into 
the state that is a result of almost all employed Kuwaitis serving in some bureaucratic 
capacity (El-Katiri et al. 2011:19).  By this contention what is revealed is not a state 
“above and beyond the social world” (Pieke 2004:518) as an aggregate entity (Gupta 
1995:393)208 that mysteriously funnels rents to the populous.  The reality is a complicated 
state-society interchange in which capital is supplied entirely by the government (Salem 
2007:9-10) while its circulation is controlled and directed by an immense public 
bureaucracy. 
 The byproducts of this administrative model with its emphasis on wealth sharing 
and the “proliferation of sinecure or luxury employment” (Nagi 1982:190) for all citizens 
are multifaceted to say the least.  Seen from an organizational standpoint, this 
employment policy has led to a “flabby” (Hertog 2011:5), uncoordinated bureaucracy 
(Eifert et al. 2003) noted for its low levels of productivity, widespread inefficiencies (El-
Katiri et al. 2011:21), and regulatory redundancy (Hertog 2011:95).  Again, many of 
                                                
208 This approach is a hallmark of traditional rentier thinking that “work mostly with macro-aggregates such 
as ‘state,’ ‘society,’ or ‘business’” (Hertog 2011:3). 
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these bureaucratic ineptitudes are tied to the minimal qualifications needed to fill posts 
(Abdalla and Al-Homoud 2012:10) designed to satisfy the delivery of rents instead of 
meeting public necessities, which Michael Herb describes below: 
 The paychecks that Gulf citizens receive from jobs held in the public sector are 
 nominally tied to services rendered, but their pay might better be thought of as a 
 monthly disbursement from the national trust fund.  Politics and the price of oil in 
 world markets, rather than local labor markets, determine the size of stipends paid 
 to citizens.  The number of citizens hired by the government is driven not by 
 government need for employees but instead by the supply of citizens, with most 
 new entrants to the job market receiving a position.  [2009:382] 
 
When all of these public sector traits are combined with a standard of employment 
security that is unlinked to job performance (Abdalla and Al-Homoud 2012:5, 10), the 
delays and lags that accompany this leviathan bureaucracy have come to be an expected 
nuisance of doing business with the state.209 
 Nonetheless, the same features of the Kuwaiti bureaucracy that make it seem so 
cumbersome have endowed it with incredible latitude for flexibility.  Particularly, the 
unrealistic and often criticized (Jaffe 1973:1186-1187) Weberian conventions of 
rationalized civil service efficiency that isolates bureaucratic actions inside a “clearly 
defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules” (Weber 1964:343) are 
completely invalid for Kuwait.210  Once weak managerial oversight (Vandewalle 
1998:27) and ambiguous departmental goals are affixed to lax hiring protocols and 
administrative bloat (Al-Dekhayel 2000:90-91), the possibilities for the “individuation of 
action” (Hoag 2011:82) are left open hidden behind a thick veil of bureaucratic 
incoherence (Hoag 2010:7, 9-10).  Thus, weaving through this maze of tangled bureaus 
typically requires that petitioners “develop strategies to ingratiate themselves with [state] 
                                                
209 Faisal.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 3, 2007. 
210 Kuwait is not special in this regard and it is doubtful that Weber’s ideals about how a bureaucracy 
should function can be reflected in any country’s administrative frameworks. 
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workers” (Lipsky 2010:9), and in Kuwait the method of this ingratiation is by familial 
and social bonds.  Knowing someone, generating face-to-face or secondary “friends of 
friends” (Boissevain 1974:3) as contacts, otherwise known locally as wasta, can alone 
mean the difference between “excessive bureaucratic inflexibility, sluggishness, and 
bungling” (Werlin 1972:249) and ministerial satisfaction.211  To give an example of 
wasta’s applicability to a broad spectrum of affairs, Sa’eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha 
provide a good synopsis of its manifestations in Jordan that is equally suitable for 
Kuwait: 
 Wasta intervention permeates every decision point in life – entry into higher 
 education, obtaining a job or promotion, importation of goods, passports, and 
 licenses, disputes with other citizens, and accusations of law-breaking.  Each of 
 these domains is covered by formal rules, but Wasta involvement expands the 
 range of possibilities for outcomes of various Wasta situations.  [2002:32] 
 
For the most part, this should not be taken to imply that these are strict, asymmetrical 
patron-client relationships (Wolf 1966b:86-87) or even balanced exchanges with finite 
expectations for repayments (Sahlins 1981:195).212  Primarily, wasta bureaucratic favors 
in Kuwait are comprised of interpersonal obligations that are customary and habitual 
(Ledeneva 1998:4), executed to forge, reinforce, and maintain social alliances (Mauss 
1954:70-72).  Since the material costs are absorbed at the expense of the state (Ledeneva 
2000:190) and other supplicants (Kilani and Sakijha 2002:33), the central resource being 
sought is the access and information needed to circumvent the administrative red tape 
that extends all the way across the municipalities, the state offices, and the ministries 
(Hertog 2005:130). 
                                                
211 Khalid A. R.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 22, 2009. 
212 The exceptions to this mode of exchange are, of course, the “service deputies” who support the regime 
in return for constituent patronage (Herb 2002:43). 
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 This is the colossal administrative backdrop, joining bureaucratic authority in 
superfluous departments with the “self-interested invocations of the law by state 
functionaries” (Hoag 2010:7), that results in the public sector illegibility (Das 2007:172) 
that contextualizes the purpose of this study posed at the beginning of this chapter:  Why 
do Kuwaiti men visit the diwaniyyat?  The answer lies in the replies that Kuwaitis 
volunteered whenever the topic of the diwaniyyat was raised.  Invariably, these responses 
were centered on the guestrooms’ association with wasta connections and the politics of 
favoritism.213  Likewise, it was scarcely unusual for an intimate exchange about wasta to 
eventually lead to explanatory tales of guestroom collusions; either relating to firsthand, 
immediate involvements or anecdotal presumptions about the sources of someone else’s 
fortunes.214  Yet, these stories of patronage in men’s parlors are easily lost when they are 
detached from the transpositions of state and society that occur so regularly under the 
implicit provisions of Kuwait’s rentier contract.  It is for this reason that the pathways of 
power in Kuwait have to be clarified to give substance to all that guestroom wasta 
embodies and why it is so essential.  This means always including in the discussion such 
rentier characteristics as the unequal parceling of rents (Okruhlik 1999:299-300) and the 
personalization of official agencies (Field 1985:95-96).  In other words, because wasta is 
such a considerable facet of diwaniyya life, and local wasta and state institutions are 
almost always moored to each other (Hertog 2005:130), to ignore or understate the nature 
of Kuwaiti rentierism is to miss the key rationale that underpins the utility of the personal 
connections fostered in these guestrooms. 
                                                
213 Farah.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 27, 2006. 
214 Tahir.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 24, 2007. 
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 It would be cynical and mistaken, though, to categorically file the transactions 
that take place in the diwaniyyat as overt, rent-seeking behavior (Yates 1996:22).  More 
often than not, hosts and attendees are engaged in a fluctuating assortment of socializing 
agendas that mirror their predispositions for companionship – tribal, hadhari, political, 
social, professional, and familial interests.215  In spite of this, these parlors are still 
instrumental for accelerating the bureaucratic process or bypassing it altogether.  This is 
because wasta is the currency of these social relationships; it is the expectation of 
“helping out” and the mutual assistance that is given during times of need (Joseph 
1990:155); it is “not a relationship for the sake of exchange but an exchange for the sake 
of a relationship” (Ledeneva 2000:184).  To be clear, wasta is an advantageous 
association that is capable of yielding resources (Joseph 1990:144) but it is not the actual 
return itself (Portes 1998:5).  Activating bureaucratic wasta in Kuwait can be as much 
about fervently searching for needed contacts as utilizing the “moral and emotional 
content” (Joseph 1990:144) of extant relationships that, due to the nation’s high rate of 
public employment (El-Katiri et al. 2011:19), make it plausible that nearly everyone 
already knows a civil servant.216  In terms of guestroom rapport, irrespective of the 
primary motives that one might harbor for visiting, the fact that Kuwaiti men are getting 
together automatically increases the likelihood that administrative wasta is somewhere in 
the room.217 
                                                
215 Anonymous.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on June 27, 2006. 
216 This is just as true for actors in the private market provided the sector’s heavy subsidization by the 
government (El-Katiri et al. 2011:20-21) and the state’s unwieldy contractual requirements (Herb 
2009:386-387). 
217 Furthermore, it was found that wasta does not have to be restricted to those in attendance at a 
guestroom.  Several diwaniyyat hosts kept updated lists and computer rosters of visitors’ family members 
that included information about their jobs, spouses, and children, and these directories could be consulted 
for assistance or to reach out during life-cycle events.  On one occasion when a member was contemplating 
a political campaign, the host sent a servant to fetch the register so that they could search for anyone who 
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 What must be remembered is that Kuwait’s wasta trails can inevitably be traced 
back to state-sourced rewards (Hertog 2005:130) that are the calculable dividends of 
these relationships after these benefits have entered into the social capital of families, 
friendships, and acquaintances.  In this sense, the activities of the state and its workings 
have become incorporated into the social milieu of interpersonal attachments (Chung and 
Hamilton 2001:329-335) to give some semblance of predictability to an erratic 
administration and lend personal credentials to its “abstract rules” (Joseph 1990:144).  
For men, the diwaniyyat that are spread throughout Kuwait represent the sites where the 
tendencies for socialization and gaining privileged bureaucratic information are 
consolidated under the banner of congeniality.  This socializing mostly revolves around 
the economies of “good-faith” (Bourdieu 1990:114-115, 119) that come with closeness 
and trust, thereby devoid of explicit requisites for compensation (Wolf 1966a:10-13).  
However, social climbers and statesmen with a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1990:66) 
do appropriate this same cachet of guestroom hospitality for their own individual aims.218  
The clout of the parlors comes from concentrating these obligations of familiarity with 
the “honest graft” of bureaucratic insiders (Riordon 1905:3-10) along a blurred 
continuum of altruism and manipulation (De Sardan 1999:34-35)219 to fabricate the 




                                                                                                                                            
might carry votes, influence, or be interested in advising the prospective contender.  Observations recorded 
at Anonymous Diwaniyya on July 23, 2006. 
218 Youssef A. M.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 27, 2007. 
219 Ali A. K.  Interview conducted in Kuwait City, Kuwait on March 16, 2008. 
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Directions for Further Study:  Towards an Anthropology of  
Gulf Rentierism? 
 
 Any cursory review of the ethnographic literature on Kuwait will find that it is 
extraordinarily thin and sparse.220  While there are no compelling reasons as to why this 
is the case, it is disappointing considering the country’s meteoric rise from an 
impoverished coastal township to a resource-rich metropolis in the span of only a few 
years.  Certainly, there have been sporadic attempts in the decades since the country’s oil 
started flowing into world markets to rehabilitate this shortcoming. 221  Nevertheless, as 
helpful and insightful as these contributions are, 222 the bulk of this research has been 
conducted by political scientists, economists, historians, and area specialists, not 
anthropologists.  Although these studies fill a significant knowledge gap, many are 
limited in their ability to shed light on Kuwaiti social life owing to their focus on “macro-
outcomes” (Hertog 2010b:284) or their conflation of the “macro, meso and micro” 
(Hertog 2011:266).  The multitudes of divergences that occur between national 
institutions, societal groups, and individual actors remain largely unexplored. 
                                                
220 Qualifying this lack of anthropological research about Kuwait is most easily accomplished by the simple 
task of attempting to locate these materials.  Presently, any discipline-specific search on Kuwait will not 
yield many results.  To place this in perspective, a keyword search for “Kuwait” in the titles or abstracts of 
the 93 anthropological journals stored with the online database JSTOR returned only seven results dating 
back to 1950 (Recovered from http://www.jstor.org on September 14, 2012).  Using the exact same search 
parameters with another online resource, the American Anthropological Association’s AnthroSource, 
produced just two articles from its 32 available journals (Recovered from http://www.anthrosource.net on 
September 14, 2012).  Similarly, a search of paper titles with the term “Kuwait” at the American 
Anthropological Association’s 2008 and 2011 meetings located two presentations, while a title and abstract 
search of the 2008 and 2009 meeting programs found only the author’s paper (Recovered from 
http://www.aaanet.org/meetings/program/ on September 14, 2012).  Ruud Strijp’s two volume 
bibliographic set on Middle East cultural anthropology finds 26 articles and three monographs about 
Kuwait published between 1965 and 1992 (1992:252, 392, 428; 1997:24, 135).  Although this does not 
account for anthropological work that is transmitted through other academic channels, like regionally-
focused publications and conferences, it does denote a conspicuous shortfall within the general 
anthropological media. 
221 To get an idea about Kuwait before it was transformed by oil revenues there are the eyewitness accounts 
by British Political Agent H. R. P. Dickson (1949, 1956) and Alan Villiers (1948, 1969, 2006), as well as 
the historical primary documents analyzed by B. J. Slot et al. (1991, 2003). 
222 Some of these works include those by Anh Nga Longva (1997, 2006), Attiya Ahmad (2012), Peter 
Lienhardt (1993), and Sulayman Khalaf (1992, 2008). 
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 Some portion of the responsibility for these omissions must be put on the 
assumptions that are presumed to be a part of rentier theory itself.  At the heart of this 
quandary is the stress that rentier thought places upon the macro effects that externally-
derived rents (Okruhlik 1999:295) are expected to produce for economic and political 
systems (Krause 2009:4).  The problem is not that the rents obtained from nonproductive 
economic activities cannot be found to have consequences – it is self-evident that they 
do.  Instead, rentier theory has placed far too much emphasis on the economy as the 
driver of oil states (Okruhlik 1999:296) and the societies within them (Gray 2011:17).  
This is what may be called rentierism’s “structural / statist” (Moore 2002:36) approach 
that is loaded with serious drawbacks when it comes to grasping the nuances of rentier 
societies.  Take, for instance, one of rentierism’s more dubious notions:  that state and 
society are effectively segregated when the government is economically self-sufficient.  
When this prospect has warranted a reexamination, it is often within the purview of 
formal institutional politics like Kuwait’s National Assembly (Gray 2011:6, 11) with 
scant regard given to the “everydayness” of the state’s welfare structures for its residents.  
Or, there is the related viewpoint that, “The role of the distributive system is not to adjust 
an existing distribution of income but, rather, to ensure that all Kuwaitis gain from oil 
rents” (El-Katiri et al. 2011:27).  The concern here is that this broad perspective tells very 
little about how the state’s petroleum monies are sent back to the populous aside from the 
state’s regulatory initiatives that, as documented here, are by no means guarantees for 
fulfillment or even suggestive of equitable disbursement (Okruhlik 1999:299-300). 
 The main issue is a twofold dilemma.  On the one hand, rentierism was expanded 
beyond its capabilities for scrutinizing the “effects of oil rent and remittances on the 
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relative strength of the state and the private sector” (Chaudhry 1989:111) to become used 
as an economic predictor of how socialization and societal habits transpire in rentier 
nations.  Illustrative of these inclinations are the tired, exhausted themes that posit the 
existence of a distinct mindset for populations of rentier states, a “rentier mentality” that 
discourages personal ingenuity (Yates 1996:22) and encourages a blind dependency on 
the government.  This rendering of rentierism relies heavily on the belief that in these 
countries, “Reward – income or wealth – is not related to work and risk bearing” 
(Beblawi 1990:88).  Hence, rentier citizenries are basically “bought off” (Gray 2011:6), 
depoliticized and made acquiescent by regime spending strategies (Ross 2001:332-335, 
347-349), to become the pacified recipients of government rents or mechanical rent-
seeking “vampires dependent on state expenditure” (Yates 1996:35).  The intellectual 
inadequacies of such speculative reasoning (Hertog 2010b:283-284), not to mention the 
detachment from empirical evidence, are now rightfully undergoing a reevaluation 
(Okruhlik 1999:295-297). 
 The second part of rentier theory’s predicament, if it is to advance as a viable 
discourse about rent-receiving countries and their internal dealings, is how it will report 
the impact that rents have on society and do so without repeating its earlier drawbacks.  
This requires abandoning simplified models weighted towards economic factors and 
official institutional rhetoric and integrating “more specific, and changing, social and 
cultural contexts” (Gray 2011:17).  Then, it might be possible to get a more accurate 
indication of the ways that rentier states, and the provisos of citizenship, are actually 
experienced by those who live within their borders.  To overcome this conundrum, local 
finesse will have to be included in rentier state theory and backed with a solid 
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ethnographic framework.  
 The possibilities for this socially-attentive agenda for rentier research seemed 
promising as recently as the late 1990s when Gwenn Okruhlik identified the fundamental 
avenues for grassroots rentierism in Saudi Arabia.  She wrote that, “The prosperity of 
private citizens is dependent upon the acquisition of government wealth, with access to 
contracts, information, jobs in the public sector or infrastructure governed by family 
relations, friendship, religious branch, and regional affiliation” (1999:297).  Regrettably, 
Okruhlik’s awareness about the human investments and social corridors through which a 
rentier state’s mission is realized has not been followed-up by further investigations 
(Rosser 2006:21) except for Steffen Hertog’s inquiries into the “political sociology of 
rent circulation” (2010b:282).  Hertog lays out the parameters of his methodologies and 
topical directions for tracking Saudi Arabia’s rents in a fashion that is evocative of what 
an ethnography of rentierism might look like: 
 To tease out the channels through which oil income has influenced Saudi 
 politics, I chose a strategy that required more than a year of field research… 
 tracing the sociology of rent distribution in the kingdom.  If income matters, how 
 so?  What exactly is done with it?  What do people do when they build a rentier 
 state and negotiate policies within it?  Who gets access to state resources and 
 how?  What kinds of power relations are established in the process?  To tackle 
 these issues, I had to look at concrete social networks within and around the Saudi 
 state.  [2011:2-3] 
 
Hertog admittedly waded into “virgin territory” (2010b:284) with his query and in the 
course of it he shows that the relevant social deficiencies that plague rentier thought 
demand fewer deterministic deductions (Rosser 2006:21-22) and more on-site analysis.  
Moreover, he pushes past the known brand of the rentier “state… as the prime mover of 
the economy” (El-Katiri et al. 2011:5) and merges into what these rents really signify 
beneath the “state-idea” (Abrams 1988:82). 
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 By tracing the money and the litany of brokers, gatekeepers, and intermediaries 
who watch over how rents are dispersed and consumed (Hertog 2007:545-548) the 
localized footprints of a rentier state can no longer be hidden under the heading of “the 
state.”  It is only by peeling back these layers of officialdom that an uncharted glimpse 
emerges into how the cogs of a welfare government operate and, notably, where the 
“official purposes of public office are challenged by strongly supported counter-
conceptions” (Leys 1965:225).  Still, pinpointing and exploring this junction should not 
be the finale for rentier theory; instead, it can serve as the preface for discerning the 
socio-cultural dimensions of the “officially illicit favour” (De Sardan 1999:41) for 
personifying the state’s abstruseness (Joseph 1990:144).  In the Gulf, where these are 
newly minted states (Fox et al. 2006:13) that were hurriedly put together (Hertog 
2007:541-545), “the logics of the familiar” (Sahlins 1999:xvi) are credible 
counterbalances (De Certeau 1980:4-5) to the administrative monoliths.  This is not to 
propose that, “the social structure in the Gulf seems to be, perhaps, the most impervious 
to change, vis-à-vis economics and ideas” (Fox et al. 2006:13) or that some stagnant sort 
of relational primordialism is dictating such personalized encounters with the state.  
Rather, it asks where have the politics of interrelational reciprocity (De Certeau 1980:5) 
been altered, extended, and regressed in conjunction with the rubrics of rentier 
governmentality (Gupta and Sharma 2006:277-278) and in what ways has rentierism 
refined the criteria for forming affiliations?  Plus, how have these states and their 
variations on rentier ideas and systems (Abrams 1988:82) been shaped and reconstituted 
(Wittrock 2000:44-45) by the social practices over which they preside (Mitchell 1999:77-
78) and partake? 
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  Answering these questions will not suddenly resolve all of rentier theory’s errors 
but it will make it more robust by giving it precision that goes “beyond generalizations 
about patronage and the ‘buying off’ of social groups” (Hertog 2010b:314) to reveal how 
rents have been assimilated into, and molded by, local cultures.  Also, there is still the 
persistent neglect of globalization’s contemporary effects (Gray 2011:19-20)223 at the 
social or transnational level for the citizenry populations in the Gulf’s rentier states (Al-
Rasheed 2005:2-6).224  For Kuwait, where the citizens enjoy the latest communication 
devices (Mellor et al. 2011:22-23), Deborah Wheeler is correct to ponder whether “some 
power to shape national sentiments can be lost by the state” (2000:444) without elevating 
telecommunications into becoming a politically causal agent (2006:22-23).  What 
remains to be seen is if these global processes, not as technologies but as 
interconnectivities, are capable of straining the social pacts that have underwritten the 
nimble arts of governing in the Gulf (Al-Rasheed 2005:10-11).  However, this has to be 
approached with the same careful attention needed to realign present conjectures about 
rentierism’s comprehensive, engulfing propositions (Gray 2011:10-12) with the realities 
of active societal spheres filled with transacting individuals and groups (Hertog 
2007:545-547).  It is in this vein that the Gulf’s globalized modernity and its rentier 
lineages (Chaudhry 1994:1-2) must be grappled with, “without unduly imposing a rigid 
and misleading institutional gridlock on an unwieldy and complex historical reality” 
(Wittrock 2000:50). 
                                                
223 The usage of contemporary globalization for the Gulf is to distinguish it from its earlier seafaring and 
long-distance trading incarnations (Khalaf 2006:247). 
224 The globalized immigrant labor force in the Gulf has received much more attention (Al-Rasheed 
2005:2-3).  For some examples in Kuwait, see Longva (1997), Russell (1989), or Shah (1986, 1995, 2000).  
A brief sample for the Gulf in general might include Gardner (2010), the volume edited by Kamrava and 
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